PTD 1966

1966 PLP 502 (PTD)

MANNILAL SAGARMAL Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, U. P.

Jurisdiction / Court
Allahabad (India)
Decided Date
This is a reference application under section 66 (1) of the Income‑tax Act which arises out of the order of the Tribunal passed in registration appeal I. T. A. No. 79 of 1947‑48 decided on 23rd December 1948. In our opinion, questions of law do arise out of the Tribunal's order. We accordingly draw up the following statement of the case.
Honorable Judges
Bhargava and Upadhya, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1966 PLP 502 (PTD)
Forum / Court Allahabad (India)
Bench Members Bhargava and Upadhya, JJ
Parties MANNILAL SAGARMAL Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, U. P.
Primary Law STATEMENT OF CASE
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1966 PLP 502 (PTD)?

This judgment primarily cites: STATEMENT OF CASE as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1966 PLP 502 (PTD)?

The case was heard and decided by the Allahabad (India) bench comprising: Bhargava and Upadhya, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1966 PLP 502 (PTD) (MANNILAL SAGARMAL Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, U. P.). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

STATEMENT OF CASE

Representation

  • The Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal in their order added that they did not see any reason to interfere with the power of the Income‑tax Officer in refusing to register the firm after taking into consideration all the facts of the case. The statement of the case would indicate that neither the Income‑tax Officer nor the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal gave any reasons arising out of the circumstances of the case which could justify refusal to register the firm. Learned counsel for the Department read out to us a portion of the order passed by the Income‑tax Officer under section 26‑A of the Indian Income‑tax Act refusing to register the firm but the facts given in that part of the order of the Income‑tax Officer have not been made a part of the statement of the case and even the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal in their order have not expressed any opinion indicating that they agreed with those reasons given by the Income‑tax Officer and that, consequently, they held the exercise of his discretion to be proper. In fact, the Tribunal do not appear to have gone into the question of the proper or improper exercise of the discretion by the Income‑tax Officer in refusing to register the firm because of their view that no application had been made under section 27 to challenge the best judgment assessment and, consequently, it could ‑be presumed that the assessee had no reasonable cause for not complying with the notice under section 22 (4). We have indicated in our answer to the first question that the Tribunal should re‑examine the point whether the Income‑tax Officer was at all justified in proceeding under section 23 (4) of the Indian Income‑tax Act so as to refuse registration of the firm. In doing so, the Tribunal would naturally have to examine not only the question whether the assessee had or had not shown reasonable cause for non‑compliance with the notice under section 22 (4) but would also have to examine whether the Income‑tax Officer had exercised his discretion properly or improperly. In view of this circumstance, we do not think that any opinion should be expressed by this Court on the second question at this stage.

Headnotes / Summary

Indian Incometax Act (XI of 1922), Ss. 23(4), 26‑A, 27 & 30 (1)‑Best judgment assessment and consequent refusal to register firm‑No application made for cancelling assessment Appeal against order refusing to register firm‑‑Duty of appellate authority. There is no provision in the Incometax Act which gives an assessee a right to make an application asking for cancellation of an order refusing to register a firm made under section 23 (4) of the Act; the only remedy provided is an appeal under section 30 (1). Where the Incometax Officer makes a best judgment assessment under section 23(4) and consequently refuses an application for the registration of a firm, if the assessee is satisfied with the best judgment assessment under section 23 (4) he need not make any application under section 27, but if he is dissatisfied with the order refusing to register the firm he can appeal against that order of the Incometax Officer challenging it on any ground whatsoever including grounds on which he could have asked for cancellation of the assessment under section

27. The mere fact that he did not make an application under section 27 for the cancellation of the best judgment assessment cannot stand in the way of his challenging the order refusing to register the firm on the same grounds. When an appeal is filed against the order passed under section 23(4) refusing to register a firm, the appellate authorities should examine on its merits the finding of the Income- tax Officer that the assessee had committed the defaults mentioned in section 23(4), ignoring the fact that no application was made under section 27 for cancellation of the best judgment assessment.

2. In the course of the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1943‑44, a notice under section 22 (4) of the Incometax Act was issued requiring the assessee to produce certain accounts and documents on 25th of June 1945. As, in the opinion of the Incometax Officer, the required documents were deliberately suppressed and the notice was not complied with he completed the assessment of the applicant under section 23 (4) of the Incometax Act in the status of an unregistered firm, refused to register the firm under the provisions of section 26‑A of the Incometax Act and rejected the application for registra tion which was based on an instrument of partnership executed on the 2nd of March 1942, with the following observations "The notice has not been complied with and the assessment falls under section 23 (4). The registration is refused and the application in I: T. I dated the 17th March 1944, stands rejected." The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the above rejection on the ground that no application was made under section 27 of the Incometax ‑Act to the incometax Officer for cancellation of the assessment made under section 23 (4) of the Incometax Act and, therefore, it could be presumed that the applicant had no reasonable cause for the non‑compliance with the notice under section 22 (4) of the Incometax Act.

3. On appeal to the Tribunal from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it was, argued by the counsel for the applicant that the Incometax Officer had acted wrongly in refusing the registration of the firm as the assessee had placed all the relevant facts about the income of the firm during the previous year before him and had proved from the account books the actual division of the profits between the partners and as the claim was backed by an instrument of the partnership there was no justification to refuse registration on the technical ground that the assessment having been made under the provisions of section 23 (4) of the Incometax Act, the registration could not be allowed. The Tribunal rejected the above contention with the following, finding. "Though the assessment was made under section 23 (4), no application under section 27 was made to the Incometax Officer for cancellation of the assessment presumably because the assessee had realised that he had no reasonable cause for not complying with the notice under section 22 (4). Under the provisions of section 23 (4) the Incometax Officer has power to refuse to register a firm and we do not see any reason to interfere with' his power in this respect after taking into consideration all the facts of the case." The order of the Tribunal is attached as Appendix `A' and forms part of the case.

4. It is on the above facts that the following questions of law arise: "Whether in the circumstances of the case, as stated above, the Tribunal could in law refuse to interfere with the discretion of the Incometax Officer exercised in refusing to register the firm under section 26‑A of the Incometax Act?" "

2. Whether in the circumstances of the case, as stated above, the refusal of registration under section 26‑A of the Incometax Act was legally permissible?"

5. The applicants asked us to refer three questions of law alleged to arise out of the afore mentioned order of the Tribunal. The respondent has rightly contended that only two questions of law arise out of the order of the Tribunal. The first part of question No. 2 sought to be referred by the applicant is, in our opinion, not fit for reference in view of the findings of fact of the Tribunal and the second point is covered by the question framed by us.

6. Parties were supplied copies of the draft statement of the case. The respondent, Commissioner of Incometax, U. P., has accepted the statement of case with the suggestion that the words "as stated above" may be inserted after the words "in the circumstances of the case" which we have done. The applicant has in spite of two extensions not cared to send any sugges tions or objections to the statement. In the circumstances, the statement as it stands now will be submitted to the High Court. R. S. Pathak for the Assessee. J. Sarup for the Commissioner.

Judgment & Decree

The order of the Tribunal is attached as Appendix `A' and forms part of the case.

4. It is on the above facts that the following questions of law arise: "Whether in the circumstances of the case, as stated above, the Tribunal could in law refuse to interfere with the discretion of the Incometax Officer exercised in refusing to register the firm under section 26‑A of the Incometax Act?" "

2. Whether in the circumstances of the case, as stated above, the refusal of registration under section 26‑A of the Incometax Act was legally permissible?"

5. The applicants asked us to refer three questions of law alleged to arise out of the afore mentioned order of the Tribunal. The respondent has rightly contended that only two questions of law arise out of the order of the Tribunal. The first part of question No. 2 sought to be referred by the applicant is, in our opinion, not fit for reference in view of the findings of fact of the Tribunal and the second point is covered by the question framed by us.

6. Parties were supplied copies of the draft statement of the case. The respondent, Commissioner of Incometax, U. P., has accepted the statement of case with the suggestion that the words "as stated above" may be inserted after the words "in the circumstances of the case" which we have done. The applicant has in spite of two extensions not cared to send any sugges tions or objections to the statement. In the circumstances, the statement as it stands now will be submitted to the High Court. R. S. Pathak for the Assessee. J. Sarup for the Commissioner. The assessee, Mannilal Sagarmal, during the course of the assessment for the year 1943‑44, made an application for registra tion of the firm under section 26‑A of the Indian Incometax Act. The Incometax Officer issued a notice under section 22 (4) of the Act requiring the assessee to produce certain accounts and documents on the date fixed. The accounts and documents were not produced and. on the facts before him, the Incometax Officer held that they had been deliberately suppressed. Thereupon, the Incometax Officer held that the notice had not been complied with and the assessee was liable to assessment under section 23 (4) of the Act. Consequently, he refused registration and rejected the application under section 26‑A of the Act. The assessee appealed against this order but the. Appellate Assistant Commis sioner of Incometax dismissed the appeal holding that no application had been made under section 27 of the Act to the Incometax Officer for cancellation of the assessment and, therefore, it would be presumed that the assessee had no reasonable cause for non‑compliance with the notice under section 22 (4) of the Indian Incometax Act. The assessee went up in appeal before the Incometax Appellate Tribunal. This appeal was also dismissed on the view that, though the assessment had been made under section 23 (4) of the Act, no application under section 27 had been made to the Incometax Officer for cancellation, of the assessment, presumably because the assessee had realised that he had no reasonable cause for not complying with the notice under section 22 (4) of the Act. The Tribunal further proceeded to hold that under section 23 (4) the Incometax Officer had power to refuse to register a firm and they did not see any reason to interfere with the discretion of the Incometax Officer in this respect after taking into consideration all the facts of this case. In these circumstances, the assessee moved the Tribunal under section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act and the Tribunal has referred the following two questions for our opinion "(1) Whether, in the circumstances of the case as stated above, the Tribunal could in law refuse to interfere with the discretion of the Incometax Officer exercised in refusing to register the firm under section 26‑A of the Incometax Act ?" "(2) Whether, in the circumstances of the case as stated above, the refusal of registration under section 26A of the Incometax Act was legally permissible ?" The facts disclosed by the statement of the case mentioned above show that both the Incometax Appellate Tribunal and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Incometax, in deciding the appeal of the, assessee against the refusal of the Incometax Officer to register the firm, relied mainly on the circumstance that the assessee had made no application under section 27 of the Indian Incometax Act for cancellation of the assessment. In proceeding in this manner, they failed to notice the distinction that the Incometax Act provides for between an appeal against a best judgment assessment made under section 23 (4) and an appeal against refusal to register under section 23 (4). In the case of a best judgment assessment under section 23 (4), provision has been made under section 27 for an application for cancellation of the assessment on certain grounds including the ground that the assessee had been prevented by sufficient cause from making the return required by section 22, or from complying with the requirements of a notice issued under section 22 (4) of the Act. An order rejecting such an application is separately appeal-able and, consequently, it has been held that, if ad assessee does not take such objections by an application under section 27 as are open to him under that provision of law, he cannot challenge the assessment itself on the same grounds when he files an appeal against the quantum of assessment made under section 23 (4). On the other hand, there is no provision in the Act by which the assessee is given a right to make an application asking for cancellation of the order refusing to register the firm on any ground whatsoever. In the case of an order refusing to register a firm passed under section 23 (4), the only remedy provided is an appeal under section 30 (1). Consequently, if an assessee happens to be satisfied with the best judgment assessment made under section 23 (4), he is not required to make any application under section 27, but there may be a case where he may be dissatisfied with the order refusing to register the firm and, in that case, he can challenge the order of the Incometax officer by an appeal against the refusal to register the firm. In that appeal, he can 'challenge the order on any ground whatsoever including grounds on which he could have asked cancellation of the assessment under section

27. The mere fact that he did not file an application under section 27 asking for cancellation of the assessment cannot stand in the way of his challenging the order of refusal to register the firm on the same grounds. Consequently when an appeal is filed against an order passed under section 23 (4) refusing to register a firm and the assessee comes up in appeal, the appellate authorities have to examine the finding given by the Incometax Officer that the assessee had committed one of the defaults mentioned in section 23 (4) irrespective of the fact whether any application under section 27 had or had not been made for cancellation of the assessment. No ,presumption could be taken against the assessee from the circumstance that he had made no application under section 27 for the cancellation of the assessment as he may have failed to make that application for reasons other than that he had no reasonable explanation for his default. In the particular case before us, our attention has been directed to the fact that the best judgment assessment under section 23 (4) was actually challenged by the assessee, on the ground that he had not failed to comply with the notice issued under section 22 (4), by an appeal against the assessment order instead of by an application under section

27. It is true that he was wrongly advised in seeking his remedy by an appeal on such a ground against the assessment instead of moving the Incometax Officer under section

27. The facts, however, show that the assessee did want to satisfy the Incometax authorities that he had sufficient cause for not complying with the notice under section 22 (4) and the presumption which was made by both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Incometax and the Incometax Appellate Tribunal that the assessee had realised that he had no reasonable cause for not complying with the notice, cannot possibly arise in these circumstances. It appears that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Incometax and the Incometax Appellate Tribunal were unduly obsessed by the fact that the assessee had made no application under section 27 for the cancellation of the assessment. That circumstance should have been ignored and in the appeals against refusal to register the firm they should have independently gone into the question which had been raised by the assessee, viz., that he had sufficient cause for not complying with the notice given by the Incometax Officer. In failing to do so, the Incometax Appellate Tribunal clearly committed an error and their decision based on this view is incorrect in law. Our answer to the first question, therefore, is that the Incometax Appellate Tribunal were not justified in refusing to‑ interfere with the order of the Incometax Officer refusing to register the firm under section 26‑A of the Indian Incometax Act on the ground on which they based their order and the Incometax Appellate Tribunal should have gone into the question on merits and dealt with the grounds taken before them by the assessee to challenge the order of the Incometax Officer. The Incometax Appellate Tribunal in their order added that they did not see any reason to interfere with the power of the Incometax Officer in refusing to register the firm after taking into consideration all the facts of the case. The statement of the case would indicate that neither the Incometax Officer nor the Incometax Appellate Tribunal gave any reasons arising out of the circumstances of the case which could justify refusal to register the firm. Learned counsel for the Department read out to us a portion of the order passed by the Incometax Officer under section 26‑A of the Indian Incometax Act refusing to register the firm but the facts given in that part of the order of the Incometax Officer have not been made a part of the statement of the case and even the Incometax Appellate Tribunal in their order have not expressed any opinion indicating that they agreed with those reasons given by the Incometax Officer and that, consequently, they held the exercise of his discretion to be proper. In fact, the Tribunal do not appear to have gone into the question of the proper or improper exercise of the discretion by the Incometax Officer in refusing to register the firm because of their view that no application had been made under section 27 to challenge the best judgment assessment and, consequently, it could ‑be presumed that the assessee had no reasonable cause for not complying with the notice under section 22 (4). We have indicated in our answer to the first question that the Tribunal should re‑examine the point whether the Incometax Officer was at all justified in proceeding under section 23 (4) of the Indian Incometax Act so as to refuse registration of the firm. In doing so, the Tribunal would naturally have to examine not only the question whether the assessee had or had not shown reasonable cause for non‑compliance with the notice under section 22 (4) but would also have to examine whether the Incometax Officer had exercised his discretion properly or improperly. In view of this circumstance, we do not think that any opinion should be expressed by this Court on the second question at this stage. Let the reference .be returned to the Incometax Appellate Tribunal with these observations. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference from the Department which we fix at Rs.

200. Reference answered accordingly.