PLD 1960

P L D 1960 (W (PLP)

Khawaja HAFIZ‑UR‑REHMAN AND ANOTHER‑Petitioners Versus THE COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE AND LAND

Jurisdiction / Court
Decided Date
Writ Petition No. 642 of 1959, decided on 28th January 1960.
Honorable Judges
M. R. Kayani C. J. and B. Z. Kaikaus, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 1960 (W (PLP)
Forum / Court
Bench Members M. R. Kayani C. J. and B. Z. Kaikaus, J
Parties Khawaja HAFIZ‑UR‑REHMAN AND ANOTHER‑Petitioners Versus THE COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE AND LAND
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1960 (W (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1960 (W (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: M. R. Kayani C. J. and B. Z. Kaikaus, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1960 (W (PLP) (Khawaja HAFIZ‑UR‑REHMAN AND ANOTHER‑Petitioners Versus THE COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE AND LAND). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Kh. Abdur Rahim for Petitioners.
  • Kamal Mustafa Bokhary for Respondent.

Headnotes / Summary

Sea Customs Act (VIII of 1878), S. 167 (81) read with S. 177‑A‑Sections not congruous‑Offence complete only when a person acquires possession with particular intention, not merely by acquisition of possession‑Collector holding inquiry in which person proceeded against had not participated‑Case ordered to be disposed of after grant of opportunity to meet case. When section 167 (81) and section 177‑A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 are placed side by side, they do not produce a congruous provision. On an analysis the offence under section 167 (81), Sea Customs Act, is complete only when a person acquires possession with a particular intention, not merely by the acquisi tion of possession. Though the alleged offenders were given a personal hearing by the Collector, the inquiry ordered by the Collector for the purpose of finding out whether the memos produced in respect of the purchase of goods were genuine, was conducted in their absence and they had no opportunity to criticise or question the evidence or reports made against them. The High Court, on a writ petition, directed that the case be disposed of after granting the petitioners an opportunity to meet the case against them. The Federation of Pakistan v. Sardar Ali P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 25 rel.

Judgment & Decree

4. For the purpose of verification he ordered " further' enquiries into the genuineness of the vouchers ", and, apparently after these enquiries had been conducted, observed in his order teat "it has been established, according to the Customs Intelligence report, that the bills in question produced by the accused in their defence are not genuine ", and that " no such firm as Messrs Mushtaq Ahmad, Cloth Merchants, Chowk Yadgar, Peshawar City, exists ." The petitioners complain that the enquiry was conducted in their absence, and that they bad no opportunity to criticise or question the evidence or reports made against them. They rely on The Federation of Pakistan v. Sardar Ali (P L R 1959 S C 728 : P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 25) which is a case very similar to the present, and it will only be necessary to reproduce from it the following passage:

" It appears to us that the full import of the amendments made in the law was not realised by the Customs authorities or even by the Central Board of Revenue. In view of the new law placing a definite onus on the possessor of this type of goods, clearly such a person is entitled to an opportunity of not only being heard but of adducing evidence, if necessary, to discharge that onus. This opportunity has in fact been denied to the respondents in the present case. After the receipt of a notice from the Assistant Collector to show cause and the submission by them of a written explanation together with 'certain receipts and vouchers, an Intelligence Officer appears to have been deputed to make an exparte enquiry in order to verify whether the defence raised was true or not. Certain witnesses were apparently examined by the Intelligence Officer behind the back of the respondents who had no chance of cross‑examining them to elicit facts in their own favour. The statements made by those witnesses were not even put to the respondents at any stage and we have it on the authority of the learned counsel for the respondents that for the first time they became aware that any such statements had been recorded by a departmental officer, during the pendency of the writ proceed ings in the High Court. We feel not a little disturbed that prejudicial action could be taken by the Customs Officers in a matter touching valuable rights to property as well as the personal liberty of the subject, on the basis of a private enquiry in which the person concerned was not allowed to participate."

5. Learned counsel for the Collector, however, argued that since the petitioners had been found in possession of goods which were reasonably believed to be smuggled, the burden of proving that they were not smuggled rested on the petitioners under section 177‑A, Sea Customs Act. Apart from the fact that their Lordships of the Supreme Court had this very burden in mind, when they made the aforesaid observations, .we have come to the conclusion that when section 167 (81) and section 177‑A of the Sea Customs Act are A placed side by side, they do not produce a congruous provision We reproduce them below so far as relevant: Offence Penalty Section 167 (81)" If any person knowingly and with intent . . . . to evade any prohibition or restriction for the time being in force . . . . . with respect thereto acquires possession of . . . . any goods. . . with respect to the importation or exportation of which any prohibition or res triction is for the time being in force . . . " Such goods shall be liable to confiscation, and the person concerned, in any such offence, shall be liable to a penalty, not exceeding five times the value of the goods.

6. To avoid tautology and to bring about simplicity, which is seldom the merit of a fiscal statute, we shall render the offence thus: " If any person knowingly and with intent to evade any prohibition or restriction for the time being in force with respect to the importation or exportation of any goods acquires possession of such goods . . . . . " Section 177A‑" (1) where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that an act to defraud the Government of any duty payable thereon or, to evade any prohibition or restriction for the time being in force by or under this Act has been committed in respect of such goods, . . . the burden of proving that no such act has been committed . . . . . shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized."

7. Consequently, when the petitioners were found in possession of these goods, it was presumed that " an act to evade any prohibition or restriction . . . has been committed in respect of such goods", and if they did not discharge the burden, it could be held proved that an act of evasion had been committed. But there was no presumption that the act was committed by the petitioners.

8. Now go back to section 167 (81). The person who commits the offence under that provision acquires possession of such goods " knowingly and with intent to evade any prohibition or restriction." It is that person who should have the criminal intention, and if section 177‑A does not presume any criminal intention against him, how does he commit an offence under section 167 (81) ?

9. It is true that the penalty clause says that " such goods shall be liable to confiscation ", and it was therefore argued that if the offence was committed in respect of the goods, then at least the goods can be forfeited, irrespective of the possessor's intention. But the penalty clause also says that " the person concerned . . . . . shall be liable to a penalty . . . . . ", so that the penalty is visited not merely on the goods, but on the person also. Then it has to be seen that the offence is described by introducing the offender foremost : " If any person, knowingly. and with intent to defraud, . . . . acquires possession of . . any goods . . . . . ", not " If any goods are found in possession of any person." The offence is thus complete only when a person acquires possession with a particular intention, not merely by the acquisition of possession.

10. It will also be of interest to point out that when item (81) was first added to section 167 by Ordinance III of 1954, it reads thus : ' " 81.‑If any person is found in possession of . . . . any goods chargeable with a duty which has not been paid or the importation or exportation whereof is for the time being prohibited or restricted . . . . . "

11. In the Act which superseded the Ordinance, however, the words " knowingly, and with intent to defraud the Govern ment of any duty payable thereon, or to evade any prohibition or restriction for the time being in force " have been introduced, and, as we said in another case, they must have been introduced "knowingly " and with some intent.

12. We accept this petition with costs, and direct the Collector of Central Excise and Land Custom, Lahore, to dispose of the case after granting the petitioners, ad opportunity l to meet the case against them. A. H. Petition accepted.