2000 PLP 2039 (MLD)

"Discontinuance of supply to consumer neglecting to pay charge‑ (1) Where any consumer neglects to pay any charge for energy or, any sum, other than a charge for energy, assessed against him by a licensee in respect of supply of energy to his premises, the licensee may after giving not less than seven clear days' notice in writing to such consumer and without prejudice to his right recover such charge or other sum by suit or otherwise, cut off the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect an, electric supply‑line or other works, being the property of the licensee, through which energy may be supplied to such premises or to any other premises, other than domestic premises running distinctly in the name of such consumer, and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply and the minimum charges on account of continued reservation of supply daring the period of such discontinuance, are paid, but not longer." A reading of the afore‑reproduced provision of law would show that where any consumer neglects to pay any sum assessed against him by a licensee in respect of supply of energy to his premises then the licensee can adopt the following process subject to service of a notice of not less than seven clear says in writing:‑‑ (i) To recover the amount by filing a suit, (ii) to recover the amount as otherwise directed in the said Act. (iii) cut off the supply of energy to such premises, and (iv) any other premises other than domestic premises, in the name of such consumers. It is this last‑mentioned power that has been, exercised by the respondents while purporting to act under the said section 24(1).

5. It will be noted that the terminology used in the section vis‑a‑vis the said power to disconnect the premises otherwise than the one in respect whereof any sum is assessed against a consumer is somewhat unusual. There is no reference to ownership of the premises or its occupation by the consumer. The insistence is that the said other premises should be running' distinctly in the name of such consumer. To my mind the only meaning that can be placed on the said wording is that apart from the premises in respect whereof any charge for energy or any other sum has been assessed against a consumer, the supply of energy to any other premises could be discontinued provided the said other premises is running distinctly in the name of such consumer that is to say that the same consumer in the same name had obtained electric connection in two different premises and in case there is a default in respect of one such premises then as a result of such default within the meaning of section 24(1) of the said Electricity Act, 1910, the said other premises can also be disconnected.

6. In the light of the provisions of .the said section 24(1) the respondents have to demonstrate that the consumer Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi and at the premises of the petitioner‑Company is the same. I have already referred to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents in some details above. I have examined the said documents which have been relied upon by the learned counsel. In Annexure A against Part B in the column requiring mention of name of the applicant is the name of Mian Taufiq Saeed Saigal. In para. C the address at which the electric connection is required is mentioned as Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi. In Annexure C in Part B the name of applicant is mentioned as Taufiq S. Saigal. In Part C the address at which the electric connection is required is mentioned as Diaper Plant of M/s. Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi. In Annexure G which is the application for electric connection of the petitioner‑Company against the column requring mention of name of the applicant, name of Tariq S. Saigal is mentioned. There is yet another column requiring the mention of the name of the Directors in the case of a company where the name of Taufiq S. Saigal is mentioned. In the column requiring mention of the address of the premises where the electricity is required is mentioned the name of Rachna Textile Mills, Gulyana Road, Gujjar Khan. The application is signed for the said Rachna Textile Mills. It is witnessed by the Mills Secretary of Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd.. It will thus be seen that even going by the argument sought to be pressed by the learned counsel for the respondents that the applicant for electric connection should be deemed to be the consumer in the case for the premises at Rawalpindi is Taufiq Saigal while the consumer in the premises of Gujjar Khan is Tariq Saigal and thus it cannot be said that the premises of the petitioner‑Company is running distinctly in the name of the consumer, namely, Taufiq Saigal against whom the amount in question has been assessed by the respondents.

7. I may, however; state here that I am not in agreement with the said line of arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents. According to the comments filed by the respondents the amount in question is due against Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi. It is not even the case of the respondents that the amount is due against the said Taufiq Saigal. The relevant Part B of the application forms (Annexures B&C) provide in Vernacular that in case of a company the name of the competent officer be mentioned. At the foot of the form Annexure C, the applicant in fact is Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi. The possibility, therefore, cannot be entirely ruled out that the applications were in fact filed on behalf of the said company by Mian Taufiq Saigal.

8. Coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the respondents based on the application to the learned Ombudsman and the order passed thereon, I find that the petitioner was not a party to the said proceedings and the learned Ombudsman allowed the amount to be adjusted against the account of the petitioner on an offer made by Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi who was the petitioner before the learned Ombudsman. This circumstance can also not be. stretched so as to attract the provisions of said section 24(1) of the Electricity Act, 1910 by assuming that the consumer in both the cases is the same. .

9. Reverting back to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner I find that the petitioner in fact is a duly incorporated public limited company and so is Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi. In the case of E.B.M. Company Ltd., relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner it was observed at page 284:‑‑ ' "Their Lordships believe it to be of supreme importance that the distinction should be clearly marked, observed and maintained between an incorporated company's legal entity and its actions, assets, rights and liabilities on the one hand, and the individual shareholders and their actions, assets, rights and liabilities on the other hand." The said observations were followed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Ikram Bus Service and others v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and others (PLD 1963 SC 564). In the case of Pakistan v. Pak Chrome Leather 'Company Ltd. (PLD 1983 Lahore 326) a D.B. of this Court in somewhat similar circumstances, while following the said case of E.B.M. Company Ltd. rejected following submission made on behalf of the Federal Government:‑‑ "It was further submitted that the respondent company and Messrs Sindh Tanneries Limited were the sister concern. The Directors of the two companies were the same. One family was running the two companies. The respondent owes more than one crore to the appellant. " I may point out here that the last‑mentioned case has arisen out of a civil suit wherein it was established that both the companies had the same Directors. On the other hand, I find that the case of M/s. Pak Ice Factory relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is squarely against the proposition sought to be propounded by the learned counsel. In the said case the consumer was the owner of the premises which was leased out to some other party. The, case of the consumer was that WAPDA should follow the lessee who was in fact consumer of electricity. His Lordship rejected the said contention and held that WAPDA‑was well within its rights to follow the consumer for payment of electricity charges. The present is the case of two different consumers altogether as would be evident from the definition of the term in section 2(c) of the said Act.

10. In the said state of law the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the said Taufiq Saigal being the signatory of the electric connection forms for the Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi and being mentioned as one of the Directors of the petitioner company in the electric supply application form is enough reason to invoke the provisions of section 24(1) of the Electricity Act, 1910, is not tenable.

11. Towards the end of his arguments learned counsel for the resondents has brought to my notice that the said Taufiq Saeed Saigal was served with a notice for payment of the said amount on 18‑10‑1999 and the amount still remains unpaid. He has further drawn my attention to some correspondence with the National Accountability Bureau. Steps are being taken to refer the. matter to the said Bureau under the provisions of Federal Ordinance XVIII of 1999 and that the matter is under inquiry by the Inter Services Intelligence. This may be so. I want to make it clear that nothing discussed herein‑above shall have any effect on any lawful proceedings against the consumer against whom the said amount has been allegedly assessed i.e. Taufiq Saigal or Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi. In fact the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to sections 54A and 54B of the Electricity Act, 1910 which gives ample power to the respondents to recover the said amount from the consumer against whom it has been assessed, as arrears of land revenue in accordance with the said provisions of law. 12 .In view of the above discussion I find that the respondents had no lawful authority to recover the amount in question from the petitioner company or to discontinue its electric supply in terms of section 24(1) of the ( Electricity Act, 1910. I, therefore, allow this writ petition subject to the observations made in para. 11 above and direct the respondents to restore the electricity to the premises of the petitioner. No orders as to costs. Q.M.H./M.A.K./K‑40/L Petition allowed.