1977 PLP 605 (PLC)

6. It is submitted by Mr. Sarwana that Mr. Sarwar the Labour Welfare Inspector who had presented the appeal was lawfully authorised by the Chairman to present the appeal on behalf of the Karachi Port Trust petitioner

1. He was also authorised by petitioner 2 namely, Chief Mechani cal & Electrical Engineer, K. P. T., Karachi. It is not disputed by Mr. Mirza Abdul Rashid, Advocate that the Karachi Port Trust is a statutory body and exercises its powers and functions either through its Board or through its Chairman or other officers and servants appointed either by the Board or by its Chairman. However Mr. Mirza Abdul Rashid, Advocate submitted that the Chairman could not delegate his powers to Sarwar who had signed the appeal.

7. In my opinion the submission is misconceived in view of the pro visions of section 23 (1) of the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886 which provides as follows:- "23.

(1) Subject to the provisions of the regulations made under section 22 and of the schedule of officers and servants for the time being in force, all administrative powers including those of appointing, promoting, suspending and punishing the officers and servants of the Board and of grant of leave to them shall be exercised by the Chairman in the case of persons drawing pay in the scale of which the maximum does not exceed five hundred rupees and in every other case by the Board provided that the Chairman may by order in writing delegate all or any of his powers under this subsection to the respective Heads of Departments or such other officer as he may think fit."

8. It will be seen from the above provisions that the Chairman, K. P. T. is authorised to delegate his powers to any officer of the Karachi Port Trust. The word 'officer' has not been defined in the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886, nor has it been defined in the General Clauses Act. However, the word `officer' finds place in the 10th description of the words 'public servant' contained in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code and was considered in that context by the Supreme Court of India in G. A. Monterio v. The Estate of Ajmer (P L D 1957 S C (Ind.) 170) and it was observed as follows :- "The true test, therefore, in order to determine whether a person is an officer of the Government, is (1) Whether he is in the service or pay of the Government, and (2) Whether he is entrusted with the performance of any public duty. If both these requirements are satisfied it matters not the least what is the nature of his office. Whether the duties he is performing are of an exalted character or very humble indeed. As has been stated in Becon's Abridgement at Vol. VI, page 2, in the article headed "Of the nature of an officer and the several kinds of officers". The word 'officium' principally implies s duty, and in the next place, the charge of such duty, and that it is a rule that whet,, one man hath to do with another's affairs against his will, and without his leave, that this is an office, and he who is in it is an officer." The neat paragraph thereafter may also be referred to in this context : "There is a difference between an office and an employment, every office being an employment, but there are employments which do not come under the denomination of offices: such as an agreement to mare bay, herd a flock, etc. which differ widely from that of steward of a manor" etc. (Vide 12 Bom. H. C. B. 1 at page 5). This was the sense in which the decision in 12 Bom. H C R 1 was understood by the learned Judges of the Lahore high Court in Ahad Shah v. Emperor, when they observed at page 157: But it is not enough that a person should be in the pay or service of Government to constitute him a public servant within the meaning of section 21 (ninethly), P. P. C. He roust also be an Officer. That expression is not, of course, to be restricted to its colloquital meaning of a Commissioned or non-Commissioned Officer it means a functionary or holder of some 'Officum' or office. The office may be one of dignity or importance, it may equally be humble gut whatever its nature, it is essential that the person holding the office, should have in some degree delegated to him certain functions of Government"

9. Following the above observation I am inclined to hold that to be an `officer' it is not necessary that one must be of a higher grade and accordingly Sarwar the Labour Welfare Inspector even though he was of Grade II-A was an 'officer' within the meaning of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 23 of the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886. Moreover, it is not disputed before me that Sarwar was not an officer of the Karachi Port Trust or that he was not armed with the authority of petitioner

2. In any case, since Sarwar had been appearing and attending the proceedings before the Junior Labour Court without any objection from respondent 1 norm of justice required that the Chairman, K. P. T. should have been given an opportunity by respondent 2 to himself sign the appeal. Therefore, the order of dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it was not filed by an authorised officer is without lawful authority and it is accordingly declared to be or no legal effect.

10. I may also mention that another submission of Mr. Mirza Abdul Rashid was that the Chairman bad no powers to re-delegate his powers but it is not a case of re-delegation but simply of delegation of powers under the proviso to subsection (1) of section 23 of the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886.

11. In the end, Mr. Mirza Abdul Rashid, Advocate consents to remand of the appeal for decision on merits. I accordingly, remand it for decision ors merits. I however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. S. Q. Case remanded,