P L D 1977 Quetta 84 (PLP)

ZAKAULLAH LODHI, J.

This Constitution petition seeks to challenge the execution proceedings in respect of decree dated 21st October 1970 passed by the Qazi, Sarawan, and armed by Majlis-e-Shura, Kalat and this Court in let and 2nd appeals vide orders crated 28th March 1971 and 4th August 1977 respectively, whereby ejectment of the petitioners from the agricultural lands of the let respondent was ordered.

2. The facts in brief are that the petitioners occupied five plots of agricultural land owned by the 1st respondent as tenants. The land is adequately described in the judgment of the Qazi Sarawan. On 18th September 1968 the 1st respondent filed a suit for the ejectment of the petitioners from the lands in question on the ground of non-payment of rent in the Court of Nazim, Sarawan at Mastung who after framing the issues referred the case to Qazi; Sarawan, for decision. The suit was decreed by the Qazi, Sarawan, vide his judgment and decree dated 21st October 1970. The petitioners preferred an appeal against the decision of the Qazi to the Majlis-e-Shura, Kalat which was dismissed on 28th May 1971. Second appeal filed before this Court was also dismissed on 4th August 1971. Thereafter the 1st respondent sought the execution of the decree passed in his favour and filed an application in the Court of Qazi, Sarawan Mastung. The petitioners feeling aggrieved by the execution proceedings, have come up to this Court in this Constitution petition.

3. The petitioner's case is that by virtue of the promulgation of M. L. R. 115 on 11th March 1972 the decree of Qazi, Sarawan had become unexecutable for the reasons that (a) para 3 of this Regulation expressly superseded all other laws and orders and decrees passed by a Court of Tribunal or other authority thereunder and rendered ineffective any custom or usage or contract, instrument, deed or other Judgment which contained anything repugnant to what has been propounded by this Regulation, and that (b) para. 25 of the regulation has prescribed the mode of initiating ejectment proceedings against the tenants which is through a Revenue Court. In short, according to him, only a decree passed by a Revenue Court was executable after 11th March 1972 and all the decrees and orders passed by any other Court or Tribunal earlier were a nullity in the eyes of law. As such the only question requiring determination would be as to whether M. L. R. 115 should be treated as having retrospective effect or not. We may reproduce below para. 3 of M. L. R. 115 which is relevant for our purposes; "

3. Regulation to override other laws etc.-The provisions of this Regulation, and any rule or order made thereunder, shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, or in any order or decree of a Court or Tribunal or other authority, or in any rule or custom or usage, or in any contract, instrument, deed or other document." From the plain reading of this paragraph it is evident that the provisions of this Regulation or any rule or order made thereunder shall have the effect of overriding all what is contrary to the provisions of this Regulation, whatever its source may be. However, to discover whether the Regulation shall have prospective effect or otherwise we shall have first advert to para. I of the regulation which deals with the date of its commencement. It specifically mentions that "it shall come into force at once". Undisputedly, the regulation was given effect by publication in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extra ordinary dated the 11th March 1972. Unless shown to the contrary, it shall be presumed that the regulation came into force on 11th March 19721 and would occupy the field from this date onwards. As the language of the regulation is free from any ambiguity, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that it would have retrospective effect by implication is devoid of any substance. The primary rule of interpretation of statute being literal construction, the intention of the Legislature is always to be discovered from what has actually been expressed in an enactment. On the principles governing the interpretation of statutes, the law laid down by English Courts as well as the Courts in the sub-continent is absolutely in agreement. I may refer to Capper v. Baldwin ((1965) 2 Q B 53). wherein it was held that the intention of the parliament must be deduced from the language used and the statute should be interpreted in a manner to give effect to the intention of the Legislature by putting literal construction to what has actually been expressed in the enactment. Putting M. L R. 115 to this test we find that there is nothing contained in it to suggest that its framers intended to give it retrospective effect. Besides this, if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted and the regulation in question is given retrospective effect it would create great hardship to those persons whose cases stood concluded prior to the coming in force of this regulation. Such an interpretation would also invite the re-opening of the decided cases to the disadvantage of the decree-holders, and ultimately give rise to uncalled for litigation which certainly can not be the intention of the law-makers. It is a cardinal principle of the interpretation of statutes that the language of an enactment should be construed in such a manner that it may be most agreeable to justice and e reason, hence if the parties whose cases already stand concluded are once again dragged into uncalled for litigation by twisting the language of the statute it would be against reason and justice.

5. Lastly we may advert to the principles governing retrospective operation of the statutes. In Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes we find following discussion on the subject ; "Retrospective operation of statutes.--Upon the presumption that the Legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation. They are construed as operating only in cases or on fact: which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appear, very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication" It would thus be seen that the principle which has constantly been followed is that a statute should be given prospective effect unless its language specifically mentions otherwise. As far as this regulation is concerned its language does not permit of such an interpretation whereby it may be declared to be having retrospective effect. We therefore hold that paragraphs 3 and 25 as also the other provisions of this regulation do not have retrospective effect and that para. 3 would not affect in any manner those decrees and order which had been passed prior to 11th March 1972. In the instant case the decree was passed on 21st October 1970 and armed in 1st and 2nd appeals before coming into force of M. L. R. 115, therefore it can be lawfully executed by the lot respondent. For the reasons given above we do not find any substance in this petition which is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we would not burden the petitioners with costs. S. A.H. Petition dismissed