P L D 1996 Supreme Court 831 (PLP)

FAZAL ILAHI KHAN, J.‑‑ According to petitioner a dispute arose between the parties which was to be settled through arbitrator regarding which on 2‑12‑1981 a deed was executed. On the conclusion of Arbitration proceedings the petitioner requested the learned Senior Civil Judge, D.I. Khan to direct the arbitrator to file the award so that it could be made rule of Court. In response to the notice issued by the Court respondent in his application denied his having executed the arbitration agreement. After recording evidence of the parties the Senior Civil Judge, D.I. Khan held that there was no valid arbitration agreement or award between the parties and on such finding dismissed the petition. Appeal against the same was dismissed by the learned District Judge on 11‑5‑1988 on the ground that it was not competent. The petitioner filed revision petition No.52 of 1988 against the said order of the learned District Judge. The Revision Petition was accepted and the case was remanded to the learned Judge on 24‑1‑1990. On remand the learned District Judge held that it had no pecuniary jurisdiction, therefore, returned the file to the petitioner for presentation in a Court of competent jurisdiction, although such objection has been earlier rejected by his predecessor. The petitioner then filed Civil Revision in the High Court (Civil Revision No.6 of 1993) in which orders of the Courts below were challenged. The learned High Court dismissed the revision petition by judgment dated 8‑5‑1995. Leave to appeal is prayed for against the judgment of the learned High Court.

2. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner at great length and going through the various orders passed in this case it is abundantly clear that the entire superstructure of the petitioner case is built on the arbitration agreement, copy of which has been placed on file. The learned trial Judge dismissed the petition on the ground that execution of the arbitration agreement was denied. The petitioner neither produced the original agreement nor the award was registered. However, the appeal as well as the revision petition against the judgment and decree both were dismissed by the learned District Judge for want of pecuniary jurisdiction and by the learned High Court refusing to convert the revision petition into appeal at belated stage.

3. Be that as it may, we have gone through the alleged arbitration agreement and on the face of it found it an ambiguous document which could not be made the basis of a valid reference to the arbitrator for making an award. The document which is alleged to be an arbitration agreement is silent as to what was the nature of the dispute between the parties at the terms on which they agreed to refer it to the arbitrator for his award. Such being the case the finding of the learned Senior Civil Judge given on merits is unexceptional. For the reasons we are not inclined to consider the objection raised before us regarding the finding on pecuniary jurisdiction and competency of the revision, petition before the learned High Court.

4. Arbitration agreement as defined under section 2‑A 11means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether arbitrator is named therein or not". The existence of dispute is essential for a reference to be resolved through adjudication of such dispute culminating in an award. If the dispute is shrouded in mystery and not clearly stated no reference could be visualised for settlement through arbitration. The agreement in question as already stated is vague and there is no mention of any specific dispute to be referred to arbitrator for its settlement. The arbitration proceedings, even if any taken, which has been denied by the respondents are vitiated. Reference can be made to "Sheodutte v. Pandit Vishmidatta and another AIR 1955 Nagpur 116 and Deep Narain Singh and others v. Mt. Dhaneshward and others AIR 1960 Patna 201 (V 47 C 68) for the proposition. For the reasons stated above we find no substance in this petition for leave to appeal and dismiss the same. However, as it has been held that there was no, valid arbitration agreement the petitioner can if he has any claim against the respondents, if so advised, seek his redress from the Civil Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that an observation be made that such suit, if filed, shall not be considered barred by time under section 14 of the Limitation Act. No observation is required as it will be for the Court concerned, on facts of the case, to decide such plea, if raised, on merits. A.A/A‑1402/S Leave refused.