1995 PLP 11 (PLC)

3. The petitioner duly attended the proceeding, but neither cross‑examined the witnesses, nor chose to make a statement or offer defence. All hat he did was making an application objecting to the competence of the inquiry Officer to hold the enquiry. On the receipt of the report from the inquiry Officer adjudging him guilty of misconduct, the petitioner came to be dismissed from service by an order dated 16‑11‑1992.

4. The petitioner had thereupon sent a grievance notice on 25‑2‑1993, wherein he reiterated all that he had written to the Prime Minister, saying that it depicted the whole truth. There was a reply to this letter, but as it did not accord any satisfaction to the petitioner, a petition came to be filed by him before the Labour Court, where the allegations once more came to be repeated. In the petition he further added that he had distributed hundreds of copies of the letter among the workers also, after the same had been despatched to the Prime Minister. It also went on to say that the enquiry proceedings were hit by the mischief of Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 as more than a month had elapsed between the despatch of he letter and knowledge thereof to the respondents and the issuance of the how‑cause notice.

5. The respondents in their written statement mentioned that they learnt Tout the contents of the letter only when they had received the same from the Prime Minister's Secretariat which was on the 2nd of September, 1992. The notice which was issued within a fortnight thereof was therefore within time and there was no question of any delay. The enquiry proceedings conducted were fair and impartial and the petitioner had maintained his defiant stand even therein. The other allegations also came to be denied. It was further alleged that the petition was not maintainable because the petitioner had not impleaded the company which was the subsidiary of the Pakistan Steel Mill with a juristic entity of its own. He had impleaded only two employees of the respondent company by their names being the General Manager and the Manager Administration respectively.

6. The petitioner was his own witness and Muhammad Bashir Ahmed the Enquiry Officer appeared on behalf of the respondent.

7. The Labour Court for the reasons given by it found that the petition was not maintainable and otherwise too misconduct within the meaning of Standing Order 15(3)(h) stood established against the petitioner. As a result the petition came to be dismissed.

8. In the appeal the petitioner had impleaded the Labour Court also as a party, apart from Muhammad Bashir Ahmed the witness referred to earlier, and the General Manager (A&P) of the Steel Mills. As the appeal was argued by the appellant himself, legal questions were not canvassed. The Memorandum of Appeal has so much to wish in propriety and decorum, but I will refrain from making any comment about the same. The prayer therein is to the effect that the respondent No. 1 i.e. the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court be punished under section 38(5) of IRO, 1969. It ends with the request to frame at least some 17 issues "and try the appellant case in its own Court".

9. According to Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 "no order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct within one month of the date of such misconduct or the date on which the alleged misconduct came to the notice of the employer " The letter of the Prime Minister was despatched in. the 1st week of June, 1992 and the appellant states that he had distributed 200 copies thereof within the campus of the factory that very day. But there is no support forthcoming on the latter count from any quarter. He has not chosen to put a question about the distribution even to the witness examined on behalf of the respondent. There is nothing to indicate that the respondents knew about it. The photocopy of the covering letter received from the Prime Minister's Secretariat directing necessary action has been placed on the record. It is dated 2‑9‑1992. There is nothing whatsoever on the record to show that the respondent had any knowledge of the doings of the petitioner prior to what has been averred by them, that is 2‑9‑1992. Under the circumstances the question of the notice being beyond one month's time is wide of the mark.

10. The Enquiry Officer was emphatically of the view that misconduct was clearly spelled out because there was also a breach of rules inasmuch the letter to the Prime Minister was not sent by the petitioner through proper channel. It is rather strange. The allegations were bristling with venom against the bosses and their rapacious doings, which according to him had brought the company to the verge of bankruptcy. That he should send it to the authorities and expect that the same would be forwarded to the Prime Minister, to put it mildly would be expecting too much. None of the two counsel appearing on behalf of that respondents could point out which was the rule which was breached. They had nothing to say about it. Probably there might be something like as instruction. Looking to the principles laid down in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Junior Labour Court No. IV, Karachi and others PLD 1978 SC 239 it will not fall within the definition of misconduct, as any act subversive of discipline in it must be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding words namely "riotous or disorderly behaviour .".

11. The main question therefore to examine remains whether the allegations hurled in the letter can be construed misconduct, and I am of the opinion that it does.

12. The proceedings in Abdur Rashid Quraishi v. Industrial Court West Pakistan, Lahore and others 1967 PLC 367 were based on a letter of the appellant in which the integrity of an Enquiry Officer had been questioned. It was held by the Supreme Court that "there was a direct attack on the probity of a superior Executive Officer of the Company directly concerned in the Management of the labour force, and a very grave accusation that this officer was himself engineering trouble among the workmen. There can be no question but that such conduct is calculated to be destructive of discipline".

13. In Cooper & Company Employees' Union v. Messrs Cooper & Company Ltd., Karachi 1970 PLC 206, the allegations against Subjally the General Manager of the Company were that he was dishonest, reckless and malicious. It was signed by 18 employees of the company. They were dismissed and their petition before the Labour Court also failed. The matter had come in appeal. It appears that Mr. Justice Inamullah Khan, learned Chairman of this Tribunal, in view of the fact that the letter in question did not relate to any grievance but was confined to the personal conduct of the General Manager, had deferred the decision to enquire from Mr. Subjally whether he was prepared to forgive and forget. When the General Manager had declined to do so, the appeal of the employees came to be dismissed.

14. Reference might also be made to M/s. Lawrencepur Woollen & Textile Mills Limited v. Muhammad Farooq and 2 others NLR 1980 Labour SC page

91. In this case leave was granted by the Supreme Court with the following background: "He addressed a letter to the General Manager with copies endorsed to the Joint Director, Labour Welfare, Rawalpindi and Labour Officer (Factories) Campbellpur alleging that his transfer to the said section was prelude to his being thrown out of his service because this was the device followed by the management which forcibly obtained resignations from service from employees sent to the said section by fabricating charges against them and that he was going to be dealt with in the same manner. According to the petitioner these false, fictitious and disparaging allegations were made by respondent No.l to coerce the management to bring it into disrepute and his conduct was, therefore, an act subversive of discipline amounting to misconduct under clause (h) of sub‑para. (3) of the Standing Order 15 of the Schedule to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The Management charged him with the alleged misconduct and after enquiry terminated his services on 23‑1‑1976. The respondent filed an application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance before the Punjab Labour Court No.6, Rawalpindi which succeeded on the grounds (i) that the charge‑sheet given to the respondent did not disclose any misconduct; and (ii) that the petitioner (management) had not given the second show‑cause notice to the respondent No.

1. The respondent was ordered to be reinstated into service. Aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner filed appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which was admitted to a regular hearing and suspended the operation of the impugned order. In view however, of the provisions of section 38 of the I.R.O. the stay order granted by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal lapsed after the expiry of 20 days by operation of law. The petitioner, thereafter, invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge the order of the Labour Court dated 23‑8‑1976 whereby the respondent had been ordered to be reinstated into service. The learned Judge in the High Court dismissed the writ petition observing that as the respondent had only complained to his superiors as well as the Labour Department concerned and it could not, therefore, be stated that a misconduct had been committed on his behalf. It was added that the workers are entitled to vent their grievances and the management sought to have enquired into their complaints rather than being proceedings against them. The writ petition was, accordingly dismissed in limine:' This view being not in conformity with the principles laid down in Abdur Rashid Qureshi v. Industrial Court of West Pakistan, Lahore referred to above, was considered by their Lordships to need examination.

15. The appellant in the instant case had not only sent the letter to the Prime Minister with the allegations referred to, but continued to repeat them unrepentantly time and again. Such an act, will be subversive of discipline with vengeance.

16. The fact also remains that the appellant had filed the petition only 1 against 2 employees of the company. Neither the company, which has got a juristic entity of its, .nor Anis A. Lodhi, Chief Executive of the respondent company or the Board of Directors, was impleaded as a party.

17. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in the appeal. I will, therefore, affirm the impugned order and dismiss the appeal. H.B.T./2346/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.