P L D 1967 Lahore 683 (PLP)

7. Learned counsel for the appellant asserts that the first two notices (Exhs. P. 1 and P. 2) were superseded by the third notice (Exh. P. 3) and, therefore, the period of three months provided by section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, during which the occupant was entitled to pay the rent due from him, shall have to be counted from the 30th of October 1961, the date on which the notice was admittedly served upon the appellant. He submits that the previous two notices could not be taken into account for determining this date.

8. Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, as is made clear by the marginal heading of that section, is meant for "protection of certain occupants". It originally bad five subsections but the last one was omitted by Ordinance XIII of 1965. Subsection (1) provides that a person specified in it shall

"be deemed to be a tenant of the transferee on the same terms and conditions as to payment of rent or otherwise on which he held it immediately before transfer." It, therefore, needs no gainsaying that such an occupant becomes tenant of the transferee by operation of law without any further ado and that no notice, etc. is required for the purpose of constituting the relationship of landlord and tenant.

9. The proviso to this subsection is in two parts. The first part provides that a transferee can charge rent on the basis of the latest assessment carried out by the Municipality or the Local Authority, as the case may be for other properties in the locality generally; while proviso (b) protects the occupant from ejectment at the instance of the transferee for a period of six years. This proviso also requires the transferee to serve a notice by registered post acknowledgement due within one month of the transfer of the property informing the occupant that it has been so transferred.

10. Subsection (2) lays down that if the notice is not given within one month the period of six years during which he would enjoy protection would begin from the date of receipt of such notice by the tenant.

11. Subsection (3) has two clauses, both operate as exceptions to proviso (b) to subsection (1), referred to above. Clause (i) provides that the protection of six years' occupa tion granted by proviso (b) would not extend to a tenant who has failed to pay rent to the transferee within three months of the receipt of notice required by' it. Clause (ii) of subsection (3) tales away the protection granted by the said proviso from a tenant who sublet; or transfers the property or any part thereof or does something which is apt to destroy or injure the property or if the tenant owns a house or shop, as the case may be, within the same urban area.

12. Subsection (4) applies the ordinary law of the land to the transferee and the tenant, on the expiry of the period of six years mentioned above or on the provisions of subsection (3) becoming applicable. The result of the resume of the provisions of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, given above, leads to the conclusions that‑ (a) the relationship of landlord and tenant between the persons covered by section 30 of Act XXVIII of 1958 is not dependent upon the giving of any notice; (b) the landlord cannot charge rent at a rate higher than the latest assessment by the Municipality or other local authority; (c) the tenant has a right to occupy the aforesaid property in that capacity for a period of six years ; and that (d) the period of six years is to begin from the date of transfer of the property if notice thereof is sent within one month of such transfer, and in case such notice is not sent within time, from the date of the receipt of such notice by the tenant. This protection stands withdrawn if the rent is not paid or tendered within three months of the receipt of notice of demand or if the property is sublet or otherwise parted with by the tenant or he commits acts which are injurious to the property or he owns any other house in the locality.

13. Since the section does not permit the charging of rent at a rate higher than described above, a notice demanding a higher rate would not be sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 30, and if the tenant does not pay rent in accordance with it he would not be liable to ejectment in pursuance of the provisions of that section. The period of six years however, has nothing to do with the notice of demand because it is to commence from the date of the notice of the transfer.

14. The first notice in this case, i.e. Exh. P. 1, was received by the tenant on the 2nd of March 1961 and a perusal of it would show that the property was transferred on the 15th of January 1960. The period of six years would, therefore, begin from the 2nd of March 1961 and not from the date of transfer because the notice was not served within one month of the transfer. This period would end on the 1st of March 1967. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, therefore, continues to be regulated by section 30 of Act XXVIII of 1958.

15. The rent was demanded at Rs. 90 per month through this notice. This amount comprised Rs. 70, payable as rent every month to the Department by the tenant before the transfer and Rs. 20 on account of additional accommodation. Section 30 (1) authorises this because it provides that the tenant would be governed by the same terms and conditions as to payment of rent on which he held the property immediately before the transfer. This notice was, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of ran section 30 and non‑compliance with it, i.e. failure to tender rent at that rate within three months, would attract the penalty of ejectment.

16. It was submitted before me that before the tenant could comply with the demand and before the period of three months granted by the Statute for doing so had expired the landlord superseded this notice by sending another notice (Exh. P. 2) in which rent was demanded at a higher rate, and it is argued that the first notice ceased to have effect thereafter. The second notice, as is clear from it3 language, was not in super-session of the first one but in cintinuation of it. It was necessitated by the fact that the assessment of tax by the local authority had meanwhile been raised to Rs. 240 and rent was, therefore, demanded at this rate. There is nothing illegal about the second notice, nor has it been so contended before me.

17. Soon after the service of this notice the tenant filed a second revision petition before the Chief Settlement Commissioner against the transfer order and the Chief Settlement Commissioner granted an order for the maintenance of status quo pending disposal of the petition. This status quo order did not invalidate the notice. It only put it in a state of suspended animation, so that the moment the second revision petition was dismissed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which automatically vacated the stay order, all the effect of the stay order was effaced as if it had never been passed and F. A. Saleem was relegated to the position in which he was on the 27th of March 1961 when the second notice was sent to him.

18. A more or less similar question arose in Secretary of State v. District Board, Rangpur (A I R 1939 Cal. 758). The District Board, Rangpur had instituted three suits, Nos. 496, 497 and 498 of 1935, against the Secretary of State for India‑in‑Council. In Suit No. 496 one of the defence taken was that it was barred by the provisions of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was urged that in view of the section the suit could not be brought until the expiry of two months next after the notice in writing has been served. The notice had been served on the 17th of August 1935 but it was later found that one plot of land had not been mentioned in that notice. On the 23rd of August 1935 another notice including that plot was served. The suit was instituted on the 23rd of October 1935. The defendant had contended that the time should be computed from the second notice and that the suit was, therefore, premature. The learned Judge who decided that case opined that‑ "in my opinion the second notice nowhere annulled or cancelled the first one. It merely amplified it by adding plot No. 669 to the subject‑matter of the suit. The introduction of plot No. 669 was made too late and therefore the plaintiff respondent has not been given any relief with respect to that plot; but it cannot be said that the second notice had the effect of cancelling the first one. The Secretary of State for India in Council had intimation by the first notice of the suit .and the suit has been brought after the expiry of two months of that information. The requirements of section 80 have been fully complied with. The second notice was served merely for the purpose of including plot No.

669. It cannot be reasonably argued that because of this attempt on behalf of the plaintiff to add a new plot to the subject‑matter of the suit, it should be held that the suit so far as it relates to the other plots men tioned in the first notice is premature.

19. I respectfully adopt the reasoning of the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court. Both the second and third notices in the present case were in amplification of the first notice and did not cancel it. The rate at which rent was demanded in the first notice was in accordance with law and the notice was, therefore, a perfectly valid notice. This notice, therefore, remained operative and F. A. Saleem was liable to pay rent in pursuance of this notice in any case.

20. The demand made by the second notice was similarly valid at the time the notice was given. Since, however, the demand was reduced at the instance of F. A. Saleem himself and he was fully aware of it I do not think the third notice was at all, necessary. Be that as it may, the mere fact that it was given does not set at naught the one already given. F. A. Saleem was, therefore, under a liability to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 70 per month up to the revision of the assessment by the Department, and since the final decision brought it down to Rs. 150 per month he has to pay rent at that rate.

21. In the circumstances of this case, explained above, I hold that the first notice is a proper and valid notice under the law and that the application for ejectment is neither bad for want of notice nor for having been brought before the expiry of the statutory period of three months.

22. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs and the case is remanded back to the trial Court for being proceeded with in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the Rent Controller on the 23rd of January 1967. A. H. Appeal dismissed. Case remanded.