P L D 1955 Baluchistan 16 (PLP)

R. K. M. SAKER, J. C.

Notices of motion were served on Khalil-ur Rahman Siddiqui, Managing Editor of the daily Ittehad, Quaetta, and also on Kamal Ahmad, Editor, Ghulam Muhammad Shahwani, writer; and Shimim Masud, another writer of the same paper, to show- cause why they should not be convicted for contempt of Court with regard to a certain article which was published in that paper. The article itself is reproduced below :- " Civil Judge Loralai ke khilaf shakayat. Loralai (bazaria Dak) : Civil Judge Loralai ke khilaf zatiat man ulajhne ki am shikayat ki jati hai. Is silsala men Cinema our is qism ke digar waqeyat ka charcha ho raha hai. Bataya jata hai keh woh aksar qarz-khwahun ko najaiz taur par na-shaista andaz men dhamki dene se bhi gurez nahin karte. Bahar hal public un ke rawayye se be-had nalan hai." The respondents were legally represented by counsel in the proceedings before me and they also submitted a written explanation. During the course of arguments and in offering their written explanation justification has been claimed for the article so published while an unconditional apology has also been tendered. Learned counsel for the respondents alleges that the article was meant to bring to light the personal behaviour of the Sub-Judge, Loralai and was not intended to be an attack upon him in his capacity as d judicial officer. Learned counsel could not, however, specify any grounds in the article in support of his contention. I am unable to accept the allegation that the contents of this article are justified, for it is immediately clear that the article itself does not make an attack upon the Sub -Judge by name in his private capacity. It is directed against the Sub-Judge (Civil Judge), Loralai and his name as such is not mantioned. It will therefore be clear that the import of the article discloses a case of severe criticism of a judicial officer. In my view this article brings the dignity and autho rity of the presiding officer of this Court into grave contempt in the eyes of the public. The article cannot be read as an attack upon the judge in his personal and private capacity. Learned counsel for the respondents has further argued that it was never the intention of the respondents to bring the. Court into contempt. The question of intention, as also held in 191, I C 834, in a case of this nature cannot be taken as a plea of defence, for it is not necessary that, in publishing an article in a newspaper, there should be proof of deliberate intention to bring a Court into contempt. If the effect of the article is in fact to bring a Court into contempt in the eyes of the public, contempt has been committed. It is only necessary to examine the article through the eyes of the readers of the paper in question. If the effect of the article is to prompt the public to believe that the presiding judge of a Court is misbehaving in the exercise of his judicial functions, this fact will be sufficient to show that the persons responsible for the publication of the article have committed contempt of Court. It is a general and sound principle that where articles which are published in the press urge the public to believe that there is no confidence in the administration of justice by any Court, the matter is of an extremely serious nature. It is essential that not only, the dignity but the independence of the judiciary in all its functions must be maintained Courts and the officers who preside over them must at all ties be protected in regard to their judicial functions. But if there should be valid reason for lack of confidence in any Court or in any judicial officer who presides over it, there are other means of redress for those who feel aggrieved They are always at liberty to approach the proper authorities with t their complaints ; but they are not at liberty to air their views in the press and thereby to undermine the confidence of the general public in the integrity of any Court. Equally sound is the principle as held in A I R 1945, All. 67 that even though allegations made against a judicial officer are correct, these are no grounds for allowing any person to make a public attack upon that officer. In the case, however, I am far from satisfied that the grounds so alleged are correct. In the article in question specific reference has also been made to a certain judicial matter which was before the Court of the Sub-Judge, Loralai, namely the case relating to the Cinema. In A I R 1940 Sind 239 it was held that even though a case is pending or has been decided, criticism of the manner in which a judge has dealt with it amounted to contempt of Court. In considering the article as a whole there is no doubt in my mind but that contempt of Court has been committed and the only question which remains is whether the apology which has been tendered by the respondents should be accept ed. In the ruling last quoted, namely A I R 1940 Sind 239 it was observed that it does not necessarily follow that because an apology is offered a Court must accept it and is disarmed. The Court can refuse to accept an apology which it does not believe is genuine. It can even, when it accepts the apology, comit an offender to prison or otherwise punish him. Further more, there cannot be both justification and apology. The two things are incompatible. I am in respectful agreement with the views stated in this ruling. In the case before me justification has been urged on the one hand and an apology offered on the other I am therefore of the opinion that the intention underlying the apology now tendered is an endeavour by the respondents to escape the consequences of the contempt which they have committed. In the light of these remarks I am disposed to think that the apology is not genuine, otherwise justification for the article would not have been pleaded. I am therefore not disposed to accept it. It will always be the duty of this Court in contempt pro ceedings to protect all presiding officers of Courts throughout Baluchistan against attacks of this nature, particularly when they are not justified and when the result is to snake the confidence of the public in integrity and the authority of the Court in question. I cannot take a lenient view of this case, and in consider ing the degree of liability of the four respondents, the main responsibility must rest with respondent No. 1 the Managing Editor -and respondent No. 2 the Editor. With regard to the two writers, they are only subordinate members of the staff and the degree of responsibility in their case is less. In the case of respondents Nos. 3 and 4, therefore, I do not propose that any action should be taken against them and accordingly I discharge the notice with a warning to them that leniency will not be extended to them in future if they trespass beyond the legitimate bounds of their duties as members of the press. But in the case of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, they are undoubtedly guilty of contempt of Court of a serious nature ; and in accordance with section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1926 read with section 2 of Regula tion V of 1940. I direct that they will be fined Rs. 250 each, in default of which they will undergo simple imprisonment for a term of one month. A. H.