P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

(c) The allegation of the present appellant from the beginning was that the application for evicting the appellant was mala fide inasmuch as the object of the respondents‑owners was to recover enhanced rent. (d) The allegation of the respondents that they were illegally dispossessed from ‑a godown was not proved because they had failed to establish that they were tenants of any such godown.

7. The first objection of counsel respecting the inspection of the premises of the appellant itself is partly explained by the admitted position that the case of the respondents was that the appellant was not using the premises in dispute or at least, not using it regularly. In view of this contention raised by the respondents, the learned Rent Controller inspected the Mill of the appellant as well as the disputed premises. It is noteworthy that no application was made by the present appellant for the inspection of the premises which was alleged by the respondents to be insufficient for business. Mr. Fakharuddin explained this; by saying that applications of this nature are not made to the Rent Controller. He said that as the Rent Controller was entitled to inspect premises, he could inspect the premises which belonged to the appellant. His insistence, according ‑to him, was that oral requests were made to the Rent Controller to inspect the A premises which were said to be inadequate for the requirements A of the respondents, but in spite of those requests he did not inspect those premises. In this connection, counsel for the respondents has rightly pointed out that no objection had been taken in the grounds of First Appeal about the omission of the Rent Controller to inspect the allegedly inadequate premises, Additionally, it is noteworthy that no application was made to the Rent Controller protesting against that omission. It is true that the objection has‑been taken in the grounds of this appeal, and Mr. Fakharuddin has stated that he had raised this question in the First Appeal at the time of his arguments. But there is no reference to those arguments in the order of the learned District Judge, Karachi. Moreover, there is nothing in the judgment of the learned District Judge, which is against the present appellant, to show that it is based on the inspection that was carried on by the Rent Controller. Some of the observations of the First Appellate Authority with respect to the needs of the present respondents are as follows :‑-- "The landlords have approached the Rent Controller for eviction of their tenant/appellant under forced circumstances, i.e. after they were forcibly and illegally evicted from the godown in Baghdadwalla building on Frere Road. Evidence on record shows that the suit premises are required for storing spare parts of radios belonging to Karimi Radio Stores." Further : "It has also been satisfactorily proved that Karimi Radio Stores has import licence, and it has actually imported radio parts. No other premises or shop is available to them for storing all these parts." According to counsel, the above observations are not satisfactory because reference has not been made to that evidence which was in the mind of the First Appellate Court; nor has the First Appellate Court referred to the witnesses or documents on which reliance has been placed by it, by name or by description.

8. The above contention of counsel strikes to me of a far fetched nature, because references by name to the witnesses or by description to the documents, which were in the mind of the First Appellate Authority and were present on the record, do not, appear in this case to have been necessary, nor is it necessary, to my mind, that in every case such a discussion should 'take place. I shall revert to this aspect of the case, when I refer to judicial precedents, after referring to the other contentions which have been raised by counsel.

9. The second contention of counsel respecting the failure of the partners of the firm for whom the premises are required, to appear as witnesses is in disregarded of the fact that the owners of the premises in dispute are father, mother and three sons. Two of these sons are partners of the firm for whom the premises is needed, but in that partnership two more sons of the same parents are also partners. That shows the unity of interest. Moreover, the present premises is being admittedly managed by the father who has appeared and supported the application. In these circumstances, I do not think that it was necessary for those sons, who are the partners of the firm, to have personally come to support the application.

10. In so far as the, third argument of learned counsel respecting the mala fides of the application is concerned, admittedly there is no evidence on the record with respect to the mala fides, excepting the allegation. made by Iftikhar Ahmed (D. W. 2) in one sentence that the respondents wanted to have increased rent. This contention could be met in the way in which it has been dealt with.

11. Lastly, counsel's contention has been that the respondents have failed to prove that the godown from which they have been dispossessed was leased out to them. This contention, to my mind, misses the real point because it is immaterial in this case as to whether it was leased out or not. The fact remains that that accommodation was in the possession of the respondents and, as, pointed out by counsel for the respondents, the evidence of D. W. 1 Qurban Hussain, has established this fact. How they were dispossessed and on what grounds their dispossession can be justified is immaterial. What is material is as to whether on account of the loss of that accommodation, the need of the respondents for more accommodation bas arisen or not. There seems to be hardly any reason for disputing the conclusions arrived at by the Rent Controller as well as the First Appellate Court that such a need has arisen.

12. In view of the above discussion of the four contentions raised by counsel for the appellant it should be easy to conclude that the defences on which counsel has relied and with respect to which, according to counsel, the discussion of the First Appellate Court is not satisfactory to him, are not of such a nature as to collectively or individually constituted a sound criticism. In fact, I explained to counsel at the very outset that, it was possible to come to the conclusion, without elaborately discussing the points which he had intended, to amplify, that this appeal was not a good one, because counsel was avoiding to say anything to show that the conclusions of the two lower authorities were in any way wrong. His insistence was that owing to the techni calities; there should be a retrial by the First Appellate Authority, and he was not even prepared that the evidence should be examined to see the effect of the alleged technical errors. The basis of counsel's stand, therefore appeared to be purely academic, and he has tried to support it by citing judgments. First of all he has relied on Jyotindra Mohan v. Kanai Mahato (A I R 1934 Pat. 66) in which it was observed that: "This (the portion reproduced in the judgment before this quotation) can in no sense be regarded as a proper discussion of the evidence, and a finding so arrived at by the final Court of fact is not binding in Second Appeal." The above proposition is undoubtedly correct when the conclusion is that the evidence had not received attention and proper discussion. The second authority is Chhaganmal Marwari v. Indra Keot (A I R 1938 Pat. 609). The learned Single Judge observed in it as follows:‑-- "The learned Judge in appeal simply reiterates on the very first page of the judgment the findings of the trial Court. He has not even referred to the evidence of the witnesses by names or whether he comes to the same conclusion from the oral or the documentary evidence." Counsel's emphasis was that the witnesses ought to have been referred to by names by the learned District Judge in this case. But even the above observation of the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court does not support that proposition fully because it says that the alternative for the First Appellate Court was to state that he had come to the same conclusion from the oral or documentary evidence. To lay down that the First Appellate Authority must write the judgment in the manner that he should refer to each witness by name or to each document separately D would be restricting the power of the First Appellate Authorities unnecessarily. The third judgment on which counsel has relied is Anandpal Singh v. Mahabal Singh (A I R 1927 Oudh 95). The learned Single Judge who decided that case has observed in it as follows :‑ "A High Court, before it can consider a finding of fact to be conclusive and binding upon it in second appeal, must be satisfied that such a finding of fact was arrived at by the lower appellate Court upon a due consideration of all the evidence, oral and documentary, produced by the parties in the case." Further: "In Surji Singh v. Kunwar Durga Parshad (1905‑8 O C 290) a Bench of the late Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh decided in the year 1905 that an appellate Court must follow the provisions of section 574, Code of Civil Procedure, in disposing of the appeal and that a substantial compliance with the provisions of the section was imperative." It will appear from the above observation that there is more relaxation of technicalities in it than in the Patna case of 1938.

13. Lastly, counsel has relied on Kristo Gobind Kur v. Gunga Pershad Sunna (23 S W R 266). The head‑note of that judgment sets out the point of the authority by stating that: "Where the Court of first instance did not give very satisfactory grounds for its conclusion upon a question of fact upon which the case almost entirely turned, and the Lower Appellate Court pronounced the first Court's reasons to be good without going into the merits or recording its view of the evidence, the High Court, in special appeal, reversed the Lower Appellate Court's decision and remanded the case for a re‑hearing; but for the purpose of the re‑hearing directed the removal of the case to the High Court as a regular appeal." From the above gist of the judgment it would appear that in that case the objection was that the Court of the first instance had not satisfactorily dealt with the questions of fact. Moreover the First Appellate Court had pronounced its judgment without going into the merits or recording its views of the evidence. In this case, the learned Rent Controller has written a lengthy judgment covering 16 pages and the First Appellate Authority has given its views of the evidence that is on the record.

14. In the above circumstances, the sum total of the objection of counsel for the appellant is that he wanted the judgments to‑be in his favour but could only say that evidence has not been discussed by the First Appellate Authority in detail, This emphasis on detail is contrary to some of the observations to which reference Eras been made above. A substantial compliance with the provisions of Order XLI, rule 31, C. P. C. is adequate and such compliance has been made in this case. The weakness of the stand taken by learned counsel for the appellant in this Court becomes glaring when it is noted that no contention was raised by him that‑any of the conclusions was wrong. In the above circumstances, I dismiss the appeal with costs. A.H. Appeal dismissed.