P L D 1961 W (PLP)

A distinctive feature of a temporary permit is that R. T. A. is exempted from following the elaborate procedure laid down in section 57, but this again does not make it a no appeal able grant because all that is required under clause (f) of section 64 is that he alone can appeal who had opposed the grant before R. T. A. Whether the objection was made under section 57 or otherwise is immaterial; as long as the grant is opposed before R. T. A. the party opposing the grant becomes qualified to prefer an appeal under clause (f ) of section 64. (d) Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), S. 62‑Discretion of R. T. A.‑Scope. R. T. A's. discretion under section 62, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 defined and restricted to three circumstances and if it goes beyond the prescribed limit its action must be open to a legal remedy. The discretion vested in R. T. A. by section 62 is a qualified discretion and cannot be allowed to be exercised arbitrarily. There is thus nothing in the provisions of clause (20) of section 2 or section 62 or again section 64 which can justify the assumption that the grant of a temporary permit is not an appeal able order. Salamatullah for Appellant. Abdul Rehman for Respondents. Secretary, R. T. A. Lahore. ORDER New This is an appeal against the rant of a temporary permit for four months in favour of respondent No. 2 on the route, Trans Lyallpur‑Mehr Shahana via Pindi Sheikh Musa 62 miles in length. The appellant Company possessed what may be called a permanent permit for this route; but its service was irregular and the R. T. Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur reported that the public were Lahore being put to inconvenience and that the existing operator's permit M. may be cancelled. He also recommended that the permit might Abba be granted to another Transport Company which the residents of the area were prepared to set up. Secretary R. T. A. was deputed to make an enquiry on the spot; he collected detailed data showing the services run by the petitioner Company and reported orally that while the service of the appellant was irregular it had improved recently and that it deserved to be given a further chance particularly because the route included a kacha portion. R. T. A. renewed the permanent permit in favour of the appellant Company, but simultaneously granted a temporary permit for four months to the respondent Company. The latter had not applied for a temporary permit; it had actually applied for a permanent one, which was pending consideration because the route had not yet been declared "open." A preliminary legal objection has been taken on behalf of respondent No. 2 that no appeal lies against a temporary permit. The term "permit" has been defined in clause (20) of section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act which ‑makes no distinction whatever) between temporary and permanent permits or between any kinds or classes of permits; and according to this definition a "temporary" permit is as good a permit as a permanent one. B The grant of a temporary permit is ‑ regulated by the provisions of section 62, which do not exclude it from the purview of section

64. A distinctive feature of a temporary permit no doubt is that R. T. A. is exempted from following the elaborate pro cedure laid down in section 57, but this again does not make it a non‑appeal able grant because all that is required under c clause (f ) of section 64 is that he alone can appeal who had opposed the grant before R. ‑T. A. Whether the objection was made under section 57 or otherwise is immaterial; as long as the grant is opposed before R. T. A. the party opposing the grant becomes qualified to prefer an appeal under clause (f ) oil section

64. Another argument advanced on behalf of respondent No. 2 is that under section 62 a Regional Transport Authority can "at its discretion" grant a temporary permit, which is inter preted to mean that R. T. A's. discretion cannot be questioned I cannot accept this interpretation because R. T. A's discretion under section 62 is clearly defined and restricted to three cir cumstances and if it goes beyond the prescribed limit its action must be open to a legal remedy. The discretion vested in R. T. A. D by section 62 is a qualified discretion and cannot be allowed to be exercised arbitrarily. There is thus nothing in the provisions of clause (20) of section 2 or section 62 or again section 64 which can justify the assumption that the grant of a temporary permit is not an appeal able order. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2 relies on A I'R Kerala 19 in which a single Judge held that no appeal can lie under the Indian Motor Vehicles Act against the grant of a temporary permit. He based his view mainly on the ground that a temporary permit can be granted without notice and without hearing objections and, therefore, cannot qualify for an appeal under clause (f ) of section

64. As the wording of clause (f ) stands, the observance of the procedure laid down under section 57 is not a condition precedent to the filing of an appeal; and if a party has otherwise opposed the grant before R. T. A. it becomes qualified to file an appeal under clause ( f ). The practice in the Board of Revenue has generally been to entertain appeals against temporary permits. P L D 1950 Ph. (Rev.) 606 has been cited on the opposite side in which the Financial Commissioner not only entertained an appeal against the graft of temporary permits but actually accepted it in the circumstances of the case. I am in no doubt that an appeal can be filed against the grant of temporary permit under clause (f ) of section 64 provided its provisions are duly complied with. Coming to the facts of this appeal, I have to observe that neither R. T. A's. order nor its file shows what temporary need this temporary permit was required to serve. A temporary permit can be granted:‑ (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need. It is agreed that (a) and (b) are not applicable to the case; clause (c) is also not applicable because there was no "particular need" either. On the same date the temporary grant was made to respondent No. 2, the permanent permit of the‑appellant Company was renewed; whatever temporary need, therefore, there was, it could be met by the appellant Company. Subsequent events have also failed to show the existence of any "particular temporary need." This Court stayed the im plementation of the permit and although more than two months have passed, no adverse consequences are reported. I must, therefore, conclude that the temporary permit granted in favour of respondent No. 2 is not justified by the terms of section 62 and must be cancelled. The appeal is accepted. K. M. A. Appeal accepted Appeal accepted.