1987 PLP 2372 (CLC)

(1) That the application on the ground of personal requirement of the demised premises could be legally made only by an owner landlord whereas the respondent only a landlady and not the owner of the shop was not entitled to present the application under section 15 of the Ordinance. (2) That the respondent was admittedly a Pardah Nasheen/Burqa Clad lady and hence she was not in a position to sit in the shop and carry on her tailoring business more particularly when the disputed shop is in the main market where all the shops were run by the males. (3) That no evidence has been adduced by the respondent to establish her financial soundness for establishing and carrying on an independent business in the shop premises in question. (4) That the respondent does not possess any Certificate or Diploma in tailoring for stitching work. The element of bona fide requirement was thus missing. That it was only a case of wish or simple desire on the part of the respondent to have the shop without requiring it for her use. She has not proved that the accommodation at her disposal where she was carrying on of stitching work was not sufficient to meet her expanding requirement in support of his contentions the learned counsel for the appellant cited the following authorities. (i) P L D 1968 Kar. 196; (it) P L D 1980 Kar. 223, (iii) P L D 1985 Kai. 624 (iv) P L D 1986 Kar. 84.

6. I have also heard the learned counsel for the respondent. He submitted that ownership of the respondent in respect of the disputed shop was specifically pleaded in the application but it was not denied or challenged by the appellant. He submitted that no doubt that the respondent was a Burqa Clad lady but she had been appearing in Court personally. In his submission, in the social set up of the appellant, ladies are doing business and there is nothing wrong in the respondents doing so. He urged that there was unimpeachable evidence available on record to show that the respondent was doing stitching of cloth for last 20 years. No Diploma was required for doing this business.

7. I have given my earnest consideration to the submissions made before me and have also carefully perused the pleadings as well as the evidence led by the parties in support of their respective case. I am clearly of the opinion that the learned Rent Controller has allowed the application for valid and good reasons.

8. The first abovenoted contention of the learned counsel is without substance inasmuch as not only that he did not dispute the ownership of the appellant in the written statement but even in the memo of appeal filed in this Court it is clearly stated by him under the heading "Facts of the case "that the applicant /respondent is the owner and landlady of shop premises bearing No.G/l, in the building on Plot No.OT‑6/126, Custodian No.1‑A‑648, Old Town Quarters, Karachi, and the opponent /appellant is the tenant in respect of the said shop premises at the rate of Rs.75 per month." The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant has thus no merits and it is repelled accordingly.

9. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is equally unsustainable. Firstly, it may be noted that there is vast difference between a Pardah Nasheen and Burqa Clad Lady. A Pardah Nasheen lady is one who does not appear in public places in any manner either Burqa Clad or otherwise, whereas a lady who moves about in public places freely but by putting on Burqa cannot be said to be a Parda Nashin lady. the respondent has been admittedly attending the rent case proceedings personally but by wearing a Burqa. She is present in Court even today. She is also admittedly engaged in the profession of cloth stitching and her case in this behalf has been fully supported by P.W.2, Muhammad Younus, and independent witness, who gets the clothes for his shop stitched by her. In these circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is without substance. Moreover, the appellant in his cross‑examination has admitted that the respondent's residence is about 50 yards from the demised shop and hence it is not difficult to conclude that the residence of the respondent is in a building which is situated near or within the main market area.

10. The next abovenoted contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is also fallacious as much as he has failed to keep in view the difference between a 'business' and a 'profession'. It is only as deposed to by her, that the respondent desires and proposes to expand her profession of stitching the clothes for others in the demised premises instead of her residence where she is, as, already stated, doing this work for about two decades. It would thus be a case of carrying out her profession in the case shop instead of her residence. To carry on the profession of tailoring one is obviously and not necessarily required to make any handsome investment. This plea, therefore, also fails.

11. Regarding the fourth abovenoted contention of the learned counsel for the appellant suffice it to say that it is self‑assumed fact with no justification that no person can carry on the profession of stitching of clothes without holding a Certificate or Diploma in tailoring or stitching. This contention is also, therefore, hereby repelled as being without substance.

12. Now I take up the last mentioned contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. I do not find any force in this contention as well. The respondent not only in her own affidavit deposed that she has been doing stitching of clothes for the last 20 years but that she has also produced another independent witness who has supported her in this behalf. It is the constitutional right of every person including a woman to carry on any lawful business or profession and there is thus no justification to deprive the respondent of this valuable fundamental right simply on the ground that she clads Burqa. The respondent has established her personal need of the case shop. I do not find any good reason to differ with the learned Rent Controller when he has held that "if she wants to do stitching work independently, she cannot be deprived of using of her own property".

13. For the foregoing reasons the, appeal fails and is dismissed hereby with no order as to costs.

14. The appellant is however, allowed six month's time to vacate the demised premises in appreciation of the fact that it is difficult to obtain the commercial premises in Karachi. The time is allowed subject to the appellant's depositing the monthly rent regularly in the lower Court. In case of default in this regard, the appellant would be liable to be evicted from the case premises without any further notice. S.Q./M‑234/K Appeal dismissed.