P L D 1964 (W (PLP)

SHAKIRULLAH JAN, J.‑This is in continuation of Bashir‑ud‑Din Ahmad, J.'s order dated the 8th of November 1963. He found that although the respondent, who was charged for committing offences under sections 409, 471 and 468, P. P. C. read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947 (Special Case No. 14 of 1960) and offences punishable under sections 409 and 471, P. P. C. read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947 (Special Case No. 15 of 1960), was no more in service when the sanction for his prosecution was accorded in both these cases by the Superintendent Post Offices, Gujrat Division, who was the competent authority, the order of the Senior Special Judge, dated the 19th of December 1960, acquitting the respondent was erroneous in view of the authority reported as All Ahmad alias Mia v. The Sate (P L D 1962 S C 102). He was further of the opinion that the respondent, who had figured as an accused and was acquitted in both the cases against him, could be described as a `successful litigant' who had secured a valuable right and, therefore, a re‑trial should not be ordered where the Central Government did not file an appeal and the Provincial Government had invoked the revisional jurisdiction after more than a year of the order of acquittal. He referred the matter to a larger Bench for deciding this matter.

2. We have heard the learned Additional Advocate‑General, Mr. Ata Ullah Sajjad, and learned counsel for the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent frankly conceded that in view of the Supreme Court judgment reported as Ali Ahmad alias Mia v. The State, relied upon by the learned Single Judge in Chambers, the acquittal of the respondent by the learned Special Judge on the ground that the accused‑respondent was no longer in service when sanction for his prosecution was given was erroneous and this finding of the learned Special Judge cannot be maintained. In view of the frank admission made by learned counsel for the respondent and the authority cited above we hold that the learned Special Judge was wrong in acquitting the accused‑respondent on the ground that sanction for his prosecution was given when he was no longer in service.

3. It was urged that the respondent was acquitted on the 19th of December 1960 and the revision petitions were filed by the Provincial Government on the 1st of February 1962 and so a valuable right had accrued to him on the expiry of the period of limitation. The learned Single Judge has, however, observed that in the case under consideration the respondent, who figured as an accused and secured an acquittal in two cases against him, can certainly be described as a `successful litigant' who has secured a 'valuable right' by the lapse of time. We do not find ourselves in agreement with the learned Judge in Chambers that the respondent can be described as a `successful litigant: In Surta Singh and others v. The Crown (I L R 1 Lah. 508) while discussing the words `successful litigants' it was observed: "Now in the present case, where the appeal is a criminal one there is no `successful litigant' who has secured any 'valuable right.' It cannot be said that the Crown has secured any valu able right by reason of the appeal not having been filed within the prescribed period. Government has nothing to gain by the appeal being dismissed as time‑barred. All that the Government is, or should be, anxious for is that justice should be done." The term `successful litigant' has been described in Karsondas v. Bai Gungabai (I L R 30 Dom. 329,) where it was held that "when the time for appeal is once passed a very valuable right is secured to the successful litigant, and the Court must therefore be fully satisfied of the justice of the grounds on which it is sought to obtain an exten sion of the time for attacking the decree, and thus perhaps depriving the successful litigant of the advantage which he has obtained". The observations of the learned Judges in the cases cited above bring out clearly the essential difference between civil and criminal proceedings.

4. The learned Additional Advocate‑General contended that there is no rule of practice that revisions which are filed after the period of limitation must be rejected simply on the ground of delay and laches. In support of his contention he relied upon Des Raj v. The Emperor (A I R 1934 Lah. 264) where it was held‑ "So far as the Lahore High Court is concerned, there is no rule of practice that criminal revisions, which are filed after the expiry of the period of 60 or 90 days, must be rejected simply on the ground of delay and lathes. The discretion of the Judge is unfettered. He may take into consideration the factor of delay in disposing of the application but that factor cannot be treated as the sole determining element and the case will have to be decided on its general merits." Although, however, there is no period fixed for filing a revision against an order of acquittal, the interests of justice demand that it should be filed within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time will of course depend on the circumstances of each case, it being impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule on this point. In the present case the respondent was acquitted on the 19th of December 1960 and the revisions were filed on the 1st of February 1962. This inordinate delay of about 13 months in filing the revisions after the acquittal of the respondent has not been satisfactorily explained, and in fact no explanation has been given at all for filing them so late. Whatever the reason for delay may be, it was evidently not due to the departmental proceedings taken against the respondent, as he was removed from service on or about the 4th of October 1956, as is clear from the report of the Superintendent Post Offices, Gujrat, dated the 14th of December 1960, at page 63 of the file. We, therefore, do not think it expedient to interfere at this stage and dismiss the revision) petitions. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.