P L D 1966 Supreme Court 94 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, C. J.‑This is an appeal by Mr. Rashid Murtaza C J Qureshi, an Advocate of the High Court of West Pakistan, against his conviction for contempt of that Court, as a result of an incident which occurred on the 19th November 1963, before Mr. Justice Jamil Hussain Rizvi, sitting in chamber. The appellant had instituted a petition for a writ on behalf of one Inayatullah, in a rent matter. He assures us that a substantial question was involved in the case. Process had been directed to issue, but had not been sent out by the office of the High Court, on the ground that Court‑fee had not been paid. Mr. R. M. Qureshi insisted that he had paid it in. On the 20th June 1963, the learned Judge ordered counsel to "check up with the office" and "if it has not been paid", payment should be made within a week. An office‑note of the 8th July 1963, indicates that the order was understood as a simple direction to counsel to pay the process‑fee. It reads as follows:‑ Kindly read the order dated 20‑6‑64‑ Mr. Rashid Murtaza, Advocate, counsel for the petitioner, was required to deposit the necessary process‑fee for issue of the notice, which ought to have been paid within a period of seven days from the date of the order. The prescribed period of 7 days has since expired, and the counsel, has not so far turned up to deposit the same. Fix a katcha date in the case and lay it before a Judge for dismissal of the case for non‑prosecution, after informing the counsel." This note was shown to Mr. R. M. Qureshi, who made an endorsement as below:‑ ; "Noted. The P. F. has been paid: There was no "checking‑up", such as had been directed by the learned Judge. The office regarded the order as laying an obligation only on the counsel, and none on the office to cause an enquiry or search. Counsel, on the other hand, insisted that he was free of obligation, having already paid in the process‑fee. The case Was laid before Mr: Justice Jamil Hussain Rizvi, on the 19th November 1963, in that condition. The learned Judge proceeded to record an order in which it was stated, that as a result of his direction for a "check up", it was found that "the process‑fee was neither found in the office nor it was paid as ordered by me". It would appear that the fact of the process‑fee not having been found in the office was orally stated by a member of the staff, although as seen above, the office note does not indicate that any enquiry as ordered had been made. The order proceeds to say that four months had elapsed, that the learned counsel was again making the same assertion he had made earlier, namely, that the process‑fee had been paid, which assertion had previously been considered and he had been asked "that in case the process‑fee has not been paid he might pay this within one week", nevertheless learned counsel had not paid the process‑fee which clearly showed that "he is not properly prosecuting the case" and therefore the petition was dismissed for non -prosecution. The learned Judge had not quite finished this order when the incident occurred as a result of which Mr. R. M. Qureshi, suffered his conviction. He said to the learned Judge, when he was about to conclude his order, "why stop at that, because if my statement is disbelieved by the Court, it may amount to contempt‑of Court or professional misconduct and that should be resorted to". Admittedly, the remark was made without any addition of words of respect or courtesy. Mr. R. M. Qureshi stated before us that he felt that an imputation of meanness in respect of a small sum of money was implied in the order, which he resented. The punishment that was being applied for the default was to fall on his client, although the default was being laid at his ‑door. Accordingly, he felt compelled to attract the appropriate penalties to himself by taking his stand upon his assertion that he had already paid the fee, and thus inviting an enquiry. The reaction of the learned Judge to this behaviour was to tell Mr. R. M. Qureshi, that what he had done earlier "did not amount to contempt of Court, but what he said and in the manner he has said will amount to contempt". To this Mr. R. M. Qureshi reacted by saying he would "welcome contempt if it comes to that". Thereupon, notice was issued to him and his statement was recorded. The notice described the substance of the contempt as being that counsel "threw a challenge to the Court by inviting the Court to take contempt proceedings against (him) and the manner in which (he) uttered the words was contemptuous". Mr. R. M. Qureshi, made a considered reply which, in the circumstances; reflects a considerable degree of presence of mind He emphasised first that in maintaining that what he had said about having paid the process fee was true, he was doing his duty, as an officer of the Court, to state true facts within his knowledge. He felt that if his assertion on a point of fact within his knowledge was not believed, the question that arose was not one "of his personal integrity but (was) a reflection on the Bar in general". Next, as to the point of "throwing a challenge" he said that his intention and purpose only was "to assert (his) rights as a lawyer". He found it impossible to apologize on this issue, as he thought it was a matter affecting "the fundamental rights and privileges of the Bar". He added that he took this attitude "despite (his) reverence for this Court, (his) humility towards this Court and even an affection for the presiding officer of this Court". It was because of adherence to the tradition of the Bar that he "was forced to take up a stand in this matter", and in his own‑ mind he was quite clear that what he had said and done did not amount to either contempt of Court or professional misconduct. The learned Judge then proceeded to record the order of conviction. He noted that Mr. R. M. Qureshi, had not only interrupted him while he was writing his order, but had thrown out a challenge "abruptly and in an objectionable manner", which manner was further described as being "rather very insulting". On the point relating to the non‑discovery of the process‑fee on the record, the learned Judge noted that when this was brought to Mr. R. M.' Qureshi's notice, his reply was that "his statement should not be disbelieved as against the clerk". The learned Judge noted that it was not a question of disbelieving his statement, but that the process‑fee being not "with the file or in the office" no further delay could be permitted. Thereupon, Mr. R. M. Qureshi, had again said that his statement should be believed, but in the view of the learned Judge, there was no occasion for any enquiry, and the only course open was for the counsel to pay the fee and this he should have done in the intervening period of four or five months. The order concluded by saying that there was no occasion for the counsel to behave in the manner he did, and his conduct amounted to contempt of Court. As he was a young lawyer, the learned Judge took a "lenient view" of the matter and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 5, fixing also a period of one week's imprisonment in default of payment of fine. In his petition of appeal, as well as in his argument, Mr. R. M. Qureshi, did not deny that he had interrupted the learned Judge in the middle of his writing the order in the case, and that he did so abruptly, but he urged that he did so because he felt his statement was being disbelieved and if this was so, he thought he should rather be proceeded against for having told a deliberate lie to the Court. He asserted that he was never given the impression, at any stage of the short proceedings, that the learned Judge had accepted his statement regarding the payment of the process‑fee as true. He had invited the learned Judge to proceed against him for the more serious offences of professional misconduct or contempt of Court as a protest against "the cursory manner in which his statement had been disbelieved" for he believed that a lawyer's statement at the bar was to be taken seriously and not to be lightly brushed aside. He said further that he was not told in what respect "his gestures, tone of voice, etc.," constituted "as insulting manner" and that in any case this did not call for such action as had been taken against him. It was conceded that the High Court had ample power to deal with contempts in face of the Court summarily. Mr. R. M. Qureshi, was only enrolled as an Advocate of the High Court on the 9th September 1958. He had a bare five years of experience at the bar, when he suffered this conviction, which for a young lawyer at the threshold of his career is somewhat of a tragedy. The misfortune is not lessened by the fact that his behaviour, which was held to be contempt of the Court, was believed by himself to be strictly appropriate in the circumstances. It is, also a matter for some regret that in the process, a substantial cause which was before the Court for adjudication perished prematurely, on account of the unfortunate clash that developed between the Presiding Officer and the counsel in the case. Having questioned Mr. R. M. Qureshi, fully regarding the circumstances of this unfortunate matter, and noted that the matter might have been somewhat clearer if the office note had stated that a search had been made for the process‑fee and it had not been found, we still think that as the facts appeared from the papers before the learned Judge, supported by some oral statement by a member of the Court staff, Mr. R. M. Qureshi's proper course was to have undertaken to pay the fee. He stated that he was upset both because his statement had not been accepted, and also because he felt that there was some idea that he was being mean about so small a sum as Rs. 2, and it was in that state of mind that he felt impelled to gain for himself a fuller opportunity of establishing the rightness of his position. It is regrettable, but seems to be a fact that in giving vent to this feeling he failed to employ the kind of language which by tradition, is incumbent upon a lawyer when addressing a Judge, in particular, a Judge of a. Superior Court. He admits that he interrupted the learned Judge and that he did so abruptly. Although proceedings in chambers are not invested with the full formality of those that take place in Court, yet the circumstances in which, and the attitude with which an interruption is made even in chamber proceedings are factors which may deprive the A interruption of all innocence in the light of contempt of the Court's authority and dignity. The learned Judge has regarded the interruption in this case as having been made in an objectionable manner, that is in the manner of a challenge, and has described it further as "rather very insulting". These observations clearly 'show that the learned Judge resented the behaviour of Mr. R. M. Qureshi, towards himself, and when all the circumstances are taken into account, in particular, the feelings which Mr. R. M. Qureshi, was frank enough to admit before us that he entertained at that moment, it would seem that the view of the learned Judge was correct. But, even though Mr. R. M. Qureshi, was rightly found in contempt, we do not think that it was necessary in the circumstances to record a conviction, and even less so, to impose a punishment of fine with imprisonment in lieu. Having attempted to appreciate the incident, in all its aspects, we consider that the leniency which the learned Judge was exercising towards Mr. R. M. Qureshi, would have found its best expression by his closing. the incident with a few words of admonition to this young lawyer, as to the impropriety of the behaviour which be had exhibited and as to the right course which he should adopt in such circumstances in the future. Mr. R. M. Qureshi, was clearly in a state of mind in which he allowed a comparatively small matter to assume in his mind the importance of an occasion for declaration of principles and assumption of an uncompromising 'attitude in support thereof. That is a tendency frequently seen in the young and inexperienced, when they walk in a complex way circumscribed by tradition, and we cannot bring ourselves to believe that an offence in this respect should necessarily invite the grave penalty, of a judicial conviction and a fine supported by imprisonment m default. Accordingly, allowing this appeal, we set aside the conviction and the sentence imposed on Mr. R. M. Qureshi, and in their place substitute an admonition that in all his future dealings with Courts, he should never forget that however important in substance or principle a matter may be, which he is placing before the Court, he should never forget that his own dignity as a lawyer obliges him to place it before the Court in the manner of a submission, couched in the traditional language of courtesy that is due to the Court. He will find that any stand which he takes in support of right principle will always gain in strength and effectiveness if it is supported by the appropriate courtesy. Appeal accepted.