1988 PLP 951 (PLC)

2. The respondent filed a grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) before the learned Punjab Labour Court No. 5 Faisalabad. After recording the arties' evidence and after hearing them the learned Labour Court ordered the reinstatement of the respondent in service with back benefits on 24‑.1‑198.1. The petitioner bank filed an appeal before the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The said learned Tribunal dismissed the appeal on 5‑12‑1984.

3. The judgments dated 24‑4‑1984 and 5‑12‑1984, passed respectively by the learned Labour Court and the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal have be," assailed through the present constitutional petition.

4. It was mainly urged on behalf of the petitioner that terms and condition of service of employees of nationalized banks and other financial institutions were governed. by the Award of the Wage Commission which is to be decanted as an Award of the National Industrial Relations Commission and that such an Award can only be enforced through the National Industrial Relations Commission an(l therefore, the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the matter. This contention found favour with a learned Division Bench of this Court. Consequently, the present writ petition as also other writ petitions filed by different nationalized banks challenging the orders passed by the Labour Courts and the Labour Appellate Tribunal, reinstating the terminated/dismissed employees were allowed.

5. The respondent and the other adversely affected employees of the banks preferred appeals before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan. The learned Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that the Award of the Wage Commission is, also enforceable under section 25‑A of the Ordinance and, therefore, the findings recorded by the High Court to the effect that the Labour Courts and the Labour Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the matter were not sustainable. Consequently the appeals of the respondent as also those of the other employees of the banks were allowed and the cases have been remanded to this Court for deciding other issues involved in the cases.

6. So far as the present case is concerned, the other pleas impugning the judgment passed by the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal are:‑‑ (a) that the respondent being an officer and a power of attorney holder could not be treated as a workman having locus standi to seek redress of his grievance under section 25‑A of the Ordinance: (b) that the grievance notice served by the respondent on the employer was hopelessly time‑barred and similarly the grievance petition filed by him was also time‑barred; and (c) that after the dismissal, he ceased to be a workman within the meaning of section 2(xxviii) of the Ordinance and, therefore, had no locus stand to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 25‑A of the Ordinance.

7. Regarding the first objection it has also been urged on behalf of the petitioner‑bank that besides being an officer and power of attorney holder, the respondent happened to be a Manager of Hernoli Branch in Mianwali District of the petitioner‑bank when he allegedly committed the lapses for which he was charge‑sheeted and, therefore, he could not be treated as a workman.

8. Admittedly the salary of the respondent at the time when he was charge sheeted was Rs. 780 p.m. and that at that time he was employed in the Zonal Office performing clerical duties. Nothing has been brought on the record to suggest that the respondent ever exercised any power vesting in him under the power of attorney. It has also come on record that he had no power of hire and fire and he could not even grant leave to any employee of the bank. It is also a common ground between the parties that in Hernoli Branch of the petitioner bank, the respondent served for some time as a stop‑gap arrangement as a Manager. The Labour Court as also the Labour Appellate Tribunal have held him to be a workman keeping in view the nature of his duties. These findings recorded by tribunals of competent jurisdiction are unexceptionable keeping m view the material available on the record. It is, therefore, concluded that the respondent has rightly been held to be a workman having locus standi to seek redress of his grievance under section 25‑A of the Ordinance.

9. So far as the objection regarding limitation is concerned, it has been noticed that the respondent was dismissed from service on 5‑3‑1983. He originally served a grievance notice on the employer on 2‑5‑1983, which was obviously within time. He, however, in the meantime preferred a departmental appeal and, therefore, the notice dated 2‑5‑1983 was withdrawn on 10‑5‑1983. His appeal was decided i.e., dismissed on 7‑9‑1983. Again he served an ordinance notice on 21‑9‑1983. Keeping in view the date of dismissal of the appeal, the second grievance notice was well within time. In this view of the matter, here is no substance in the plea regarding limitation.

10. A considered analysis of the provisions of section 2(xxviii) of the Ordinance pertaining to the definition of workman and of section 2 (xiii) relating to the definition of expression `Industrial dispute' seen in the perspective of the deeming clause comprised in section 25‑A (4) of the Ordinance leads to an irrefutable conclusion that a grievance concerning the non‑employment of the terminated/dismissed workman taken before the Labour Court tinder section 25 A of the Ordinance is to be deemed as an Industrial dispute. Thus, a dismissed workman has a locus standi to seek redress regarding grievance arising out of his dismissal under section 25‑A of the Ordinance. Needless to add that the Supreme: Court of Pakistan in its judgment whereby the present case and the other cases have been remanded has categorically held that the Ordinance is applicable to the dismissed workmen.

11. No other point has been urged on behalf of the petitioner.

12. In the light of the above discussion it is concluded that there is on merit in the under consideration writ petition which is, therefore, dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs. S.Q./H‑76/L Petition dismissed.