1992 PLP 1613 (MLD)

Faizuddin for Appellant. Muhammad Sadiq for Respondent. Date of hearing: 8th April, 1992. These F.RAs. are directed against two identical orders passed by Vth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi East on 21‑9‑1990, dismissing the applications under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 filed by the appellant against the respondents in respect of two rooms in House No.51‑B‑1, Block‑6, P.E.C.H.S. Ltd., Karachi.

2. The appellant is the owner of the above house which is situated, on a plot measuring 100 sq. yds. He remained out of Karachi in connection with his service till 1979, while his house was looked after by his relative Shahmat Ali, who rented out these rooms to the respondents @ Rs.80 and Rs. 70 per month respectively. The appellant proceeded on L.P.R. in lieu of his retirement in December, 1982 and occupied the remaining portion of the house i.e. one room, verandah and courtyard, beside kitchen, bath‑room and W.C. His family consisted of his wife and two grown‑up sons of marriageable age. Since the house was hardly sufficient for their needs, hence these two rooms were required by the appellant for his bona fide personal use and occupation and that of his family. On the refusal of the respondents to vacate these rooms, the appellant filed applications under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which were dismissed as above.

3. The respondents contested the applications. They denied that the appellant was the owner of the rented premises in dispute. They alleged that these rooms were used as shops by them from the very inception of the 'tenancy. They also denied that the accommodation in possession of the appellant was not sufficient for his needs. They denied that he required the premises for his bona fide personal use. They alleged that these proceedings were taken only to harass the respondents, so that they may yield to the unreasonable demand of the appellant for enhancement of rent.

4. Affidavits‑in‑evidence were filed by the respective parties. The deponents were cross‑examined by the Advocates of the respective opposite parties. The learned Controller, after taking into consideration the evidence so recorded, took up the issue as to requirement of the premises for bona fide personal use of the appellant and decided the same against him.

5. I have heard Mr. Faizuddin Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Muhammad Sadiq Advocate for the respondents.

6. The learned Controller has based his finding that the house in possession of the appellant was sufficient for his needs on the use of words `hardly sufficient' instead of `insufficient' in the application and the fact that the number of his family members has not increased since 1970. The reasoning by the learned Controller is not convincing. The word `hardly' has never given been meant to carry any affirmative intention. Reference in this connection may be made to the New Oxford Illustrated Dictionary page 767, where 'the word `hardly' is defined to mean `in a hard manner, with difficulty, harshly, scarcely'. Hence to say that while using the words `hardly sufficient' the appellant meant to convey that the premises in his possession was sufficient for his needs was not correct. Moreover, clause (7) of section 15 of the S.R.P.O. does not place any such condition on the accommodation in possession of the owner. All that it. says is that "(7) the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children". In the same way the argument that since the number of family members of the appellant has not increased, therefore, there is no justification for him to ask for eviction of the respondents from these two rooms, is not correct. Admittedly the appellant was an officer enjoying respectable status. He has retired in 1982 and was re‑employed in service on contract basis, but he had come back to Pakistan and was occupying the house in question along with his wife and two sons. One of his sons was an Engineer on a ship, while the other was an Accountant in a Company. Both were grown up and of marriageable age, the area of the house is 100 sq. yds. only. Only one room 10' x 12' was in possession of the appellant and his family. It, therefore, 13 can be easily imagined that a person with such a family and status would naturally need much more accommodation than these two rooms or shops, as the respondents have termed them. The mere fact a small room or two have been scrambled by the appellant with asbestos sheets roofs on the ground or the first floor, which he is using as a store, cannot be considered to be sufficient accommodation for a person with such a status and family.

7. Mr. Muhammad Sadiq, learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the appellant has relied upon 1984 MLD 19 (Mrs. Dephne Decruze v. Malik Muhammad Yusuf) where it was held that `intentional suppression by landlord of relevant facts in eviction application and in evidence in support thereof reflects an the bona fides of his personal requirement'. He has also relied upon 1984 CLC 755 (Begum Jan v. Abdul Rasool) ‑where it was held that where the landlady made a false allegation that she was a widow and tried to attract sympathy of the Court, it reflected on her bona fides and an eviction order was set aside.

8. I have gone through both these rulings. In my view these are not applicable to the facts of the present case. There is no material suppression made by the appellant in his applications under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. As already pointed out by me, the scrambling of an asbestos sheets store or room does not amount to a room in the sense in which it is understood in an area like P.E.C.H. Society, where the house in question is situated.

9. Similarly 1986 CLC 1751 (Kar.) (Mst. Safia Hassan v. Ishrat Hussain) where it was held that there was no change in the circumstances of the family, since the time the tenant was inducted, is a ground for refusing ejectment, would also not apply to this case because admittedly the appellant has retired from service and has come back to Pakistan to occupy his own house.

10. Lastly the respondents' counsel has relied upon 1983 CLC 1905 (Kar.) (Province of Sindh v. Nisar Ahmed) where ejectment was refused because the landlord suppressed the material fact that his sons possessed two shops, is also quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case.

11. I am satisfied that since the landlord is a retired Government Officer and has got a wife and two grown‑up sons; one is an Engineer and the other is an Accountant, who are of marriageable age and has come back to Pakistan from foreign, the house in his possession is clearly insufficient for his needs. Hence his requirement of these two rooms or shops is bona fide and in good faith. Reliance in this connection was placed in PLD 1989 SC 356 (Abdul Malik v. Muhammad Ilyas Khan), where it was held that when the landlord was above sixty years of age, had no other house or property except the disputed premises and had been residing with one son or the other and had been involved in litigation for getting the tenant evicted since 1967, but did not succeed till 1982, held that this indicated genuine personal need on his behalf. Law did not require a landlord to establish his need of absolute, requirement of premises without which he would have no shelter over his head., What was meant is that he required the premises for his reasonable needs. Landlord being in occupation of two rooms only, having no drawing room, dining room, or lounge. One landlord married, while another unmarried. Landlords working on executive jobs. Held, bona fide personal requircmentl established. Reference in this connection may be made to 1986 CLC 1472 (Exlostica v. Peter D'Souza). In another ruling of this Court reported in 1986 CLC 395 (D.B.) (Bhaledino v. Dur Muhammad) it was held that in ejectment proceedings on the ground of personal bona fide need of landlord statement of landlord on oath with regard to personal need being in consonance with pleadings and remaining unshaken in cross‑examination and not rebutted satisfactorily, a genuine requirement is spelt out, landlord's bona fides cannot be doubted. S.R.P.O. under section 15‑A give sufficient protection to tenant in case a landlord rclcts the premises to some other person or does not use it personally. In view of the above discussion, I am of the clear view that the impugned orders cannot be upheld. I, therefore, allow the F.R.As., set aside the impugned orders, direct the respondents to vacate the premises within three months and hand over the vacant possession thereof to the appellant. In ease the execution application is filed after three months, the learned Controller shall issue writ of possession without notice. H.B, ,/A‑1210/K Appeal allowed,