1982 PLP 897 (CLC)

2. Against the aforesaid order of appointment of receiver the petitioner filed a review Petition under Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C., which was how ever dismissed on merits on 31‑5‑1979.

3. Against the order dismissing the review application the Petitioner filed a Revision Petition before the learned District Judge being Revision No. 53 of 1979 which was also dismissed on 10‑9‑1979.

4. In the meantime however on the advice of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53 of 1979 was filed on 23‑7‑1979 in the Court of the learned District Judge against the orders dated 23‑5‑1972, 31‑5‑1976 and 31=5‑'.979 passed by learned Civil Judge. The above appeal was heard by the 4th Additional District Judge; Hyderabad who by order passed on 24‑3‑1980, dismissed the same on the ground that it was barred by time. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner has filed this revision application.

5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has argued that the time in prosecuting the review application before the trial Court which was dis missed on 31‑5‑1979 and the Revision Application dismissed on 10‑9‑1979 by learned District Judge were proceedings bona fidely prosecuted by the Peti tioner on the advice given by the learned Advocate who was then appearing for him and that in view of the provisions of section 14, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act the time so spent is to be excluded in calculating the period within which the appeal was required to be filed. He further submitted that even otherwise there was sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the appeal before lower Appellate Court under section 5 of the Limita tion Act. As regards the applicability of section 14, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act, it may be pointed out that the time is to be excluded for the period during which any proceeding was being prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. We however find that the Petitioner's case does not attract the provisions of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. The Review and the Revision Petitions filed by him in the lower Courts were not dismissed for want of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature. The question o C exclusion of time under section 14(2) of Limitation Act, therefore does not arise.

6. In any case the application under Order XLV11, ruse 1, C. P. C., for review and revision application under section 115, C. P. C., were dismissed by orders passed on 31‑5‑1979 and 10‑9‑1979 respectively. The Petitioner had however on 23‑7‑1979 filed Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53 of 1979, which was dismissed as time barred by the learned lower Appellate Court. For the purposes of section 14 (if applicable) as well as for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay of each day is to be explained. The order by which the learned Trial Court dismissed the review application was passed on 31‑5‑1979 but there is nothing on the record to explain delay of such a long period (53 days) in filing the Appeal Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 53 of 1979 on 23‑7‑1979. In my opinion the appeal was hopeless barred by time and no justification has been made out for condoning the delay or excluding the time under section 14 of the Limitation Act and thus the learned Lower Appellate Court was fully justified in dismis sing the said appeal as barred by time.

7. It may in the end be also observed that the interest of minors as well as pardanashin ladies is involved in the suit and the record shows that the Petitioner who is prima facie entitled to only 29 paisas share, is depriving the ladies and the minors from their rightful dues out of the income. He has set up adverse title on basis of an alleged gift of which no particulars have been supplied. In the circumstances, I find that the conclusions arrived at by the learned Civil Judge are correct and sufficient to justify the appointment of receiver of the property which is subject matter of the suit. The appointment of the receiver is just, convenient and in the interest of justice necessary to protect interests of all the parties particularly the minors and pardanashin ladies. No illegality or irregularity has been pointed out in the order of learned Courts below. Accordingly the Revision Petition is dismissed. The stay order is vacated. The Revision Application is dismissed with costs. K. M. A. Petition dismissed.