1980 P Cr (PLP)

FAKRUDDIN G. EBRAHIM, J. This petition challenges the seizure and detention of prize bonds of the value of Rs. 22,58,500, by the Customs Authorities in a pending proceeding under section 13 of the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977 before the Special Judge, Anti‑Smuggling, Karachi and the short contention in its support is that there is no provision in this Act for seizure and detention during the pendency of any proceedings. The petitioner admits that he was in possession of the said prize bonds and the explanation given by him is that he was negotiating a deal as an estate broker in respect of two commercial plots one measuring 780 sq. yds. and the other measuring 634 sq. yds. both situate opposite Mahboob Market, Saddar, Karachi and for that purpose he had received Rs. 221 lacs from two gentlemen, namely, Lt.. Col. Saadat Hussain Bokhari and Sajjad Mirza,' though at the time of the seizure he did not recall the names of these two gentlemen.

2. Mr. Sami Ahmed, the learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to section 31 of the said Act which provides for a show‑cause notice by a Special Judge as to why whole or any 'part of the property reasonably suspected to be acquired by smuggling be not forfeited t the Federal Government and went on to argue that the occasion for forfeiture under section 32 only arises if the finding is that the property ,to ‑ which the notice relates is property acquired by smuggling. The argument of the learned counsel was that there was no provision like in the Sea Customs Act which under subsection (1) of section 168 provides for seizure and detention of goods pending enquiry.

3. Mr. Mansoor Ahmed Khan, the learned counsel for the official respondents, however, relied upon the well‑established principle of law that grant of a statutory power, in this case forfeiture of property reasonably suspected to be acquired by smuggling following a show‑cause notice, carries with it the duty in proper eases to make such orders so as not to render the proceedings nugatory. As was observed by Grover, d., of‑‑the Supreme Court of India in I T. O. v. M. K. Muhammad Kunhi (1973 P T D 147) the firmly established principle is that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. Our Supreme Court in the case of Sind Em ployees' Social Security v. Adunjee Cotton Mills (P L D 1975 S C 32) rejected the contention that in the absence of any express power an Appellate Court had jurisdiction to grant a stay of the operation of an impugned order on the ground that such was necessary to enable the Appellate Court to exercise its conferred jurisdiction more effectively and in accordance with what indisputably are requirements of justice and reason. In the present case the power to detain the property reasonably suspected to be acquired by smuggling is, to our mind, incidental or ancillary to the jurisdiction of the Social Court under the said section. 31, for otherwise proceedings under it will become fruitless and irrelevant. To this Mr. Sami Ahmed , the learned counsel for the petitioner replied that to meet this contingency section 341 of the Act provides that the pro" mentioned in a notice under section 31 shall not be transferral by any mode whatsoever pending its )tearing and such transfer will be void as against the Government in whom such property will vest on a forfeiture order made under section 32 and that under its subsection (2) a person who transfers any property shall be punishable with imprisonment for a terns which may extend to the years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 34 to our mind gives at best a limited protection and, therefore, cannot be regarded as any substitution of the ancillary power of every Court to safeguard the interests of parties before it during the pendency of proceeding. We are further of the view that section 34 makes it necessary to have recourse to this ancillary power for it will avoid hardship to innocent purchaser of such property.

4. We are even otherwise not inclined to interfere in our Constitutional jurisdiction for the order is not only otherwise just and fair but is only an interlocutory order.

5. The result, therefore, is that there is no merit in this petition and it is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.