P L D 1953 Baluchistan 11 (PLP)

R. K. M. SAKER, J. C.‑This is a revision petition under the provisions of section 115, C. P. C., read with section 33 of the British Baluchistan Courts Regulation against the order of the learned District Judge in Baluchistan, dated 23rd June 1952, whereby he upheld on appeal an order of the Sub‑Judge, Quetta dated 25th March 1952, directing the defendant‑petitioner to bear the costs of the suit against him. The brief facts of the case are that the defendant‑petitioner was the tenant of the plaintiff‑respondent and owed arrears of rent for the property when he occupied. In due course, the plaintiff'‑respondent sued for recovery of arrears of rent and the plaint was presented in the Court of the Sub‑Judge, Quetta. At one of the adjourned hearings the defendant‑petitioner admitted the claim for arrears of rent, though he had denied it in his written statement. He proceeded to pay the rent in Court, claiming that he should not bear the costs of the litigation. The learned Sub‑Judge, however, passed an order giving costs in favour of the plaintiff‑respondent, against which order the defendant‑petitioner appealed. The learned District Judge upheld the order of the lower Court. Learned counsel for the defendant‑petitioner seeks to chal lenge the order of the lower Court mainly on the grounds that liability for costs was denied and that the original Court did not frame an issue as to liability of costs, but came to an arbitrary decision upon this matter. He further contends that in accordance with the provisions of Order 24, Rule 4 of the C. P. C. the plaintiff' was responsible for bearing the costs. It is first necessary for me to consider, with some care, whether the powers vested in me under the provisions of section 115, C. P. C. are attracted in a case of this nature. On previous occasions I have held that unless some question of jurisdiction is the reason for approaching this Court in revision proceedings, the powers of this Court are not attracted. It has been held that where a Court exercises its jurisdiction in the legal manner prescribed but arrives at a conclusion or decision which is erroneous in law or fact, it merely decides the issue before it errone ously, though in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. In that event, such order is not open to revision. In my view, this is the correct interpretation of what are intended to be the powers vested in this Court under section 115, C. P. C. Section 33, British Baluchistan Courts Regulation gives supplementary powers to this Court to interfere in any question involving any important question of law or custom. In the light of the above principles, there can be no question but that any Court has wide powers in regard to the awarding of costs. Order 24, Rule 4, C. P. C. makes it incumbent upon a Court to consider which of the parties is most blamed for the litigation when awarding costs. From these words it is clear that some discretion vests in the Court. Moreover, section 35 of the C. P. C. also gives discretion to a Court to award costs as it thinks fit. It has also been held that a mistake committed by a Court on the point of costs is hardly a ground for revision ; nor will bare failure to exercise a judicial discretion as to costs justify an interference in revision. A High Court will not interfere in revision unless it is satisfied that discretion has been exercised arbitrarily. I now come to the order of the learned Sub‑Judge, a portion of which is reproduced below :‑ "It is a case for the recovery of Rs.

578. The defendant appeared through his counsel Dr. Saggu and he admitted the claim of the plaintiff for Rs. 578 with the request that no costs should be given to the plaintiff. While the counsel for the plaintiff pleaded that the costs must be given on the ground that the claim was for rent. I therefore give a decree for Rs. 578 with costs against the defendant in favour of the plaintiff." When the defendant‑petitioner appealed to the learned District Judge that Court came to the conclusion that it was the duty of the defendant‑petitioner to make payment of rent to the landlord and also held that the general principle is that a success ful party is entitled to his costs. On these grounds the appeal was dismissed with costs. I must therefore consider whether the lower Courts have acted arbitrarily in the matter of awarding costs in this case. The judgment of the Sub‑Judge clearly indicates that the defendant‑petitioner contested payment of costs and though I am of the view that this Court came to a decision, which was undoubtedly, arbitrary the matter does not rest there; for in adjudicating upon the payment of costs in accordance with the provisions of Order 24, Rule 4, C. P. C., it is incumbent upon a Court to consider which party is most to blame for the litigation. Though neither of the Courts below has dealt with this point, the A record indicates that the defendant‑petitioner was in occupation, for several months, of the house belonging to the plaintiff‑respondent. it further indicates that lie had not paid any rent until ultimately the plaintiff‑respondent was compelled to sue for arrears. When this occurred, the defendant‑petitioner continued to contest the claim on the grounds that under the Rent Control Regulation a separate claim was sub judice, regarding the determination of rent and that until a decision in that case had been arrived at he was not expected to pay arrears of rent. The learned District Judge in hearing the appeal, quite rightly came to the conclusion that this was no valid ground for refusal to pay arrears of rent and if over‑payment bad been made, it could have been adjusted ultimately. It follows therefore that the defendant‑petitioner is to blame for this litigation and on these grounds alone I do not feel disposed to interfere. The revision petition is dismissed with costs. The manner in which this case has been disposed of by the two lower Courts leaves much to be desired. It is clear from the record that the payment of costs was a matter which was contested, It was therefore incumbent upon the Sub‑Judge to frame an issue upon this point and not to have decided the matter arbitrarily. His order should have given reasons why he awarded costs in the manner he did. Furthermore, the various grounds on which revi sion of the lower Court's order have been urged before me were the grounds raised before the lower appellate Court. The record contains a copy of the written grounds on which the case was presented to the appellate Court. In the judgment of the lower appellate Court there is, however, no mention at all of any of these grounds. Whether they were good or bad grounds, is not for me to say, but when cases come before this Court in revision and, as in this particular case, similar grounds are used in argument this Court must be in a position to know the manner in which the appellate Court had disposed of the appeal, that is in relation to the grounds which had been argued before it. The judgment of the lower appellate Court deals largely with other matters and makes no mention of the written grounds of appeal. I consider therefore that in future cases it is of the utmost importance that an appellate Court should deal adequately in its c judgment with whatever grounds in appeal have been adduced before it, provided always that obviously frivolous or irrelevant grounds may be ignored. Parties present. Order announced. A. H. Petition dismissed.