1973 PLP 159 (PLC)

(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss. 34, 36(2) & 37(14) read with Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, rr. 1 & 2 and O. XLIII-Interim injunction Order of Labour Court refusing to grant interim injunction- Whether appealable. Order of Labour Court refusing to grant interim F injunction restraining the Management from implementing its order of reversion of appellant (worker) pending decision on main application under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1'369, was being challenged in appeal before the Labour Appel late Tribunal. It was contended that having regard to section 36(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the labour Courts and Appellate Tribunals are Courts of civil jurisdiction and as such provisions of Order XLIII of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, providing appeal against order regarding interim injunction passed by Labour Court under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.Would be appealable before Labour Appellate Tribunal. Held: On a perusal of sub-clause (2), of section 36 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 it would appear that it is only for the purposes of adjudication and determination of an industrial dispute that the Labour Court shall be deemed to be a civil Court. There is a clear distinction between the appellate jurisdiction and jurisdiction to adjudicate and deter mine the jurisdiction to hear appeal has to be conferred by statute. Under sub-clause (4) of section 37 of the Ordinance, the power of appeal against decisions, except under section 25-Ay has been taken away. The appeal would lie only against awards. At any rate, even if the Tribunal under sun-clause (3) of section 38 of the Ordinance had the same power as the Labour Court, but it is subject to any other provision made in the Ordi nance. The Ordinance specifically provides that no appeal would lie against decisions, except a decision under section: 25-A of the Ordinance. If the intention of the Legislature was to make all orders or decisions appealable, such a limitation would not have been provided under sub-clause (4) of section 37 of the Ordinance. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss. 2(ii) & 37(4) read with Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) 0- XXXIX. rr. 1 & 2-Interim injunction-Order of Labour Court whether appellant is entitled of not to interim injunction pending decision on main application under S. 34-Not an award-Not appealable. Application under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was fending before Labour Court challenging order of reversion of appellant workman. The Labour Court rejected an application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 praying for interim injunction against Management restraining it from implementing its order of reversion on the ground that reversion had already taken place before filing the application under section

34. It was contended that the order of Labour Court refusing to grant interim Injunction was an award and as such appealable bef9re the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Held: The, phrase "any matter relating thereto", is the definition of "award" in section 2(ii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, may be read ejusdem generis with the employ ment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person. The point for considera tion in the present case is as to whether the impugned order refusing to grant ad Interim injunction restraining the Manage ment from reverting the appellant on the ground that the appellant had already been reverted prior to its filing the applica tion under section 34 of the Ordinance amounts to an award. Such an order does not decide or determine any industrial dispute. The Labour Court has not disposed of the dispute between the appellant and the Management. All that the Court bas held is that the appellant is not entitled to ad interim injunction. Whether the appellant is entitled to injunction or not, cannot be said to be a question relating to the employ ment, non-employment or terms and conditions of service. The question as to whether the appellant was entitled to ad interim injunction or not is an independent question, which has nothing to do with the main question as to whether the respondent could revert the appellant or not. This question has yet to be decided by the Court. It is, therefore, beyond doubt that the impugned order is not an award, but only a decision or an order, which is not appealable under section 37(4) of the Ordinance. The Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.'s case 1967 P L, C 691 held not applicable. Management of Municipal Committee, Mianwali's care P L D 1968 Lah. 395 distinguished Wasi Ahmad for the Union. This is an appeal against an order of the learned Chairman of the Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi, dated April 24, 1972. The impugned order was passed on an application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C, for ad interim injunction restraining the Zonal Manager, Karachi Omni Bus Service, from implementing its order of reversion! as 'Conductor pending ' the disposal of the appellant's application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). The learned Chairman accepted the contention of the Zonal Manager that the appellant had already been reverted before he had filed his application under section 34 of the Ordinance and under Order XXXIX, C. P. C. On that conclusion the question of ad interim injunction did not arise.

2. A preliminary objection has been taken that the appeal being against a decision or order of the learned Chairman, it was final and, therefore, no appeal lay under section 31 of the Ordinance. Mr. Wasi Ahmad, the learned Representative fir the appellant, raised two-fold contentions before me, that is, (1) that the Labour Courts and the Tribunal being Courts of Civil Jurisdiction provision of Order XLIII, C. P. C., which provides for appeal against orders passed under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. would be applicable. and (2) that the impugned order refusing to grant the injunction restraining the respondent from reverting the appellant amounts to an award. I propose to dispose of these two contentions separately. "A Labour Court shall, for the purpose of adjudicating and determining any Industrial dispute, be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). . . . . . . . . . (a) . . . . . . . . . . (b) . . . . . . . . . . (c) . . . . . . . . . . (d) . . . . . . . . . .

4. Under sub-clause (3) of section 38 of (be Ordinance, "the Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the award, and shall exercise all the powers conferred by this Ordinance on the Court, save as otherwise provided. . . . . . . ." On a perusal of sub-clause (2) of section 36 of the Ordinance, it would appear that it is only for the purposes of adjudication and determination of an industrial dispute that the Labour Court shall be deemed to be a civil Court. There is a clear distinction between the appellate jurisdiction and jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine The jurisdiction to hear appeal has to be conferred by statute, Under sub-clause (4) of section 37 of the Ordinance, the power of appeal against decisions, except under section 25-A, bus been taken away, The appeal would lie only against award. At any rate, even if the Tribunal under sub-clause (3) of section 38 of the Ordinance bad the same power as the Labour Court, but it is subject to any other provision made in the Ordinance. The Ordinance, as already observed, specifically provides that no appeal would lie against decision, except a decision under section 25-A of the Ordinance. If the intention of the Legislature was to make all orders or decisions appealable, such a limitation would not have been provided under sub-clause (4) of section 37 of the Ordinance. "'Award' means the determination by a Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award; 'Industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person ;"

6. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that the phrase "any matter relating thereto", in the definition of "Award" may be read ejusdem generis with the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person. The point for consideration now is as to whether the impugned order refusing to grant ad interim injunction restraining the Management from reverting the appellant as Conductor on the ground that the appellant had already been reverted prior to its filing the application under section 34 of the Ordinance amounts to an award. I am of the view that it does not decide or determine any industrial dispute. The learned Court rightly observed that "if the applicant succeeds in proving his contentions in the application under section 34 of the

1. R. O., 1969, he will be granted the reliefs he seeks."

7. The learned Court has not disposed of the dispute between the appellant and the Management. All that the Court has held is that the appellant is not entitled to ad interim injunction. Whether the appellant is entitled to injunction or not, cannot be said to be a question relating to the employment, non -employment or terms and conditions of service.

8. Mr. Wasi Ahmad, in support of his contention that the impugned order may be read as award, relied on two cases. One is that of the Supreme Court of Pakistan -The Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Limited (1967 P L C 691). In that case the Supreme Court of Pakistan came to the conclusion that the award being appealable the order interpreting also would be appealable. This case has no application to the circumstances of the present case. The other case on which Mr. Wasi Ahmad relied is that of the Management of Municipal Committee, Mianwali (P L D 1968 Lah. 395). It was content ed in that case that the decision of the Labour Court that it had jurisdiction to decide certain demands did not amount to an award. The High Court came to the conclusion that a decision on a question, although it may not be determination of an industrial dispute, yet it would be an award, provided the question bears some relationship with the Industrial dispute. In that case, the appellant had raised the question of jurisdiction and the High Court observed that it directly related to the dispute and, therefore the determination thereon was an award. In the present case, the question as to whether the appellant was entitled to ad interim injunction or not is an independent question, which has nothing to do with the main question as to whether the respondent could revert the appellant or not. This question has yet to be decided by the learned Court. In the present case, the learned Court having come to the conclusion that the appellant had already been reverted the question of ad interim injunction did not arise. As I have already observed, the question that the appellant could or could not be reverted is a question yet to be decided by the learned Court. 9. 1 have, for the reasons given above, come to the conclusion that the impugned order is not an award, but only al decision or an order, which is not appealable under section 37(4)[E of the Ordinance. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.