PLD 1950

P (PLP)

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX — Applicant Versus KALECHAND MOTI RAM‑Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
Decided Date
Income‑tax Reference No. 110 of 1944, decided on 15th January 1948.
Honorable Judges
O'Sullivan and Thadani JJ.
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P (PLP)
Forum / Court
Bench Members O'Sullivan and Thadani JJ.
Parties COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX — Applicant Versus KALECHAND MOTI RAM‑Respondent
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: O'Sullivan and Thadani JJ..

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: P (PLP) (COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX — Applicant Versus KALECHAND MOTI RAM‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Headnotes / Summary

IncomeTax Act (XI of 1922)

S. 4 (3) (i)‑‑mere Placing of certain amount in Dharam account towards, charity Nature of charity not indicated, nor trustee or beneficiary named‑Account not a charitable trustInterest accruing from account held, to be income‑Not exempt from tax.. Where a sum of Rs: 1,405 was shown .as interest in the assessee firm's books in a certain account headed "Udomal Virumal Dharmada Account," the sum being claimed to have been applied towards a charitable purpose but no trustee was appointed and the nature of charitable purpose as well as the beneficiary had not been indicated with reasonable certainty Held, that the mere placing of an amount in‑ an account and applying the accruing interest towards a charitable purpose, does pot amount to a trust, The situation is not altered merely by describing the account at for "dharam" or "dharmada". The account therefore could not be rightly considered to be relating to property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes within the meaning of section 4 (3) (i) of the Act, hence the interest accruing from the account was not exempt from incometax. As neither the purpose of the trust no: the beneficiary have been indicated with reasonable certainty, a gift or trust in favour of "dharam" is void for vagueness tend uncertainty. It is a maxim of equity, that the execution of a trust shall be under the control of the Court. The trust therefore must be of such a nature that it can be under that control. For that purpose it is necessary that the subject‑or object can be ascertained by' the Court. If the subject or object cannot be ascertained, the trust cannot be enforced by the Court, and it is void. 23 Bom. 725 ref.

Judgment & Decree

Being dissatisfied with the Tribunal's decision, the Commissioner of Incometax has had this reference, made to this Court under section: 66 (1) of the Act. Paragraph 6 of the Statement of the, case by the Tribunal summarises the mint at issue as follows: "The only point in contest before us was whether setting apart and placing the fund in the Udharam Virumal Charity Account under the circumstances stated before constituted a valid trust for religious or charitable purposes, so as is exempt the, income from taxation under section, 4 (3) (i) of the Act. On a considera tion of the question, we held that a valid trust had been declared: We have‑ recorded our reasons in para. 5 of our Judgment The grounds upon which the Tribunal held that there had been a valid trust for charitable or religious purposes by Udharam Virumal are set out in pare. 5 of their judgment as follows:-- " The question then is whether there is valid trust for a charitably or religious purpose in this case. It may be conceded that the mere placing of an amount in an account and applying the interest earned by it towards charitable purpose will not amount to a trust. The facts in the present case, however, are entirely different. Late Udharam Virumal opened an account which is expressly described as a charity account, and transferred an amount of Rs. 30,000 from his personal account to it. This act clearly reflects his intention to divest himself of the (2) settle the amount upon trust for those purposes. We think that it was an error to suppose that it continues to be a party(?) of the deceased's estate, since it is admitted .that ,his three sons who succeeded to it and those that have succeeded to the latter have not only (not?) claimed any interest in the funds but have been faithfully applying the annual interest towards the charitable and religious objects. In other words, the sons and grandsons of deceased Udharam are holding the fund as trust fund, as trustees Further, after the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's decision iv this case the Incometax Officer asked the assessee to file a sworn declaration that they had no interest in the fund or the income. It is difficult to understand the Incometax Officer's requiring such a declaration after the matter had passed his hands. But that is not to the purpose. In compliance with the order, Mr Motiram who is the surviving son of the late Udharam and partner of the assessee firm filed a sworn declaration in which he has stated that none of the heirs of .the deceased claim any interest in the fund. Lastly we have the admitted fact that the incometax authorities continuously excluded the interest from being assessed to tax until the present assessment." We are of opinion that the view of the Appellate Tribunal is not justified. As the Tribunal have themselves pointed out, the mere placing of an amount in an account and applying the accruing interest towards a charitable purpose, does not amount to a trust. The situation is not altered merely by describing the account is for "dharam or dharmada". The Tribunal appears to have overlooked the necessary incidents of a valid trust. A " trust " is defined in the Trusts Act as follows :

" A ' trust ' is an obligation annexed to the ownership of pro perty, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted bar the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner the person who reposes or declares the confidence is called the author of the 'trust' ; the person who accepts the confidence is called the ' trustee ' the person for whose benefit the .confidence is accepted is called the beneficiary' the subject‑matter of the trust is called ' trust property' or" trust money ' the beneficial interest' or ' interest ' of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee as owner of the trust property ; and the instrument, if any, by which the trust is declared is called the instrument of trust." Section 5 requires that in order to create a valid trust of movable property, the trust shall be declared by a non‑testamentary instrument in writing signed by the author of the trust and registered or by will, unless the ownership of the property is transferred to the trustee. Section 6 which relates to the creation of a trust is as follows: "Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts (a) an intention on his part to create thereby a trust, (b) the purpose of the trust (c) the beneficiary, and (d) the trust property and (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust property to the trustee ". Assuming in this case that Udharam Virutnal intended to create a trust in respect of a of Rs, 30,000 no trustee was appointed, much, less was there transfer of the trust property to a. trustee or an acceptance of this trust by the trustee Moreover, neither the purpose of the trust nor the beneficiary have been indicated with reasonable certainty. A gift of trust in favour of "dharam" is void for vagueness and uncertainty This point is dealt with in Mulla's Hindu Law, p. 472 para. 405 under the heading "gift to dharam void". After specifically slating that a gift or bequest to dharam is void for vagueness and uncertainty, the learned commentator goes on to discuss various cases including decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in support of his proposition. He says :-- " It is a maxim of equity that the execution" of a trust shall be under the control of a Court. The trust therefore must be o such a nature that it can be under that control. For that purpose it is necessary that the subject or object can be ascertained by the Court. If the subject or object cannot be ascertained, the trust cannot be enforced by the Court, and it is void. In the case of al gift to dharain the judicial Committee observed in Runchordas v. Parvalibai 7 Sar. 543 (P C) that the objects which can be considered to be meant by that word are vague and uncertain. In Wilson's dictionary the word "dharam" is defined to be law virtue, legal or moral duty. Relying upon this definition or dharam, the judicial Committee held that the word ' dharam' was as vague Ai the words 'purposes charitable or philanthropic' which. On account of their vagueness, render a trust "it those purposes void in the English Law. Gifts for `charitable or other purposes' or gift expressed in other alternative terms are not charitable for they may be executed without any park of the property being applied to charitable purposes." This aspect of the matter appears to have been overlooked by the Tribunal. It is obvious that the so‑called trust in this case cannot be controlled or enforced by the Court. The questions as drafted and referred to us by the Tribunal covering the point at issue are: (1) Whether there was evidence before the Tribunal on which it could be held that the sum of Rs. 30,000 was held under trust or other legal obligation wholly .for religious or charitable purposes within the meaning of section 4 (3) (i), Incometax Act . . . (2) Whether in the circumstances of the case the amount of Rs. 30,000 placers in the Udharam Virumal Dharmada Account" was rightly considered to be property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious and charitable purposes within the meaning of section 4 (3) (i) of the Act. For the reasons given above, our answers to these questions are both in the negative. We allow the Commissioner's costs. A. H. Answers in the negative.