P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

FAIZULLAH KHAN, J.‑Writ Petitions Nos. 354, 394, 405, 397 and 587 of 1964 have been instituted, respectively, at the instance of Umara Khan, Amiruddin, Roza Din, Mir Badshah and Sardar Khan, and are directed against the Regional Transport Authority, Peshawar, and Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore, challenging the decisions, of the Regional Transport Authority which were affirmed on appeal by the Board of Revenue, whereunder the route permits of the petitioners have been suspended for a period of six months. Since a common question regarding the true interpretation of subsection (3) of section 59, in particular clause (b) read with section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is involved, all these writ petitions can be conveniently dealt with in a consolidated judgment.

2. The admitted facts, giving rise to these writ petitions, briefly are that the drivers of the motor vehicles covered by various permits were involved in accidents and cases under section 304‑A were registered against them. Ajab Khan and Khial Badshah drivers of the vehicles, respectively, in Writ Petitions Nos. 406 and 397 have been convicted, while the criminal cases against the drivers in the remaining three Writ Petitions Nos. 354, 394 and 587 ended either in discharge or acquittal.

3. Mian Yunas Shah, learned counsel for Amiruddin petitioner vehemently argued that since Mr. Bashir Ahmad, Magistrate, 1st Class by his order dated 30th October 1963, had discharged the driver, the finding of the criminal Court was conclusive and binding on the Regional Transport Authority and the petitioner cannot be held to have committed breach of any of the conditions specified in subsection (3) of section 59 or of any condition contained in the permit within the meaning of section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Reliance was placed on the decision in Jemroa D'Silva v. The Regional Transport Authority, South Kanara and another (A I R 1952 Mad. 853).

4. Mr. Abdul Qadus Khan, learned counsel for Sardar Khan petitioner, adopted the argument of Mian Yunas Shah, learned counsel for Amiruddin petitioner, in that in his case too the driver had not been convicted. The case of Umara Khan is also similar to that of Amiruddin and Sardar Khan, as in his case also the driver had not been convicted.

5. Mian Muhammad Yunas, Advocate, on behalf of Sardar Usman Ali Shah, Advocate for Roza Din and Mir Badshah petitioners argued that the convictions of the drivers for rash and negligent act did not per se render the permits to be cancelled or suspended, in that the order for cancellation or suspension of the permits could be made only for breach of any of the conditions mentioned in subsection (3) of section 59 or of any conditions in the permit and the conviction for rash and negligent driving had not been mentioned in subsection (3) of section 59 nor was it one of the conditions contained in the permit.

6. Mr. Sher Bahadur Khan, Additional Advocate‑General, on the other hand, argued that the convictions of the drivers for rash and negligent act ipso facto rendered the permits liable to be cancelled or suspended as the case would come under the mischief of clause (b) of subsection (3) of section

59. In regard to the remaining three cases (in which the drivers had been either discharged or acquitted) the learned Additional Advocate‑General tried to argue that the very fact that the vehicles were involved in accidents resulting in loss of lives, and cases under section 304‑A, P. P. C. were registered against the drivers, was sufficient warrant that the vehicles were "driven at a speed exceeding the speed lawful" under the Vehicles Act, and clause (b) of subsection (3) would be attracted. In other words, it was argued that as soon as the vehicle was involved in accident and a case for rash and negligent driving registered, it was to be presumed that the vehicle was driven in excess of the authorised speed and consequently a breach of clause (b) of subsection (3) was brought about. It may be mentioned here that the maximum speed limit for the vehicles with which we are concerned is 25 miles.

7. Since the decision of the cases turns on the interpretation of subsection (3) of section 59 and section 60 (1) (a), it will be convenient to reproduce the said sections. Subsection (3) is in the following terms :‑ "59. (1) . . . . . . . . . . . (2) . . . . . . . . . . . (3) The following shall be conditions of every permit‑ (a) that the vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates are at all times so maintained as to comply with the requirements of Chapter V and the rules made thereunder (b) that the vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates are not driven at a speed exceeding the speed lawful under this Act; (c) that any prohibition or restriction imposed and any maximum or minimum fares or freights fixed by notification made under section 43 are observed in connection with any vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates ; (d) that the vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates are not driven in contravention of the provisions of section 72 ; (e) that the provisions of this Act limiting the hours of work of drivers are observed in connection with any vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates ; and (f )that the provisions of Chapter VIII so far as they apply to the holder of the permit are observed. Subsection (1) (a) of section 60 runs thus "60. (1) The transport authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit‑ (a) On the breach of any condition specified in subsection (3) of section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit, or (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . (d) . . . . . . . . . . . . It will be noticed that rash and negligent driving has not been mentioned in clause (b) of subsection (3). The said clause merely states that a vehicle could not be driven at a speed exceeding the lawful speed, i.e. mentioned in Schedule 8 for various classes of vehicles.

8. We do not feel called upon in the instance cases to decide the broad question whether the conviction of a driver for a rash and negligent act per se would constitute a breach of clause (b) of subsection (3) as we think that the cases of Roza Din and Mir Badshah petitioners (in which the drivers were convicted) can be decided on the narrow point that from the perusal of the order dated 18‑11‑1964 of Qamar Ali Shah, Section 30 Magistrate, Nowshera, in Case No. 202/2 in which Khial Badshah driver of vehicle involved in Writ Petition No. 397 of 1964 was concerned and the judgment dated 26‑4‑63 of one of us in Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 1963, in which Ajab Khan driver of the vehicle involved in Writ Petition No. 406 of 1964 was concerned, it has been in most unequivocal terms held that the drivers in both these cases had been driving the vehicles at a speed exceeding 25 miles which is the maximum speed limit. It follows from the above discussion that in both the cases there was a breach of clause (b) and as such the order of suspension of the permits in these two cases cannot be called into question. Writ Petitions Nos. 397 and 406 of 1964 are, therefore, dismissed with costs.

9. This takes us to the remaining three writ petitions in which the prosecution failed to secure convictions of the drivers of the vehicles concerned. We are not unmindful of the fact that mere speeding does not constitute a rash and negligent act and, therefore, in a given case notwithstanding the discharge or acquittal of the accused for rash and negligent driving there may be a finding or some other legal evidence from which it can be held that the driver had committed a breach of clause (b,) of sub section (3) of section 59 of the Act by driving the vehicle in excess of the maximum limit and in such a case notwithstanding the acquittal or discharge of the accused the Regional Transport Authority may suspend the licence for violation of the breach of clause (b) of subsection (3), referred to above. In the instant cases however, the judgments of the Magistrates discharging or acquitting the accused are not on the record, nor the learned Additional Advocate‑General produced any such judgment to show that notwithstanding the discharge or acquittal of the accused on the charge of section 304‑A, there was a finding of any other legal evidence to suggest, much less prove, that the vehicle had been driven in excess of the authorised speed. Since the Regional Transport Authority is a quasi judicial body, therefore, there must be some evidence before it to sustain the finding that there had been a breach of clause (b), i.e., the vehicle concerned had been driven in excess of the authorised limit, and in the absence of any legal evidence that the vehicle had been driven in excess of the authorised limit the mere fact that the truck was involved in an accident cannot be considered as a proof of the fact that the vehicle had been driven at a speed not authorised by the law. It is well‑settled proposition of law that suspicions, however grave are after all suspicions and cannot take the place of proof. We may profitably quote the observations of V. D. Bhargava, J, in Brij Bhusan Pandey v. State Transport Authority, Lucknow and another (A I R 1958 All. 30) on this point. At page 32 in para. 8 his Lordship observed :‑ "The Regional Transport Authority is in the nature of a quasi judicial body and in acting as such, though it may not be bound by the strict law of evidence or the Code of Civil Procedure, yet it has to have some kind of proof before it can act upon it. In cases of convictions, unless the owners are aware of those convictions and unless these convictions are properly established before the Regional Transport Authority, it would not be proper for it to act merely on the reports of the Superintendent of Police."

10. It follows from the above discussion that the suspension of the permits in the three Writ Petitions, namely, 354, 394 and 587 of 1964, cannot be sustained. We accordingly accept these writ petitions with costs. S. A. H./S. Q. Petitions accepted.