1996SCMR883 (PLP)

MUKHTAR AHMAD JUNEJO, J.

Leave to appeal is sought against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 23-10-1995 in Writ Petition No.4'71 of 1988. Under a letter of appointment dated 16-9-1984 respondent No.3 Muhammad Ashraf was appointed by the petitioner as Technician Grade-V with basic pay of Rs.150 per month, besides usual allowances. The said respondent joined the establishment of the petitioner and served there till 28-5-1986. On said date services of respondent No.3 were terminated under a letter on the ground that he had failed to establish authenticity of copy of Matriculation Certificate he had submitted before the petitioner-company at the time of his appointment. Being aggrieved, respondent No.3 served the petitioner with a legal notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (IRO), but the petitioner declined to reinstate the said respondent. The respondent therefore invoked jurisdiction of the Punjab Labour Court No.3, Lahore under section 25-A of I.R.O. for his reinstatement. The matter was contested by the petitioner. After recording of evidence, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement of respondent No.3 in establishment of the petitioner with back benefits. In appeal, learned Labour Appellate Tribunal maintained the order of the Labour Court and dismissed the appeal. The petitioner invoked jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan but without any success. Hence this petition for leave to appeal. Mr. Saleem Sehgal, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Labour Court as established under section 35 of the I.R.0. had no jurisdiction to entertain grievance application of the respondent, because termination of services of the respondent was not an industrial dispute. Mere fact that a Labour Court can adjudicate and determine an industrial dispute, which has been referred to or brought before it under I.R.O., does not restrict jurisdiction of the Labour Court. According to clause (d), subsection (3) of section 35 of the I.R.O., a Labour Court can exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under the I.R.O. or any other law. Learned counsel for the petitioner conceded that the establishment of the petitioner was covered by the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter mentioned as the Ordinance of 1968). Clause (3) of Standing Order 12 of the Ordinance of 1968 reads as below:-- "(3) The services of a workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance." Aforesaid provisions show that any workman who is aggrieved by the termination of his service etc., may invoke section 25-A of the I.R.O. Obviously a grievance application under section 25-A of the I.R.O. cannot be moved before a Civil Court. According to section 25-A of the I.R.O. a worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement to the notice of his employer in writing, within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises, and the employer shall communicate his decision in writing to the worker within 15 days, but if the employer fails to do so, the worker may take the matter to C.B.A. or to the Labour Court, as the case may be, and where the matter is taken to the Labour Court it shall give a decision on the same within a period specified in subsection (4). All these provisions go to show, that a person who is covered by the definition of "worker " given in the Ordinance of 1968, if aggrieved by termination of services, has no other remedy except to invoke jurisdiction of the Labour Court. There is thus no substance in the contention of the learned counsel that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. Learned counsel further argued that respondent No.3 had played fraud upon the petitioner by producing photo copy of Matriculation Certificate which was not genuine and on that account his services were liable to be terminated. In this respect learned counsel was of the view that it was an act of misconduct on the part of the concerned worker. Misconduct has been defined under clause (3) of Standing Order 15 of the Ordinance, 1968. This does not include the act attributed to the respondent. There is nothing to show that during the course of his employment, in the establishment of the petitioner, respondent No.3 had committed any act of misconduct defined by Standing Order 15 of the Ordinance, 1968. Hence services of the respondent could not have been terminated on the ground of his being guilty of misconduct. The Labour Court under its judgment has taken the view that respondent No. 3 was already worker in the petitioner's concern before his appointment as Technician and such appointment was result of his previous performance and subsequently qualification of the post was made a reason to terminate his services. That Matriculation was not prerequisite qualification for the post of Technician. While ordering back benefits the Labour Court took note of the fact that the respondent's evidence about his being jobless since termination of his services, had not been belied and rebutted. Learned Tribunal took view that in reality respondent No.3 was not proved to have committed any fraud upon the petitioner. The Tribunal concurred with order of the lower Court about reinstatement of the respondent No.3 and about grant of back benefits. In the Constitutional petition learned High Court could not have interfered with the concurrent findings of fact, as rightly observed in the impugned judgment. The petitioner has not made out case for interference and consequently leave to appeal is declined and this petition stands dismissed. A.A./M-3224/S ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Leave refused.