P L D 1955 Lahore 183 (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑This is a reference under section 100 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. Nek Muhammad, respondent in this reference, filed a suit in the Revenue Court for ejectment of Muhammad Yusuf petitioner alleging that he was his tenant. The defendant denied that he was a tenant and set up acquisition of title by adverse possession. A number of issues were framed, including one as to whether there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. This issue as well as the others were found against the defendant and the suit was decreed. On appeal the learned Collector held that the issue as to whether there existed the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was really an issue relating to adverse possession which a Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to decide. He accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit leaving the plaintiff his Remedy in a Civil Court. There was a further appeal against this decree to the Commissioner who remanded the case to the Collector on the ground that if the suit had been entertained wrongly, it should be decided whether a reference should be made under section 100 of the Punjab Tenancy Act to the High Court. When the case came back to the Collector, he made the present reference to the High Court under section 100 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. The reference does not say that the decree of the Assistant Collector should be registered as a decree of a Civil Court. It simply says that the record is submitted to the High Court in pursuance of section 100 (1) of the Punjab Tenancy Act. The assumption underlying this reference is that the suit which was filed by the respondent against the petitioner in the Court of the Assistant Collector was not triable by his Court. Section 100 comes into operation only if it is found that jurisdiction has been wrongly exercised by a Civil Court or Revenue Court in good faith. I am of the opinion that the assumption is based on a misapprehension. The ground of the assumption is that the question of adverse possession is one that can only be tried by a Civil Court, but that only means that Civil Court is the proper Court for determining as to whether a person has or has not acquired a title by adverse possession: The fact, however, that with respect to the acquisition of title it is the Civil Court that can make a final pronouncement does not at all mean that if the defendant in a suit for ejectment filed in the Revenue Court raises the plea of adverse possession, the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court is at once ousted. If that were so, all defendants in such suits would simply have to take the plea that they were in adverse possession .to get the suit dismissed. Jurisdiction of a Court is determined (in the absence of an exceptional provision) not by the plea of the defendant but by the allegations in the plaint. That is all well established proposition and I may refer in support only to the Full Bench case Cheta v. Baiya and others (A I R 1927 Lah.452). Powers to grant relief are so distributed over Courts that on the existence of a particular set of facts a particular Court is entitled to grant a particular relief. Every plaintiff who comes into Court has to state the facts on the basis of which he claims relief. In order to find out whether the Court has jurisdiction the facts which are stated in the plaint are to be assumed as correct and then the question to be put is as to whether on the basis of those facts the Court in which the suit is filed is the proper Court to grant relief. To hold otherwise would amount to refusing relief without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to prove his case. When grant of relief on the existence of certain facts is within the jurisdiction of a Court it is for that Court to determine whether such facts exist. The jurisdiction which initially vests in the Court cannot be ousted by any plea which the defendant advances in the absence of any special provision. In the present case it could not possibly be said that on the plaint, as it was filed, the suit did not lie in the Revenue Court. The plaintiff was alleging that the defendant was his tenant at will or tenant from year to year whom he was entitled to eject at the end of an agricultural year. Assuming that this allegation was true, which Court could eject the tenant? Obviously it was only the Revenue Court. If the defendant accepted the allegation of fact, the Court would have to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff. If instead of accepting the allegations the defendant denies them, the Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the allegations .made in the plaint are correct or not. It the defendant denies the relation of landlord and tenant, the Court has to go into that question. The fact that the defendant raises the plea of adverse possession does not debar the Court from going into the question of the existence of such relationship. It may be found in some judgments of the Financial Com missioners as well as of the High Court that a question of adverse possession is really a .question for decision by a Civil, Court. I have no quarrel with that proposition, but that proposition does not in any way involve that a Revenue Court is debarred from going into the question of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, .merely because the B existence of that relationship depends upon the possession being adverse or permissive. The Revenue Court can, when deciding whether the relationship of landlord and tenant, exists or not, take into consideration the nature of the defendant's possession. It will not finally pronounce as to whether the defendant has acquired title by adverse possession because it is not concerned with that matter. The relation ship of landlord and tenant is a relationship created by a contract, express or implied. The Revenue Court has only to determine the existence of any such implied or express contract. It cannot give any decision whether the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession and even if it gave such a decision that would not bind the parties. For the purpose of explaining the position I may refer here to section 98 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. That section provides that if a matter which is to be decided by a Revenue Court is such that it is more proper for decision by a Civil Court, the Revenue Court may, with the sanction of the Court to which it is immediately subject, order any party to the proceedings to institute a suit in the Civil Court for the purposes of obtaining a decision on the question, and if he fails to comply, may decide the question as it thinks fit. If, on the other hand, the party so directed does file a suit in the Civil Court, then the final decision of the case before the Revenue Court shall be made in accordance with the decision of the Civil Court. There is no doubt that in a case where a defendant raises the plea of adverse possession, the matter for decision by the Revenue Court may be such as would be more proper for decision by a Civil Court. How ever, it would not be so in every case in which the defendant raises the plea of adverse possession. The Revenue Court has to see whether the plea is not merely frivolous and whether the circumstances of the case are such as really require an inquiry into the question of title before the question of relationship of landlord and tenant is determined. The relationship of landlord and tenant is based, as I have already stated, on a contract express or implied and ordinarily a, finding as to the existence of such a contract could be recorded by a Revenue Court without assistance from the Civil Court. Also the procedure under section 98 is purely optional and does not in any way take away the jurisdiction E of the Revenue Court to decide the question that is before it. It is to be remembered that even after the question is decided by the Civil Court, the decree in that suit is to be passed by the Revenue Court and the suit is to remain pending. The suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that the question is more appropriate for determination of a Civil Court. If the party directed does not file a suit, the question has to be decided by the Revenue Court. It should be clear from what I have stated above that the suit as framed was cognizable by a Revenue Court and at no stage did the Revenue Court lose its jurisdiction. This reference to the High Court under section 100 of the Punjab Tenancy Act is not warranted by law. The reference is answered accordingly. The parties will bear their own costs of the reference. A. H. Reference held nor warranted by law.