1993 PLP 138 (PLC)

2. The appellant had been working with the respondents at their factory at Korangi, for a number of years. On 14‑7‑1981, he was served with a charge -sheet on the ground that in spite of a number of warnings he had continued producing less than the standard, and the above act constituted misconduct under clause 15(3)(j) read with clause 15(1)(ii)(d) of the Schedule to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The reply to the charge‑sheet was found to be unsatisfactory and an enquiry was ordered.

3. The appellant took up the matter against the respondent before the N.I.R.C. and received a Prohibitory Order, dated 22‑7‑1981, directing the management not to pass any final order against the appellant until the matter pending before it was finally adjudged. However, this order was vacated by the Full Bench of the N.I.R.C. on 20‑1‑1982 and even the complaint was dismissed.

4. In the meantime the domestic enquiry against the appellant had been completed and he was dismissed from service on 31‑1‑1982. The dismissal order was signed by the Managing Director.

5. It is alleged that the appellant had sent a grievance notice to the respondents, dated 22‑4‑1982 and receiving no reply submitted the petition before the Labour Court.

6. The allegation came to be denied in the Written Reply filed by the respondents. In paragraph 28 it was specifically mentioned that the grievance notice referred to, was a repeat notice and the petition was time‑barred. The other allegations were also denied.

7. The appellant, apart from himself, examined Muhammad Afzal and Waris Khan. Shahid Ahmed Bajwa and Khawaja Tariq Nazir appeared on behalf of the respondents.

8. The Labour Court found that the petition was time‑barred, and nothing smacked of any bias or prejudice in the domestic enquiry, or that there was any breach of the principles of natural justice. It was further found that the dismissal of the appellant was due to misconduct which has been duly proved in the "impartial domestic enquiry". It, therefore, dismissed the petition.

9. In the case as presented by the appellant, it was alleged that the grievance notice had been sent by him on 22‑4‑1982. However, during the course of the cross‑examination he was confronted with a letter, and he owned its authorship unequivocally. The record shows that the evidence of the parties was completed on 4‑8‑1983 and the matter was fixed for arguments on 29‑8‑1983. On six consecutive dates the matter was adjourned and the arguments took place on 1‑12‑1983. It was when the letter dated 4‑2‑1982 came to be referred to on behalf of the respondents, Mr. S.P. Lodhi, the learned representative for the petitioner made an application that as the appellant was not properly confronted with, the letter in question, "he should be re‑called for re‑examination". The application came to be dismissed by the Labour Court, Then another application was presented under section 36(2) of the IRO for sending the documents to the handwriting expert for the verification of the signatures thereon. This application was also resisted and came to be rejected by order dated 15‑2‑1984.

10. The learned Presiding Officer had taken care to compare the disputed signature with a number of signatures of the appellant on the record of the case, and to my mind it was an eminently proper approach. The request was nothing but an attempt to escape through the key hole when all the doors seemed to be closed against the petitioner. It has been repeatedly held by the Courts that surrendering its judgment in the hands of the handwriting expert can be an extremely perilous approach. I have myself compared the disputed signature with the documents on my record and that of the Labour Court. There can be no manner of doubt that the signature in question was that of the appellant.

11. The appellant was the General Secretary of the Union and had been attending the Courts in different capacities as the record bears out, and there is no question that when he owned the letter he could be labouring under any misapprehension. He could not accept the authorship without looking to his signature. According to the finding of the Presiding Officer that would be the grievance notice sent to the respondent and the petition will be demonstrably time‑barred. There can be hardly any doubt that it is the grievance notice, bearing all the characteristics of a grievance notice and a second notice would be wide of the mark. Reference may be made to S.M.W. Jafri v. Muhammad Saleem Shaikh and others PLD 1979 Kar. 432 and M/s. Pakistan Machine Tools Factory v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and others 1992 PLC 650.

12. It was, however, contended by Mr. Ali Amjad, learned counsel for the appellant that since no specific mention of this notice was made in the Written Reply it cannot be allowed to defeat the petition and he gave certain citations in support of his contention, namely M/s. Chowdhry Brothers Ltd. v. M/s. Jaranwala Central Cooperative Bank 1968 SCMR 804 and Haji Ayoob v. Mst. Bachai and others PLD 1983 Quetta

114. Reference was also made by him to the case of Pakistan Development Corporation v. Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. PLD 1960 Kar. 885 in which it was held that even an admission according to section 31 of the Evidence Act cannot act as a conclusive proof of the matter and that it was open to a person who had made the admission to say that he had done it through mistake, misapprehension and miscalculation.

13. It is not necessary to examine the facts and law laid down in these cases referred to above as pleadings cannot otherwise be construed with the same rigidity in a Labour Court as in a regular Court of law. It should not be forgotten that under the scheme of the I.R.O. (see section 49) even lawyers cannot appear before the Labour Court as a matter of tight but only with the permission of the Presiding Officer. The Written Reply clearly made out that the grievance petition was barred by limitation, though the details were lacking. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant had been taken by surprise. It was also contended by Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani that in spite of this specific denial there was no rejoinder forthcoming. Be as it may I am satisfied that the letter dated 4‑2‑1982 had been sent and that would be the grievance notice and therefore the petition was patently barred by time. It might as well be mentioned that the appellant had not chosen even to make any application for condonation of the delay. That disposes of the appeal, but a word might as well as be mentioned on merits.

14. It is significant that right from the stage the appellant was served with the charge‑sheet, the line adopted was that he as the General Secretary of the Union had to be busy running the affairs of the Union and his output occasionally had to suffer. Issues were joined by the respondent. It is also true that the Production Book had nor been brought on the record but on a number of dates low production stands made out. He was also repeated warnings about his production, and refused to heed to the same.

15. The suggestion that the appellant had come to harm only because he was the General Secretary of the Union is wide of the mark. He had been convicted by the learned Chairman, N.I.R.C. in 1973 for instigating an illegal strike where he had been sentenced for three months. However, no attempt was made by the respondent to dislodge him from the job. No fault can be found with the domestic enquiry either. The Enquiry Officer appointed earlier was re‑placed, once the appellant proceeded against him before the NIRC, and his successor had tried to accommodate the appellant as much as could be possible. It is true that later on he did not participate in the enquiry but no blame under the circumstances on the record would lie with the respondents.

16. I am clearly of the view that there is no merit in the appeal. I will, therefore, uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal. H.B.T./2077/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.