1984 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

Date of hearing : 18th July, 1982. S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).‑Haji Bashir Ahmad has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded Inspector‑General of Police, Punjab and Deputy Inspector‑General of Police, Sargodha Range, Sargodha, as respondents.

2. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that adverse remarks contained in letter of respondent No. 1 dated 13th June, 1981, be expunged.

3. Brief facts of the case are that for the year 1980 Mr. Ali Irfan Malhi, D. I.‑G. Police, Sargodha Range while countersigning the report of S. P. (Reporting Officer) observed as under :‑

"His performance leaves much to be desired." The above remarks were conveyed to the appellant vide letter No. S./5654/81, dated 13th June, 1981. The appellant submitted his representation to the Inspector‑General of Police, for expunction of above remarks. The I.‑G. Police Punjab, called for the comments of the Reporting Officer who after examining the representation, Character Roll of the appellant and the comments of the Reporting Officer rejected the representation. Hence this appeal.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned District Attorney assisted by the representative of the Department and have perused the record of this case carefully with their assistance.

5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the direct Supervisory Officer of the appellant, was S. S. P. Faisalabad, who according to his instructions contained in I.‑G. P. Standing Order No. 32, made no adverse comments whereas D. I.‑G. Police who was the countersigning authority, made this observation which he was in no way justified do make. It has been further argued that the appellant was not heard in person which was his fundamental right, therefore, the order of I.‑G. P. suffers from ibis fatal defect. Learned counsel has made a grievance that the remarks recorded by respondent No. 2 are of general nature without city any concrete example method, which is against the principle laid down in I.‑G. P. Standing Order No.

32. Learned counsel has addressed us at length to show that the assessment made by the D. I.‑G. Police on the work of the appellant, was not based on facts and the appellant performed his duties diligently to the entire satisfaction of his S. S. P.

6. On the other learned District Attorney has submitted that the D. I.‑G. Police has commented in detail by citation of facts and figures the efforts and lapses committed on the part of the appellant, therefore, it cannot be said in any manner, by the appellant that the said officer has given this report without any concrete evidence or material on the record.

7. With regard to the principle of audi alteram partem so urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, it has been submitted that there was no provision for granting personal hearing to the representee in para. 44 of the S. G. A & I. Department Booklet "Instructions about Confidential Reports." Moreover the representee also did not request for personal hearing. In the end learned District Attorney, has forcefully argued that the commenting officer has fully justified his stand there?fore, this Tribunal will not be justified to interfere with his such assessment.

8. We have given our anxious thought to the points so raised by the parties and have carefully taken into consideration the points raised in the memo. of appeal as well as the comments made in parawise comments by the D. I.‑G. It has been submitted by the D. I.‑G. that as many as eleven robbery/dacoity cases were reported during the year 1980 in Sub?-Division, Jaranwala. Index of crime went upto 1,376 cases in the year 1980 as compared with 1,280 cases registered during the corresponding year. In this manner the D. I.‑G. indicated that there was an increase of 96 cases during the year the appellant remained posted as D. P. O./ Jaranwala. He has further commented by saying that violent and heinous crime was watered down and paddling was resorted to, under direct supervision of the appellant. In this connection he has cited a specific example in case F. I. R. No. 312, dated 10th November, 1980 under section 17, Offences Against Property (Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 P. S. Khurarianwala, we need not go into the details of this case but after going through the record of this case we are satisfied that the D. I.‑G. was relying on a concrete example against the appellant. He has also quoted at case in which machinery was forcefully/forcibly taken away in Trucks by armed men to Kohat. The complaint nominated the accused. The machinery could not be brought back to Mills and was left with the accused on Superdari at Kohat. This according to the D. I.‑G. was a very important factor in holding that the performance of the appellant leaves much to be desired. . 9.While going through the Character Roll of the appellant, we find that this was not the first adverse entry in the said document but a number of times adverse entries were made but the appellant was invariably successful in getting the same expunged. We are not aware of the history of these cases so as to know how these entries were expunged and what were merits of these cases, but in the present case we would follow our earlier decision in such cases wherein we have held that where the Reporting Officer has been able to justify his assessment then he would be the best judge of the situation and not the Tribunal. We have carefully' taken into consideration the comments of the D. I.‑G. and are fully satisfied that the observation so made by him was neither arbitrary nor harsh in view of the facts and figures so cited by him.

10. In view of the above we do not find any merits in this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly. The parties shall bear their own costs. M. Y. M. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.