P L D 1961 (W (PLP)

ANWARUL HAQ, J.--‑This order will dispose of. Criminal Revisions Nos. 716 and 77 , of 1960, filed respectively by Shah Din alias.Shahya and Waheed Beg against their convictions under section 19 (f ) of the Arms Act, by Mr. Muhammad Amin Lone, a Magistrate of the first class at Lahore. Each of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for nine months. Their appeals were rejected by Mr. Shafi-ur‑Rahman, the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore. The charge under the Arms Act arose against the petitioners in connection with an incident on the 17th of June, 1958, when a police‑party aimed with a search warrant under section 5 of the Gambling 'Act raided the house of petitioner Shah Din in Baroodkhana, Lahore. Ix was alleged that these two petitioners and their companions resisted their arrest and while doing so they brandished knives with a view to causing hurt to the members of the raid party, but they were, however, over‑powered during the scuffle, some simple injuries were caused to some members of the police force as well as to the petitioners and their companions. It was alleged that the petitioner Shah Din was armed with a knife which had a blade 7' long, while in the case of Waheed Beg the length of the blade is said to be 6".

2. In the initial stages the entire case relating to the incident in the house of Shah Din was taken up jointly by the trial Magistrate, but after framing charges he separated the case under the Arms Act from that under section 332/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The learned Magistrate then separately recalled the prosecution witnesses for further cross‑examination in respect of the charge under the Arms Act and has recorded a separate judg ment in this behalf.

3. The petitioners and their co‑accused had pleaded not guilty at the trial and asserted that they had been falsely implicated due to the enmity of Inspector Muhammad Aslam (P. W. 1). Certain defence witnesses were also produced but they did not; however, have any direct' knowledge as to the details of the incident giving rise to the present charge.

4. As regards the facts of the case, I have already review& the evidence at some length in my judgment dealing with Revision Petitions Nos. 713, 715 and 772 of 1960, and as the substantive evidence in the present case is the same, it is not necessary to cover the same ground again. For reasons recorded in that judgment I have no hesitation in holding that the two petitioners were, indeed, found in possession of the knives in question, without any licence or permit under the Arms Act, and that at the relevant time they weilded these knives as weapons of offence.

5. It has, however, been contended on their behalf that, in the first place, there has been a misjoinder of charges, as the learned Magistrate did not record the examination‑in‑chief of the witnesses separately for the purpose of the present charge and instead relied on the evidence already recorded by him in the main case under section 332/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. In the second place, it is contended that the knives in question do not fall within the definition of "arm" and, therefore, their possession is not punishable under the law.

6. As regards the objection regarding misjoinder of charges at thesame trial, it seems to me that the same is without substance. It is clear that the charge under section 19 (f) of the Arms Act A has arisen out of the same incident which gave rise to the charge under section 332/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code and, therefore, under the provisions of section 235 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioners could have been tried for the two offences at the same trial. Even if all the accused persons were not charged with all the offences alleged to have been committed, they could have been tried together under section 239 (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the offences were committed in the course of the same transaction. In other words, the position under the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure appears to be that it was not necessary for the trial Court to try the petitioners at separate trials for charges under section 332/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 19 (f) of the Arms Act. However, by way of abundant caution the learned trial Magistrate separated the trial on the two charges after condacting the preliminary inquiry and framing the charges against the petitioners and their co‑accused. No purpose would have been served by separate recording of examination‑in‑chief of the prosecution witnesses for the purpose of the charge under section 19 (f) of the Arms Act. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners were not able to indicate as to what prejudice had been caused to any of the petitioners by the procedure adopted by the trial Court. I am, therefore, of the view that the procedure adopted by the trial Court was neither illegal nor prejudicial to the petitioners in any manner whatsoever. The trial of the petitioners on the charge under the Arms Act was, therefore, properly conducted.

7. The next question is whether the knives recovered in this case fall within the definition of arms as given in section 4 of the Arms Act. This definition runs as follows :‑ "`Arms' includes fire‑arms, bayonets, swords, daggers, spears, spearheads and bows and arrows, also cannons and parts of arms, and machinery for manufacturing arms." It has been repeatedly held that the definition of "Arms" in the Arms Act is not exhaustive, and whatever can be used as a instrument of attack and defence and is not an ordinary implement for domestic purposes, falls within the purview of the Act [See The Crown v. Ralla Singh (32 P R 1918) in which their Lordships followed the earlier decisions in No. 16 Punjab Record 1900, 20 Punjab Record 1900 and I L R 34 Cal. 749]. The same view has been held in Bishan Singh v. Emperor (81 I C 943), where a hunting knife was held to fall within the definition of arms. Again in Emperor v. Nga Lu Gale (A I R 1928 Rang. 49) it was observed that:‑ "It is clear that .the purpose for which an implement is primarily intended regulates whether it should be deemed to be arms. In the present case, the knife has a blade 51 inches long with a pointed end, and it is fitted to a long handle and turns over into the handle, and there cannot be any room for doubt that the primary purpose for which such an implement is manufactured is to supply weapons to persons who want efficient stabbing instruments. It is extremely difficult to conceive, of any domestic purpose for which such an instrument would be necessary or useful. It is a sort of weapon which, though not called a dagger, would be as effective as a dagger in its use."

8. As against these authorities, reference was made by the learned counsel for the defence to Emperor v. Me Thin and others (25 I C 337), which was a case decided by the Lower Burma Chief Court. It was held that clasp‑knives are not within the meaning of section 19 (f) of the Arms Act. The reasoning given was that "it cannot be said that when manufactured they were primarily intended to be used for offence or defence. They are certainly useful for ordinary purposes such as for domestic use or for cutting sticks. In ordinary parlance they would not be spoken of as arms." This aspect of the matter was considered in Emperor v. Nga Lu Gale, to which reference has been made above, and I respectfully agree with the observations made therein to the effect that it cannot be laid down as a hard and fast rule that no clasp‑knife would fall within the meaning of the word arms, The determination of this question would depend on the circum stances of the case and not only on the shape of the weapon or the size of its blade. If the weapon in question is obviously and primarily designed as an instrument for domestic use then it would normally fall outside the definition of arms, but if it is j such that it cannot be described as an instrument of ordinary daily domestic use, and is on the other hand, capable of being employed as a weapon of offence and defence, it should then be regarded as falling within the definition of arms. And if in a particular case, it is in fact so employed, then clearly no doubt would be left as to the fact that it does fall within the definition of arms.

9. Viewed in this light, the two knives recovered in the present case from the petitioners Shah Din alias Shahya and Waheed Beg, respectively, are clearly covered by the definition of arms. In the one case the bide is seven inches long and in the other if is six inches long. Knives with blades of such length Ore not normal domestic appliances, and in this particular case, the evidence makes it clear that they were in fact wielded as weapons E of offence against the raiding police party. The two petitioners have, therefore, been rightly convicted under section 19 (f) of the Arms Act for being in possession of these weapons without the necessary license. The sentence of nine months' rigorous imprison ment in each case is not at all excessive. In any case, it has already been ordered by the learned Sessions Judge that these sentences shall run concurrently with the sentences awarded to the petitioners under section 332/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code in the main case. There is thus no reason to interfere with the sentences either. The two petitions .are dismissed. K. B. A. Petitions dismissed.