1983 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

(c) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)- -- S. 4 and Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance (XIII of 1978), S. 3-Appeal to tribunal-Dismissal of appellant not being under Ordinance XIII of 1978 and he also not being a civil servant, jurisdiction of tribunal, held, cannot be invoked. Muhammad Bashir Kayani for Appellant. Date of hearing : 31st May, 1980. MUHAMMAD DAUD KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-It is an appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, against the order of dis missal dated 22nd August, 1979, passed by the General Manager with the approval of Chairman, National Radio Telecommunication Cor poration (hereinafter called N.R.T.C.). Prayer as appeal is to set aside the impugned order and to re-instate the appellant with full back benefits. Brief facts relevant to the issue involved are that Appellant Mehboob Ellahi was employed in N.R.T.C. in 1968 as junior Accountant. He got promoted as Senior Accountant on 26th Aril, 1974. Assistant Accounts Officer on 1st May, 1975 and Accounts Officer on 18th December, 1977. On 13th March, 1979 a Committee was appointed to enquire into the affairs of the N.R.T.C. allegedly under Ordinance XIII of 1978 (Corpora tion Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978). On the basis of the report, appellant was suspended, charge-sheeted and then dismissed from service as mentioned earlier. The only other relevant factor is that N.R.T.C. is limited company created by Articles of Associations, under the Companies Act, 1913. It is now contended that proceedings against the appellant being under the Ordinance XIII of 1978, he is deemed to be a Civil servant as per section 5 of the Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance 1978. The enactment declares service of a Corporation as Service of Pakistan and every person in such service removed therefrom or rever ted to a lower post may resort for remedy to a Service Tribunal. Con dition precedent is that a person is either appointed or promoted during 1972 to 1977 period mentioned earlier. One appointed can be removed and if promoted can be reverted. The other point raised by the learned counsel is that irrespective of the special provisions enacted to declare particularised employees as Civil servants the present appellant is even otherwise deemed as such because N.R.T.C. though a company registered under the Companies Act, 1913 is entirely financed and operated in the interest of Ministry of Defence. All its products are compulsorily sold to the Defence Organization. Consequently it is urged that when an Organization entirely operates in connection with the affairs of the Federation its employees cannot be otherwise than civil servants. The appellant was nowhere recruited during the prescribed period. He got certain promotions after 1972 but the matter of his removal is not referable under the said Ordinance. If it was intended to make use of Special Powers Ordinance, suspension order, charge-sheet and dismissal from service would not have been issued at all. (Section 3 of Ordinance XI1I). No reasons were to be given nor a notice would be necessary. The charge-sheet, inquiry and dismissal were ordered by the Director -General who delineated the cause therefore of corruption. Thus the very issuance of charge-sheet takes the proceedings out of the pale of (Special Powers) Ordinance. The other point raised is equally devoid of any force. As pointed out earlier, the appellant was an employee of a registered Company. The company although financed by the Government and working entirely under its directions, does not constitute its employees to be Civil servants. The company may be acting in the affairs of the Federa tion but its employees are only employed in company's affairs. They cannot be deemed to be holding a post in connection with the affairs of the Federation. Service of Pakistaa has been defined in Article 260 of the Constitu tion. It means any service, post or office in connection with the affairs of the Federation and includes All Pakistan Service, Defence Services and any other Service declared as such by or under enactment of Parliament. Article 240 further clarifies the position by indicating mode, of appointment and conditions of service of such persons, Clause (a) makes it imperative that such service of the Federation and post in connection with the affairs of the Federation shall be controlled by or under an act of Parliament. Reading these two Articles togeth9r what transpires is that every civil servant must of necessity be governed by an Act of Parliament. When terms and conditions of any particular appointment are not so controlled and any company or Corporation is entitled to make its own regulations regarding terms and condition, irres pective of its financing and disposal of its products. Its employees cannot be deemed to be civil servants because the essential requirement of control by Parliament is lacking. The company itself or the Corpora tion may be so governed but its employers are altogether independent of any Parliamentary Act. They are not Civil servants despite financing by Government and exclusive benefits thereto. In similar circumstances WAPDA employees were not held to be civil servants till 1975. Special amendment had to be made in WAPDA Act to constitute them as such. Similarly Banks employees although these institutions have been nationalized, are not civil servants. They are governed by different set of rules made by the Corporation itself. Even the necessity of Ordinance XIII of 1978 declares the initial status of Corporation employees were civil servants there was no necessity to promulgate the Corporation Employees (Special Power) Ordinance, 1978. It was needed because Government was conscious of their status and for a particular purpose they were required to be conceded into civil servants. Thus, from whatever angle we look at the case of dismissal of the appellant not being under Ordinance XIII and otherwise he not being a civil servant, jurisdiction of this tribunal is not attracted. The appeal is dismissed in limine. Appeal dismissed.