P L D 1956 Peshawar 48 (PLP)

Respondent No. 2: ex‑parte. HABIB ULLAH KHAN, J.‑Mst. Umatul Faruq instituted a suit in the Court of Sub‑Judge First Class, Peshawar, on 29th November 1950, for possession through redemption of 1/2 share in a house, against Mst. Umatul Rasul, who died during the pendency of the case, and is now represented by her heirs, Aziz Ahmad and other defendants. She had engaged Malik Abdul Latif Advocate as her counsel, and executed a power‑of‑attorney in his favour. During the pendency of the suit, Malik Abdul Latif joined Government service as Traffic Magistrate on 6th December 1950. As a result his license was suspended. He was relieved of his duties on 15th May 1951, and on his application, his license was revived on 19th May 1951. He again started conducting the case on behalf of his clientess. On 1st November 1954, the parties compromised the case and made a joint statement in Court, which was signed by Malik Abdul Latif on behalf of Mst. Umatul Faruq. The suit was accordingly dismissed. Mst. Umatul Faruq filed an appeal in the Court of the Senior Sub‑Judge, Peshawar, mainly on the ground that she was ignorant of the compromise brought about on her behalf, and that the counsel who signed it on her behalf was not her competent agent. The plea did not prevail with the Appellate Court, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed. She has now come up to this Court on revision. Two points arise in the petition for decision, namely: ‑ (1) Whether the power‑of‑attorney executed in favour of Malik Abdul Latif counsel became operative with the revival of his license after he re‑joined the Bar, and (2) Whether the compromise was brought about by the counsel for the petitioner against her consent, or without her knowledge. The question in regard to the power‑of‑attorney need not detain us long. It is true that the power‑of‑attorney ceased to operate when the license of the counsel was suspended on his joining the service, but on the revival of his license, his power‑of‑attorney was also automatically revived. It is not in dispute that the petitioner did not take any steps to have the power‑of‑attorney cancelled either through a written notice or verbally. On the other hand, it is evident from the record that the counsel, on his return to the Bar, took up the case again and conducted it from 15th May 1951, right uptil 1st November 1954, when it was finally decided. During this long period he appeared in the case many a time. When the Commissioner appointed by the Court examined Mst. Umatul Faruq as a witness at her residence on 21st July 1953, the counsel was there, and her evidence was recorded in his presence. This clearly shows that she did not treat the power‑of‑attorney as cancelled, and confirmed its continuation by her conduct. Therefore, I hold that the power‑of‑attorney was still opera tive and effective when the compromise was brought about. As regards the second question, it may be pointed out that though Mst. Umatul Faruq is a purdah nashin lady, her interests were fully looked after by her husband, Haji Fazal Ilahi, and her grown‑up son, Muhammad Yunas, who almost always appeared in Court with the counsel, and used to give him instructions on behalf' of the lady. This fact is proved by the evidence of Malik Abdul Latif made on solemn affirmation before me. As a matter of fact, the compromise with the other party was negotiated and brought about by Haji Fazal Ilahi himself on behalf of his wife, and he informed Malik Abdul Latif of it, and the latter, after satisfying himself that it was in the interest of his clientess, agreed to it. Even after the compromise, the counsel had personally met his clientess, and the latter had told him in unequivocal terms that she was perfectly satisfied with the compromise brought about by him. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred me to certain authorities in support of his argument that Malik Abdul Latif was not competent to enter into a compromise on behalf of his clientess, but the facts of these are quite different from those of the one before me. In the present case, there is a clear clause in the power‑of‑attorney conferring express authority on the counsel to compromise the case. It is not quite understandable as to how the counsel was incompetent to agree to the compromise, which had been brought about by her husband and son, and which she ratified by her conduct when she told her counsel that she was perfectly satisfied with it. Therefore, finding no substance in the revision petition, I dismiss it. In view of the fact that a question of law is involved in the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. K. M. A. Petition dismissed.