1998CLC968 (PLP)

WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑‑‑Through this petition the petitioner has questioned the manner and mode of the textile quota allocations currently in vogue. The petitioner claims that it is an exporter of men and boys' trousers, slacks and shorts to the U.S.A. Referring to S.R.O. No.166(1)/92, dated 7‑3‑1992 the petitioner maintains that the petitioner has a vested right in the continuation of the quota allocation Policy/Rules and Procedure, envisaged therein. Allocation of export authorisations to performance holders under such S.R.O. was to be in the ratio of 50:50 for quantity and value. The Rules and Procedure enunciated in the S.R.O. were designed "for implementation of bilateral textile agreements from 1st January, 1992 to 31st December, 1996." It is the case of the petitioner that during the period postulated such could not be altered to the petitioner's detriment. However, the very rules and regulations in the S.R.O. contemplated that the Federal Government shall have "the authority to review the policy of textile and clothing export authorisations and make suitable changes therein as may be necessary." The Federal Government also reserved the right and power to issue its own interpretation, clarification or amplification of the rules, as and when found necessary. As it transpired, another S.R.O. viz. 228(1)/94, in exercise of the same powers under subsection (1) of section 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1950, was issued by the Federal Government, whereby the aforesaid S.R.O. was superseded on 8‑3‑1994 and an altered procedure was provided, again operative up to 31 st December, 1996. For our purposes, the only alteration was that in the year 1994 quota entitlements were to be determined either in accordance with the relevant provisions in S.R.O. No.166(1)/92 "or on the basis of quantity exported by the performance holders in 1993, if the Associations concerned with a category so opt". It would appear that the respondent No.2, Pakistan Readymade Garments Manufactures and Exporters Association, of which the petitioner is a member, called a General Body Meeting for 26‑4‑1994 to exercise such option through a notice issued to its members on 16‑4‑1994. The petitioner maintains that such was not the requisite 10 days' clear notice under the Articles of Association. It is, however, admitted that the petitioner received the notice on 23‑4‑1994 and duly attended to deliberations of the meeting on 26‑4‑1994, when the association decided to opt for seeking allocations to its members on the basis of quantity exported by the performance holders in 1993. According to the petitioner, the decision in the meeting was illegal and the petitioner has suffered in consequence. This petition was brought on 26‑5‑1994 seeking redress. It is no doubt correct that quota rights are valuable rights. What, however, is to be seen is whether the petitioner has suffered any injury and further whether the injury has been inflicted unlawfully. In the first place, the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the respondent No.2, of which the petitioner is a member, merely provide that ten days' notice would only "ordinarily" be given for a general meeting and besides a shorter notice would suffice, if opinion be that convening of the meeting involves an element of urgency. Besides, non‑receipt of the notice is stipulated not to invalidate the proceedings of any general meeting (Article 22). It would, thus, appear that the matter being urgent a shorter notice may not have been out of place. What is more, the petitioner did get the notice and did participate in the general body meeting. No cavil, therefore, on that score should 'be in order. Coming to the larger controversy, it is to be noted that matters of the kind involved in. these proceedings, are best resolved on a collective basis and individuals must bow to collective wisdom and collective aspirations. For this reason, the Federal Government seems to have correctly dealt with the respondent No.2 and that respondent (of which undeniably the petitioner is a member) exercised the option given to it, the option being none other than either to insist on the modalities of the scheme of 7‑3‑1992 or to opt for the rule of quantity exported by the performance holders, contemplated in the new version notified on 8‑3‑1994. The petitioner, therefore, cannot legitimately question the collective will of its compatriots. It must be emphasised here that these are no trifling matters. The Federal Government on the basis of such‑like schemes has to fulfil its international commitments, in this case with the Government of the United States of America and individual grievances, even if subsisting, must make way to the larger good. Even otherwise, it has not been shown to us that the petitioner has suffered on account of the change introduced. We repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the petitioner as to how the alteration has adversely operated against the petitioner. The yardstick for that could be none other than whether or not the petitioner has earned the same or greater amount of foreign exchange on its exports, subsequent to the new policy. Apparently, the petitioner may have earned more because that is what we have inferred from the argument. Indeed, the current scheme appears to be all round more beneficial and caters to expertise, quality and merit. It is easy to conclude this. Assuming restrictions as to quantity, for restrictions under the current controversial state of International trade cannot be excluded, it is obvious that those who export better quality of goods are likely to earn more from the same quantity than those who were to export, inferior goods necessarily entailing lesser returns. All said and done, the petitioner does not seem to have suffered and does not merit relief. Several cases, however have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. They are Rehmatullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner PLD 1963 SC 633, Shaikh Fazal Ahmed v. Raja Ziaullah Khan PLD 1964 SC 494, Mardan Industries Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1965 Pesh. 47, Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs v. Azizuddin Industries PLD 1970 SC 439, Muhammad Nawaz v. Government of Punjab 1981 SCMR 523, Abdul Jalil Khan v. Addl. I.‑G. Police 1983 PLC (C.S.) 1042, Muhammad Nawaz v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1420 and Army Welfare Sugar Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1652. While we must express our appreciation for the hard work and tenacious pursuit of his case on the part of Mr. Haroon Ishaque Jangda, we regret that none of these precedents, in the circumstances of the case, is helpful to the petitioner. These cases, speaking broadly, lay down that a notification cannot arbitrarily curtail any vested rights nor can it operate retroactively and besides the principles of Animus Revertendi and Locus Poenitentiae preclude the recall of earlier dispensations or re‑tracing of the steps after a decisive step has been taken. None of these. principles applies here because no vested right is shown to have been taken away to the prejudice of the petitioner nor the petitioner can ventilate an individual grievance of an uncertain character against the larger body of persons of which the petitioner is only one. For the foregoing reasons, through a short order passed on 16‑12‑1996, we had dismissed this petition. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. A.A./R‑46/K Petition dismissed