1993 PLP 134 (PLC)

4. The appellant was his own witness and Dr. Saeedullah and Izharul Haque appeared on behalf of the respondents.

5. The learned Presiding Officer found that the appellant was not an aggrieved party as he seemed to be satisfied with his retirement which was in good faith and in exercise of the powers under clause 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.

6. The first contention raised by Mr. Latif Saghar was that the order of retirement had not been passed by a competent authority. According to him it should have been passed by the Chairman of the P.I.D.C. 7.? Mr. Aftab Ahmed AM took me through section 6 of the Ordinance No. LII of 1984 which reads as under:‑ "

6. Continuance in service of employees etc.‑‑(1) All officers, advisers, workmen and other employees of the Corporation shall stand transferred to the Company or, as the case may be, subsidiary as from the date of vesting of the projects, and properties in the Company or the subsidiary. (2) Every officer, adviser, workman and other employee employed in a business or project or in connection with the properties vested in the Company or a subsidiary, by whomsoever appointed, shall, on the day of the vesting of the business, properties or project in the Company or the subsidiary, become an officer, adviser, workman or other employee, as the case may be, of the Company or the subsidiary. (3) An officer, adviser, workman or other employee who becomes an officer, adviser, workman or other employee of the Company or a subsidiary shall in the Company or the subsidiary be entitled to such terms and conditions as are not less favourable than those to which he was or may be entitled immediately before the day on which he becomes an officer, adviser, workman or other employee of the Company or the subsidiary and his transfer to the Company or the subsidiary shall not entitle any such officer, adviser, workman or other employee to any compensation or to the designation he was holding at the time of such transfer and no claim for such compensation or designation shall be entertained by any Court, Tribunal or other authority."

8. The letter of incorporation has also been produced on the record which is to the effect that the P.I.D.C. Medical Centre was duly incorporated as to be Company under section 42 of the Companies Ordinance.

9. Dr. Shahnaz Ahmed who passed the order was acting as the Chief Medical Officer. Under the circumstances there is no ground left to make any complaint on that score.

10. Mr. Aftab Alvi maintained that the petition itself was not maintainable and it was so found by the learned Presiding Officer. Support was sought from M/s. Futehally Chemicals Limited, Karachi and 2 others reported in 1973 PLC page 297 which was a decision from a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court and Muhammad Rafique v. Premier Tobacco Industries Limited, Kotri which is a decision of this Tribunal reported in 1981 PLC 670 wherein it was held that if the worker had collected his dues in full and final settlement of his claims, he would not be considered as an aggrieved person for the purpose of section 25‑A, I.R.O.

11. However, there was a contrary view taken in Maqsood Pervez Bhatti v. Textile Machinery Company (Private) Limited in Appeal No. KAR‑266 of 1990 of this Tribunal and also in the case of Climax Engineering Company Limited v. Shoaib Ahmed and another reported in 1985 PLC page 400 which was a decision of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court where it was found that mere collection of dues on the part of the worker would not be decisive and he did not forfeit his right to challenge the termination of his service.

12. The learned Presiding Officer preferred the view taken by the Sindh High Court and found that the objection about the maintainability of the petition would prevail. All I need say is that in the circumstances of the case, that was the proper view to take. There are certain salient features which could not escape attention. It has been deposed by the witness of the respondent that the appellant had been hospitalised in 1984 due to acute cardiac condition namely Ischaemic heart disease and was admitted at the National Institute of Cardio‑Vascular Diseases Karachi under the treatment of Dr. Prof. Muhammad Shareef w.e.f. 26‑6‑1984 to 4‑8‑1987. He was on medical leave, special medical leave, earned leave and leave without pay. There are vouchers also to show that payments were made towards his conveyance charges and special diet also. There is also the report of Dr. Shareef a Cardiologist as referred to earlier. The appellant denies much of it but he had taken pains to produce 2 certificates from doctors. The first which has been issued by Modern X‑Ray Centre is not very legible but the other one shows that he was still suffering from Ischaemic heart disease and was put on exercise tolerance test where he did not complain of any chest pain and ended in the following terms‑‑ "He is now declared to be fit to resume his duties."

13. So, on the showing of the appellant he was found by his doctors in 1988 to be fit enough to resume his duties. He had however been retired in 1987 and it would be too much to expect that the respondents would wait so long on the hope that the appellant would one day improve, assuming that he had improved. The duties entrusted to the appellant were of a very delicate nature. He was driving the ambulance of the Centre and the lives of patients could not be put in jeopardy in his insecure hands. ?

14. There is nothing to show that anybody could be nursing any grudge or bias against the appellant. Even when the letter of retirement was issued it was clearly mentioned that he was entitled to all the benefits which were available to him and quite a bit of money was given to him by way of gratuity and other counts including TA. and D.A. There is a letter on the record wherein he had approached the authorities for his re‑employment in some other capacity. Of course he has tried to suggest that he was deceived but the repudiation is meaningless.

15. All that was done was that his services were terminated under clause 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The only requirement was that he had to be paid in lieu of notice and there had to be a reason assigned which could pass muster. That was duly done. It is thus a matter of termination simpliciter and must hold the ground. In view of all this there is no occasion to differ with the findings arrived at by the Labour Court. I will therefore uphold the order and dismiss the appeal. H.B.T./2082/Lb.S??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.