P L D 1959 (W (PLP)

AKHLAQUE HUSAIN, J.‑These two applications have been made for revising two orders of the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi, dated 8th September 1956, upholding the orders, dated the 21st September 1954, by which Mr. Shamim Ahmad learned XVIth Additional City Magistrate, Karachi, dismissed two complaints by the Chief Officer, Karachi Municipal Corporation against Ahmad Hasan and Haji Moosa under sections 155/256 of the City of Karachi Municipal Act of 1933 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The sole point involved it, these cases is whether a com. by the Chief Officer, which was not signed by the Chief Officer and bore only the facsimile of his signature, could be treated as a valid complaint in view of section 264 (I) of the Act which provides :‑ "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act except on a complaint signed by the Chief Officer". A single Judge decision of this Court reported as Abdul Surtar v. The State (P L D 1958 Kar. 417) has already held that such a complaint can be taken cognizance of by a Court. These two cases were referred to a Division Bench only because some of the points mentioned in the unusually full and thorough order of Mr. Shamim Ahmad were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided Abdul Sattar's case. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not require a com plaint to be signed, or even to be made in writing. The learned Magistrate was therefore quite right in thinking that what was required by subsection (1) of section 264 was the actual signature and not its facsimile. He was also right in thinking that this conclusion is further strengthened by the provisions of sub section (2) which obviously on account of the provisions of subsection (1) dispenses with the necessity of examining the complainant under section 200, Cr. P. C. We have little doubt that had section 264 stood by itself it would have been impossible to accept the facsimile of a signature as a valid substitute for the signature itself, Rule 7 in the First Chapter of the 8th Schedule to the Act, however, provides as follows :‑ "(l) Every licence, written permission, notice, bill, schedule, summons or other document required by this Act or, any rules made thereunder to bear the signature of the Chief Officer or of any municipal officer shall be deemed to be properly signed if 1t bears a facsimile of the signature of the Chief Officer or of such municipal officer, as the case may be, stamped there upon. (2) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to apply to a cheque drawn upon the municipal or education fund". Emphasis was laid by learned Magistrate, with obvious justification, on the fact that as the Chapter is titled "Notices and Advertisements" the expression "other document" in sub rule (1) cannot reasonably be deemed to include such an important document as a complaint of an offence against a citizen. Learned Magistrate, however, failed to notice that the other rules in the Chapter clearly demonstrate that its title is in fact inexact and misleading. The rules provide for as important documents as those whose validity depends upon the consent and approval of the Chief Officer (Rule 2) and bills and schedules (Rule 3). These documents cannot by any stretch of logic be described either as notices or advertisements. Learned Magistrate has also drawn an inference from section 282 of the Act w1iich cannot be justified. This section runs :‑ "The Corporation may add to Schedules I, VI (except Chapter X), VIII and IX rules not inconsistent with the pro visions of this Act (which expression shall in this section be deemed not to include the said schedules) to provide for any of the matters dealt with in such schedules, or for any of the purposes specified in section 286 and may, subject to the same limitation amend, alter, or annul any rule in the said schedules: Provided that, if any rule regulating the punishment of an offence is altered or amended, the punishment to be awarded under such altered or amended rule shall not exceed the maximum prescribed in section 285". The learned Magistrate has rightly remarked that the Corporation cannot make any rules inconsistent with the pro visions of the Act ; and had the rule in question been framed by the Corporation we would have had no hesitation in endorsing the conclusion of the learned Magistrate. But the rule in question has admittedly not been framed by the Corporation. It was framed by the Legislature itself as a part of the Act. So long a] the Corporation does not alter it, that rule must be read as a part of the Act itself and, in the absence of a clear conflict B between it and any section of the Act, given full effect by accepting the obvious meaning of the language used therein. Every attempt has to be made to reconcile the rule with the provisions in the relevant sections of the Act. The words "licence, written permission, notice, bill, schedule, summons" do not belong to the same genus or species and, therefore, the doctrine of ejusdem generis cannot be applied in interpreting the expression "or other document" which immediately follows them. The words "or other document required by this Act or any rules made thereunder to bear the signature of the Chief Officer" are unequivocally clear and are applicable to a com plaint which is required by section 264 to be signed by the Chief Officer. Subsection (2) makes it clearer still that all documents, excepting a cheques, required by the Act to be signed by the A Chief Officer may validly bear only the facsimile of the Chief, Officer's signature. For the above reasons we are in respectful agreement with the ruling in Abdul Sattar v. The State and allow these applica tions. We hereby set aside the order of both the lower Courts and direct that the learned Magistrate should restore the two complaints in question to their original number and proceed to try the cases according to law. A. H. Applications allowed.