1988 PLP 1575 (SCMR)

ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J. ‑‑The dispute in this case pertains to shop premises of which Mst. Saeeda Khatoon, respondent herein, is admittedly the owner. It is also not in dispute that when she filed an eviction application against the petitioner, she was a widow. Therefore, the provisions of section 14 of Sind Rented Premises Ordinance were fully applicable to the respondent so far as her status to avail the benefit of that provision of law is concerned. After compliance with the requirement of the statutory notice she filed an eviction application against the petitioner.

2. The petitioner contested her right mainly on three grounds which according to him proved that the eviction application was made mala fide. These grounds shortly stated were that the respondent was a sick old lady suffering from paralysis and hence unable to carry on any business in the shop, that her son was a very young boy also unable to manage a business and that she had obtained an ejectment order in respect of another shop situated in the same building. Learned Rent Controller accepted these pleas of the petitioner and dismissed the application for eviction by his order dated 17th December, 1985, holding that the respondent had failed to prove that she needs the premises for her personal use in good faith.

3. On appeal, however, a learned Single Judge of the Sind High Court disagreed with the findings of the Rent Controller and held that the respondent has proved that she needs the premises for her personal use for setting up a business which she will run with the help of her son who was aged 18 years and her son‑in‑law. Accordingly the appeal of the respondent succeeded and her eviction application under section 14 was accepted by judgment dated 7th July, 1987.

4. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has brought this petition for leave to appeal from the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised a two‑fold contention before us. It has been urged firstly that after becoming a widow the respondent had agreed to continue the tenancy of the petitioner by enhancing rent which amounted to a fresh tenancy, with the result that she was disentitled to the privilege extended to widows under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance. It was secondly contended that during the pendenqy of the ejectment proceedings in this case, the respondent had obtained possession of another shop on the ground floor of the building on the ground of reconstruction. We find no force in both these contentions. By virtue of the definition of the term "tenant" in the Ordinance, it is quite plain that the tenancy of the petitioner was continuous and did no; terminate even on the date when the petitioner agreed to enhance the rent. There is no principle of law or any provision whereby mere enhancement of rent would be tantamount to creating a tenancy. It might well be that the tenant may have induced the landlady not to evict him at that juncture of time by giving her lure of enhanced rent. Be that as it may, the proposition does not receive support in law that mere alteration of the terms and conditions of the tenancy would constitute a fresh tenancy. In order to constitute a fresh tenancy it must be shown to have terminated by an order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, which is not the case here. As to the second contention, it is sufficient to state that obtaining possession on the ground of reconstruction does not ipso facto terminate the tenancy of the tenant who was in occupation of such premises at the time of such an order. The reason is that upon reconstruction of a new building the law gives the; tenant of the old premises the option to be reinstated in the new building. It, therefore, follows that during the time the new construction is being set up, part of the building to be constructed is held by the landlord in trust for the benefit of the ousted tenant, until such time as it becomes certain that the tenant does not exercise his, option of reinstatement within the prescribed time. Therefore, it will not be correct to say that the respondent is in occupation of another building of her own at the time ‑when the eviction order in this case was passed.

5. No other argument was advanced and upon perusal of the judgment of the High Court, we are satisfied that the respondent has made out a case for obtaining possession of the disputed premises by virtue of her right under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance.

6. In the result the judgment of the High Court is unexceptionable and the petition is accordingly dismissed. M . Y . H . / M‑502/S Petition dismissed.