1970 PLP 707 (PLC)

M. N. Narasimhareddy for Respondent No.

2. This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the award of the Industrial Tribunal given in Industrial ‑Dispute No. 43 of 1965 on 28th June 1966. The relevant facts are: The Government of Andhra Pradesh, referrers a dispute by G. O. Ms. No. 1304 Home (Labour‑1) Department dated 25th June 1965, to the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad, for disposal. The issue was whether the dismissal of one Veeresham, an employee of the petitioner‑company, was justified and if not, to what relief he is entitled? This Veeresham was an assistant fitter in the factory. He was charge‑sheeted by the company on various counts, in particular, for misbehaviour and using abusive language against the Director of the company. Veeresham, the second respondent herein, filed his explanation. Upon an enquiry, the domestic tribunal came to the conclusion that all the charges levelled against the employee were proved; and consequently Veeresham, was dismissed from service by the petitioner. It is this dispute that was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. It appears that the Industrial Tribunal recorded some evidence. By its award, which is now impugned, it found that the Management had decided to victimise Veeresham so that they may be rid of a perpetual nuisance, and consequently had that the dismissal of Veeresham was not justified. Since Veeresham could not be re‑instated, as the company itself had come into trouble, Veeresham was found entitled to his back wages and other reliefs and benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date when the company had closed its business. It is this award that is now impugned in this writ petition. The principal contention of Mr. B. K. Seshu, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that after having found that the order of the domestic enquiry tribunal was defective, the Tribu nal itself ought to have decided, after holding a trial, as to whether toe dismissal of Veeresham was justified. The Tribunal could not have relied upon the evidence recorded by the domestic tribunal partly, and partly upon the evidence recorded by it (the Industrial Tribunal). I find sufficient force in this contention. In so far as the findings of facts are concerned, they are binding upon me. It is not possible for this Court to review the evidence and come to its own conclusion. It having been found that the Management sat over the case of Veeresham with a view to victimise him, it was open to the l4anagement to justify the dismissal before the Tribunal. In such a cast, the emir matter was open before the Tribunal. The Tribunal ought to have recorded evidence adduced by the parties and decided, a: if it was the primary authority, whether Veeresham was guilt of the charges levelled against him by the Management and if so, what punishment should be inflicted. Instead of doing that, the Tribunal seems to have relied upon, the evidence recorded by the domestic Tribunal and, partly on the evidence recorded by itself, without providing the parties a full opportunity of meeting the case. While it was upon the Management to justify the dismissal, it was equally upon the employee .to lead evidence, to refute the charges levelled against him. ' That this is so is well supported by a decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory v. Motipur Sugar Factory ((1965) 27 F J R 376)'. The following paragraphs of the said judgment, appearing at pages 385‑386, are specially to be noted in that behalf. Their Lordships observed : "....where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman it is open to him to justify the action before the Tribunal by leading all relevant evidence before it. In such a, case the employer would not have the benefit which he had in cases where domestic enquiries have been held. The entire matter would be open before the Tribunal which will have jurisdiction not only, to go into the limited questions open to a tribunal where domestic enquiry has been properly held... but also to satisfy itself on the facts adduced before it by the employer whether the dismissal or discharge was justified. It was pointed out that the important, effect of omission to hold an enquiry is merely this: that the Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prime face case but would decide for itself on the evidence adduced whether the charges have really been made out'... But in principle we see no difference whether the matter comes before the Tribunal for approval under section 33 or on a reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In either case, if the enquiry is defective or if no enquiry has been held as required by Standing Orders, the entire case would be open before the Tribunal and the employer would have to justify on facts as well that its order of dismissal or discharge was proper... A defective enquiry in our opinion stands on the same footing as no enquiry and in either case the Tribunal would have jurisdiction to go into facts and the employer would have to satisfy the Tribunal that on facts the order of dismissal or discharge was proper." Their Lordships further observed at page 387: "That is why this Court has consistently held that if the domestic enquiry is irregular, invalid or improper, the Tribunal may give an opportunity to the employer to prove his case in doing so, the Tribunal tries the merits itself. This view is consistent with the approach which industrial adjudication generally adopts, with a view to do justice between the parties without relying too much on technical considera tions and with the object of avoiding delay in the disposal of industrial disputes." Respectfully following the above said decision, I hold that the impugned award suffers from the said infirmity, on the basis of which it is to be quashed: It is open to the Industrial Tribunal to give a reasonable opportunity to the parties to adduce such evidence as they desire, after recording which, it should decide afresh as to whether the dismissal of Veeresham was justified, and‑if not, to what relief he is entitled. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. In the circumstances of the case, h9wever, I do not make any order 'as to costs.