P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

(a) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children; (b) he is not occupying another residential building, suitable for his needs at the time in the same urban area in which such building is situated;" Counsel urged that, in the present case, the emphasis of the respondent has been on the need of the house owing to the illness of her husband which was not a need that was recognizable under the above quoted law. The above‑quoted law recognizes the need of the children of the landlord only and of no other relative. The need of the husband should therefore, be considered to have been impliedly excluded for tire purposes of getting the premises vacated. Moreover, according to counsel, it was necessary for the learned District Judge to apply the provision which is contained in paragraph (b) also because paragraphs (a) and (b) go together. Instead of doing so, the learned District Judge, according to counsel, has not applied the relevant law at all but has attempted to apply the provisions of section 10 of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953 although that statute had been repealed in the meantime.

4. Before taking into consideration the stand of counsel for the respondent, I may mention that according to the order as well as admittedly the family of the respondent consists of herself and her husband only. The husband has been proved to be a patient of T. B., diabetes, high blood pressure and heart trouble.

5. As a point of law counsel for the respondent has met the argument advanced by counsel for the appellant by urging that the words "for his own occupation" which occur in paragraph (a), quoted above, are to be considered from the point of view of the needs of the respondent. He argued that they are not restricted to the landlord personally and singly taken apart from his family, but should be considered along with the family because the need of the family is his own need. He further contended that the requirements of paragraph (b) were not overlooked but were taken into consideration by the learned District judge, as follows:‑

"It has been admitted by the appellant that she had changed her residential premises 2 times before she occupied the present premises. It strongly proves her version that she requires the premises at present occupied by the respondent bona fide because of the illness of her husband. If she had any other motive or intention, as alleged by the respondent, she could have asked for her own premises earlier. She never did it before. Another difficulty in the present premises is that it consists of two rooms only, one room over the other. Latter is occupied by Ismail while the former is used by the landlady, because kitchen, etc. are attached to it. I have already pointed out that there is no air and light. A T. B. patient requires both. The premises occupied by the respondent has those conveniences."

6. Counsel for the appellant did not criticise the above views but he referred to the judgments in the cases of Abdullah v. Adam Ali (P L D 1961 S C 28) and Rustom Khudadad v. Arakan Furniture Mart (P L D 1962 Kar. 79) to press his point that the needs of her husband could not be considered to be the needs of the respondent herself. It is pointed out in those authorities that in terms of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, the requirements of a `brother' and of a `nephew' of the landlord were not the needs of the landlord himself. He argued on this basis that in terms of the present provisions, which have been quoted above, the distinction between the personal requirements of a landlord and those of his relatives should be distinguished. As "children" are specifically mentioned in the provisions, it should be taken that the other relatives are impliedly excluded by them.

7. As against the above contentions of counsel, the learned Advocate for the respondent has argued that a brother and a nephew are not considered to be members of a Muslim family and referred to the following observations which occur in the commentary on the expression "occupation for him", which occurs in section 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act, by J. H. Dalal: "The said words should be given a fair and liberal construction and they must be interpreted to include his family dependants and such persons who may be essential for the purpose of such occupation. The said words mean occupation of himself and all persons who are dependant upon him. It is not the intention of the Rent Restriction Act to disrupt a family and to drive members of the family out because they start earning and are not dependant upon a member in whose name the premises stand." Further: "In considering a landlord's requirement the Court ought to take into consideration the fact that there are other persons residing with him in his present premises and whom he does not wish to turn into street." I enquired from the learned Advocate for the respondent as to why the word "children" only has been mentioned in paragraph (a) quoted above in preference to any other relative of the landlord. He replied that the purpose apparently was to give the benefit to married and independent children also. In support of this view of counsel, the following remark contained in the Commentary by Mr. Shaukat Mahmood on section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 is relevant:‑-- "The fact that the child is married or is not dependent on the landlords or accommodation or otherwise is immaterial for the application of the section."

8. The above examination of the provisions of law on which counsel for the appellant has relied leads to the conclusion that the requirements of paragraph (b) have been properly taken into consideration by the learned District Judge and that the words "for his own occupation" which occur in paragraph (a) should be taken to include all genuine requirements of the landlord and not to be restricted to the requirement of a shelter for his own body and the bodies of his children. This is indicated by the words "suitable for his needs" which occur in paragraph (b). The needs of the landlord cannot be discriminated so as to separate the inner needs and outer needs of his body because both of them are projected on his environments. His hunger may be projected in the form of a need for a kitchen and his need for physical comfort may be projected in the form of a need for servants; nor can "his needs" be restricted to physical needs in contradistinction to social, economic, intellectual, emotional and spiritual needs, which may be projected in the form of a need for a sitting room, for an office, for a wife, for children, for a room reserved for prayers or for a room reserved for maintaining a library. The needs would differ from landlord to landlord and some of those which may be genuine in one case may not be so in another case; nor is it open to the landlord to declare his needs as his own subjective decisions, firstly, because his needs reflect the ideas of the society and secondly because his rights are controlled by the society. The character of the social order to which he belongs places the general limits on his needs and his own characteristics place special limits on them. Mr. Dalal has rightly pointed out in the above‑mentioned commentary that:‑ "In order to determine what is family or dependant or person essential or necessary for occupation in each case, it is proper and desirable for the Court to bear in mind the context of social order, habits and ideas of living and the socio‑religious customs of the community to which the landlord belongs." The writer could add that personal characteristics of a landlord, when relevant, also constitute a necessary set of considerations for determining his needs. If he is a poor man his genuine needs must be within his means; if he is a non‑believer he is not likely to need a room for prayer and if he is an illiterate person he is not likely to need a room for a. library. The point is: what life he leads, can lead and may lead. It is such life, and not merely the need to occupy a place for having a roof over his head, that is significant.

9. The above examination of the situation is sufficient to draw the final conclusion in these proceedings but before stating that conclusion I may mention that counsel for the appellant had brought it to my notice that he had applied for the amendment of the grounds of this appeal which application had also been fixed for hearing alongwith the appeal. No notice of that application was given to the respondent. Counsel suggested that the application should be considered and decided before the decision of the appeal. The application for amendment seeks to embody in the grounds of appeal, according to counsel, the allegation that the respondent has now given up the premises which were situated in the same area in which the premises in dispute are situated and which she was occupying at the time of making the application. The remarks of the learned District Judge made with respect to the premises which were in her occupation at the time of the application are, therefore, according to counsel, not applicable to the premises which she occupies now and, therefore, the conclusion should not be that the present premises are also not adequate for her needs. I have dismissed that application firstly, because it is very belated and, secondly, because' paragraph (b) of the provision on which counsel relies takes into consideration the premises which were in occupation of the landlord~ at the time of making the application. Thirdly, the learned District Judge has pointed out that the respondent has been changing her accommodation which proved that she was not able to find suitable accommodation for her requirements. The last change, I may add, can be reckoned as an additional fact in support of the same conclusion.

10. I pointed out to counsel for the appellant that the insistence of the appellant on withholding the premises which belong to the respondent in spite of her anxiety to herself occupy them appears to be in disregard of the preferential right of the landlord to get the premises needed by him for his own comfort and requirement. In this case, the respondent had offered the premises which were occupied by her in exchange of the premises which the appellant occupied at the time of the application. That offer was not accepted, and counsel has explained that the reason was that the application for ejectment itself was dismissed by the Rent Controller. The explanation was not convincing because the application for ejectment was pressed in spite of the offer. Counsel has now tried to make use of the present change of accommodation by the respondent as an argument in his favour by saying that even the premises which she had offered has been made unavailable now. This outlook on the situation has not impressed me at all.

11. The overall conclusion of the above discussion is that this appeal should be dismissed. It is hereby dismissed with costs. K.B.A. Appeal dismissed.