P L D 2002 Supreme Court 849 (PLP)

IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.‑‑These petitions for leave to appeal have been filed against the judgment, dated 6th April, 1999 passed by Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench whereby I.C.A. tiled by Abdul Haque (respondent in C.P. No.797‑L of 1999) has been allowed.

2. Precisely stating the facts of the case are that Municipal Committee, Ahmedpur East inducted the respondents as its tenants in Muhammadi Market on monthly rent. Later on vide Resolution No.54 of 17th February, 1992 it was decided to dispose of the shops in possession of the respondents and simultaneously in pursuance of the same resolution leasehold rights of respondents in the shops which were in their possession were cancelled. Accordingly, the property was sold to the petitioners. Admittedly, there had been a long litigation between the new purchasers and the respondents who were the tenants of the Municipal Committee but ultimately the Municipal Committee took over the possession from the respondents in purported exercise of jurisdiction under section 122(3) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, 1979). The action of the Municipal Committee was called in question by the respondents before Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench by instituting a writ petition which was dismissed on 30th June, 1999 but in Infra‑Court Appeal tiled by respondents relief as prayed for was granted to them and the Municipal Committee, Ahmedpur East, was directed to restore the possession of the shops taken over from the respondents.

3. It is important to note that learned Division Bench of Lahore High Court has held that the relationship of the landlord and tenant shall be governed between the parties under the provisions of Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, 1959). As such against the judgment of learned High Court Civil Petition No.472‑L of 1999 has been tiled on behalf of purchasers of the property as well as by the Municipal Committee being Civil Petition No.797‑L of 1999.

4. Mr, Saeed‑ur‑Rehman. Farrukh, learned Advocate Supreme Court, at the very outset, contended that petitioner No.2 Muhammad Hanif son of Umar Din has entered into a compromise with respondent No.6 Muhammad Arshad son of Jan Muhammad, outside the Court. To substantiate his plea, he placed on record the deed of compromise arrived at between them.

5. In view of the above situation, petition is dismissed to the extent of petitioner Muhammad Hanif and respondent Muhammad Arshad.

6. Learned counsel appearing for petitioner (in C.P. No.472‑L of 1999) inter alia contended as under:‑‑ (a) That the observation of the learned High Court namely that the parties rights shall be governed by the provisions of Ordinance, 1959 is incorrect because under section 3 of the Ordinance, 1959 the Provincial Government had issued a notification, dated 27th October, 1967 to the effect that the provisions of Ordinance, 1959 shall not apply to those buildings or lands which belong to local bodies administered areas and which are used for commercial (b) That under section 122(3) of the Ordinance, 1979, Municipal Committee after having cancelled the tenancy rights of respondents had jurisdiction to take over the possession of the shops from them because despite of serving notice upon them, they were not agreeing to hand over its possession.

7. Learned counsel appearing for respondents contended as under:‑‑ (i) That exemption granted by the Provincial Government under section 3 of the Ordinance, 1959 with regard to non‑application of the Ordinance upon the property belonging to the Municipal Committee etc. in pursuance of notification dated 27th October, 1967 shall not be applicable because presently the Municipal Committee is not owner of the property as now property vests in the petitioners who had purchased the same, therefore, it was incumbent upon them to have atorned the respondents under section 13‑A of the Ordinance, 1959 to be their tenants etc. and thereafter petitioners may have sought ejectment of the respondents under the provisions of Ordinance (VI of 1959); (ii) That' because the property is not owned by the Municipal Committee, Ahmedpur East, therefore, it has no jurisdiction to exercise powers under section 122(3) of the Ordinance, 1979 for the purposes of dispossessing the respondents from their lawful occupation.

8. After having heard both the sides and gone through the relevant provisions of law as well as the impugned judgment carefully, we grant leave to appeal in both the petitions to examine, inter alia, the contentions raised by parties' counsel.

9. Petition tiled by the Municipal Committee being C.P. No.797‑L of 1999 is barred by time but this question is postponed till the final hearing of appeals.

10. Pending decision of appeals, arising out of instant petitions, parties are directed to maintain status quo.

11. Learned counsel for respondents stated that office be directed to fix these cases at an early date because respondents are out of possession without any justification. Office may do so, subject to soliciting necessary approval from Hon'ble Chief Justice. M.B.A./B‑64/S Leave granted.