P L D 1959 Supreme Court (Pak) 272 (PLP)

H. S. Suhrawardy, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, S. R. Pal, Advocate Supreme Court. M. J. Jaffar, Advocate, High Court, under rule 4, Order V, Supreme Court Rules, 1956, with him), instructed by Naimuddin Ahmad, Attorney for Appellant. B. A. Siddiky, Advocate‑General East Pakistan, A. T. M. Mus tafa, Advocate, Supreme Court with him), instructed by K. Hossain, Attorney for Respondent No.

1. Respondents Nos. 2, 3 & 4: Ex parte. C. A. No. 12‑D of 1958 Asrarul Hossain, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court, (Muhammad Meser Ali, Advocate, Supreme Court with him), instructed by Abdur Rub, Attorney for Appellants. B.A. Siddiky, Advocate‑General, East Pakistan, (A.T.M. Mus tafa, Advocate, Supreme Court with him), instructed by K. Hossain, Attorney for Respondent No.

1. Respondent No. 2 : Ex parte. S.K. Sen, Advocate, Supreme Court, instructed by D.N. Dutta, Attorney for Respondent No, 3, Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (Meser Ali, Advocate Supreme Court, with him), instructed by D. K. Khadim, Attorney for Appellants. B. A. Siddiky, Advocate‑General East Pakistan, (A.T.M. Mustafa, Advocate Supreme Court, with him), instructed by K. Hossain, Attorney for Respondent No.

1. Respondents 2‑6 : Ex parte. Date of hearing : 18th May 1959. MUHAMMAD MUNIR, C. J.‑This order will apply to Civil Appeals Nos. 19, 12‑D and 38‑D of 1958, which arise out of different orders made by a Division Bench of the High Court of East Pakistan at Dacca on different dates and on different appli cations for writs. There is nothing common in these appeals except the question whether the order of the High Court dismissing the applications summarily was a proper order. In Civil Appeal No. 19 certain notifications of the Provincial Government under the Industrial Disputes Act were called in question by the employers by an application for a writ. An indus trial dispute between eight mills and three labour unions had been referred to the Industrial Tribunal on the 20th August 1956. There was an amicable settlement between the three Unions and 4 out of the eight mills. On the basis of this settlement an interim award was given by the Tribunal, which was published by the Pro vincial Government in the official gazette of 29th January 1957, and declared binding on the parties for a period of one year. The dispute between the Unions and the remaining mills was pending with the Industrial Tribunal when, in consequence of some demands made by another Union, the Government on 22nd Octo ber 1957, cancelled their notification of 29th January 1957 and referred the dispute, including the items in respect of which a settlement had already been arrived at, to the Tribunal. Later on this notification was also cancelled and a fresh reference was made on 7th February 1958. Subsequently on 15th July 1958, the noti fication of 7th February was also cancelled and another reference made under sections 7 and 10 of the Act to the 2nd Industrial Tribunal. The main point taken in the application for a writ, which was presented on behalf of the aggrieved mills, was that the Provincial Government had no jurisdiction to issue the notifica tions subsequent to the notification of the 29th January 1957, and that so far as the matters covered by the award of 24th January 1957, were concerned, the award having actually been acted upon by the parties, the subsequent notifications to the extent that they related to the demands already settled were invalid. The applica tion prima facie raised an arguable question for consideration and decision, but the High Court dismissed the application by the short order "This writ petition is rejected". Appeal No. 12‑D arises out of a similar order recorded on an application for a writ made by one Haji Safar Saud and others against the Province of East Pakistan. The applicants had called in question the acquisition of certain property by the Provincial Government under a notification dated the 1st August 1956, which had been issued in pursuance of a pre‑Partition notification of the 6th October 1945. The property had been acquired by the Provin cial Government for the Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills, a company whose head office had been transferred from Dacca to Calcutta with the establishment of Pakistan. The points taken in the appli cation were: ‑ (1) that the Government had no jurisdiction to acquire the land for a foreign company; (2) that the land was being acquired for the benefit of a private person and not for the benefit of the company ; (3) that several irregularities had been committed in the acqui sition of the land, and (4) that some of the land was wakf or covered by graveyard which could not, under the law, be acquired. These were substantial questions which had to be properly adjudi cated upon by the High Court if the application was not dismissed on other grounds but in this case also the High Court recorded the same order "This writ petition is rejected". In the application for a writ which gives rise to Appeal No. 38‑D, two notices issued by the Provincial Government under section 5 of Act X of 1953, East Bengal Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act, 1952 and the action taken in pur suance thereof were challenged, the ground for the application for a writ inter alia being the Act was not at all applicable to the case presented in the application, and that because of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code a suit could not immediately be instituted. This application also was summarily dismissed by the High Court. On the applications of the appellants two cases were certified by the High Court for appeal to the Supreme Court, while in the case of Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1958, special leave to appeal was given by this Court on the 20th November 1957. The question that arises in these appeals is whether when an application for a writ is made to the High Court in which a serious question is presented for consideration, it is a proper course for the High Court to dismiss the application by a summary order without recording any reasons, though an appeal to the Supreme Court lies as of right. Of course, a writ petition may be rejected on the ground that it is belated or that there is another equally efficacious remedy open to the petitioner or that the petition raises disputed questions of facts which cannot be properly investigated) in writ proceedings. But where such is the case, the ground should be stated and in the absence of any indication in the order that it was dismissed for any such reason the Supreme Court will presume that the petition was dismissed on the merits and on that view an order of the kind recorded in these cases is obviously an unsatisfactory method of disposal. There are two basic objec tions to this procedure (1) the Supreme Court has no idea of the) grounds on which the application was dismissed and is thus deprived of the benefit of the High Court's opinion, and (2) the non‑suited party has no means of knowing that the questions raised by him were considered by the High Court. There may, of course, be cases where the High Court may refuse to interfere without recording a reasoned order, as for instance, where the Court has before it a properly recorded order of a Subordinate Court or a statutory authority. But where there has been no prior adjudication of a matter and substantial questions of law are raised by an applicant invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, it is, in our opinion, the undoubted duty of the High Court` to state what the precise point raised by tale applicant was and the grounds on which it was rejected. This is all the more necessary where an appeal in the case lies to the Supreme Court as of right. We are, therefore, constrained in each of these appeals to` set aside the order of the High Court and to remit the applications for reconsideration and the recording of a proper order. It will be open to the High Court if after hearing the arguments it decides to issue a rule nisi to do so and then dispose of the application according to law: In Appeal No. 12‑D the temporary injunction already issued by the High Court will continue till the decision of the application. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court. A. H. Cases remanded.