1998 PLP 495 (PLC)

2. The brief facts of the case leading to the writ petition are that Muhammad Hussain, Abdul Waheed and Muhammad Akram respondents Nos. 4 to 6 while in service of the petitioner were dismissed from service vide order dated 16-5-1.992 after holding enquiry on the allegations of misconduct and misbehaviour which allegations were not correct. Thereupon under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, respondents Nos. 3 to 6 filed case before respondent No.2 who referred the same to Labour Court No. 9, Multan. The said Court issued direction that fresh domestic enquiry be held. Thereafter, respondents Nos. 3 to 6 again filed case under section 22-A(8)(g) vide No. 4-A (240)/92-L and moved an application under Regulation No. 32(2) of the N.I.R.C. (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 1975 for the grant of interim injunction against the domestic enquiry and as such obtained the status quo order from respondent No.2. The petitioner contested the same action and respondent No. 2 vacated the status quo vide order dated 22-4-1992. However, the petition remained pending. The enquiry was held independently and the Inquiry Officer reported against respondents Nos. 3 to 6, holding guilty of misconduct and then they were dismissed vide order dated 16-5-1992. Instead of seeking relief under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969, they filed the application on 20-5-1992 vide Application No. 7(238) of 1992-L before the N.I.R.C. and the same was referred to respondent No.

2. The then respondent No. 2 again issued status quo order ante by reinstating respondents Nos. 3 to

6. The writ petitioner moved an application vide No.7(269) of 1992-L on 26-5-1992 for vacation of the said aforementioned order of status quo ante. Respondent No.2 accepted the said application and granted the status quo in favour of the petitioner on 26-5-1992 which virtually mean that the dismissal order dated 16-5-1992 was allowed to remain in field. Without disclosing the order aforementioned respecting vacation of stay, respondents Nos. 3 to 6 moved an application for Contempt of Court against the petitioner and obtained order dated 15-10-1992 passed by, respondent No.2 directing the writ petitioner to pay the wages to respondents Nos. 3 to 6, the dismissed employees. On 15-10-1992 the appeal was filed before the Full Bench of N.I.R.C. against the aforementioned order and obtained the interim stay order. In the appeal it was prayed that the payment be not paid to respondents Nos. 3 to 6 as order dated 20-5 -1992 was illegal and void. The petitioner also moved as application under section 151, C.P.C. requesting respondent No. l to summon the record. The record was called but respondent No. 1 did not send for the same and fixed the case for arguments on 4-4-1994. On the said date he decided the appeal in slip shod manner and did not issue any direction to respondent No. 2 to decide the issue of jurisdiction first. Respondent No. 1 also decided the application of the respondents vide order dated 15-5-1994 and directed the petitioner to pay the wages and the dismissed respondents Nos. 3 to

6. Though their dismissal order dated 16-5-1992 had already been effected and as such passed an order illegally and without deciding first the question whether respondent No. 2 had the jurisdiction or not in the matter. Hence the petition.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

4. The main plea taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondent No. l and also respondent No.2 have no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under section 22-A(8)(g) submitted by respondents Nos.3 to 6 and to pass any order thereof. The impugned order dated 4-4-1994 passed by respondent No.2 and impugned order dated 15-5-1995 passed by respondent No. l were without jurisdiction and void. The contents of the petition submitted by respondents Nos. 3 to 6 before respondent No. l challenging the order of their dismissal show that the same were moved before the N.I.R.C. for the reasons that respondents Nos. 3 to 6 are office bearers of the union and the action taken by the writ petitioner against them appears to be the unfair labour practice. The petition was rightly moved before the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 when the respondents Nos. 3 to 6 moved the application for the second time on 20-5-1992 for soliciting the order of respondent No. l in order to obtain a direction to the petitioner for payment of their wages. In case General Manager (Administration), Punjab Industrial Development Board, Lahore and another v. National Industrial Relations Commission and another (1987 PLC 129) the writ petition was dismissed with the following observation:-- "It means, that where a case of unfair labour practice is likely to occur the commission has the jurisdiction to pass prohibitory order.

Undoubtedly, the impugned orders of N.I.R.C. are interim orders and it is well-established that this Court has never favoured interference with interim orders of the Tribunals in writ jurisdiction except in cases where the Courts or Tribunals had no jurisdiction at all. The determination of the next contention of petitioner's counsel, as to whether, the order of transfer in the circumstances of the case amounted to unfair labour practice or the employees' union could maintain the application would pre-empt N.I.R.C 's decision on merits touching factual aspect of the case, I am, therefore, not inclined to embark upon the exercise particularly when I have held that the N. I. R. C. had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders." In the present case is also that of unfair labour practice, the law laid down as above and observations made therein are applicable on all fours. The original order dated 20-5-1992 passed by respondent No.2 and all subsequent orders standing thereon have been passed within jurisdiction and are legally valid. Moreover, order dated 24-4-1995 was passed by respondent No. l and the same was conceded and the matter disposed of in view of the compromise between the parties and this fact has not been disclosed by the petitioner in the petition. In view of the law laid down in A.R. Khan v. P.N. Bore through Legal Heirs (PLD 1987 SC 107) an impugned order passed by a Tribunal even with tacit consent of the petitioner disentitles him to the grant of any discretionary relief for setting aside the same order through writ petition.

5. In view of the above discussion I come to the conclusion that the petition does not succeed.

6. Consequently, this petition stands dismissed. A.A./C-11/L Petition dismissed.