1998 PLP 468 (SCMR)

RAJA AFRASIAB KHAN, J.

On 17th of June, 1969, Alam Sher and Abdul Ghafoor, the petitioners instituted separate suits against the Province of West Pakistan and others, the respondents for declaration to the effect that they were entitled to get the ownership rights of the land measuring 12/1-2 acres each allotted to them under Grow More Food Scheme in Chak No. 145/WB Tehsil Mailsi, District Multan and the orders having been rendered by the Collector and Additional Commissioner (Revenue) Multan dated 23-2-1966 and 22-9-1966 respectively were illegal and inoperative qua their rights. These orders were, therefore, sought to be set aside. The suits were contested by the respondents by filing written statements. It was stated that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case under section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. To start with, both the suits were decreed with costs by Senior Civil Judge, Vehari by giving finding that the documentary evidence produced and relied upon showed that plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land and the defendants had failed to rebut that evidence. It was also held that the plaintiffs being in possession, were entitled to be given the proprietary rights of the disputed land. The respondents went in appeal to challenge the impugned judgments and decrees. An Additional District Judge, Vehari vide his judgments and decrees dated 8-2-1981 accepted both the appeals and dismissed the suits of the petitioners leaving the parties to bear their own costs stating that in view of section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter and the controversy could alone be decided by the Revenue Court. The petitioners' Regular Second Appeal Nos.67 and 68 of 1981 were dismissed by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court Multan Bench vide separate judgments dated 15--11-1995 thereby confirming the findings having been rendered by the First Appellate Court. These petitions seeking special leave to appeal have been instituted by the petitioners. Learned counsel submits that the judgments and decrees of the trial Judge were valid inasmuch as it was held that the petitioners being in possession were entitled to be given the ownership rights of the disputed land. We have not been persuaded to hear the learned counsel on merits because there was bar to entertain and decide the civil suit under section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act. The said section reads: "Jurisdiction of Civil Court barred as regards matter arising under the Act.--A Civil Court shall not have jurisdiction in any matter of which the Collector is empowered by this Act to dispose and shall not take cognizance of the matter in which the (Provincial Government) (Board of Revenue) or Collector or any other Revenue Officer exercise any power vested in it or in him by or under this Act. " Learned counsel was asked to demonstrate that the Civil Court was competent to decide the dispute between the parties in presence of clear bar as mentioned above. He, however, submits that the Civil Courts would always be competent where the judgments/orders are -without jurisdiction or based on mala fide. The argument is without substance as the above provisions are mandatory in nature stating that Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute over which the Collector etc. had the authority to decide. Learned counsel was also unable to show as to how the orders passed by the competent Revenue Authority were without jurisdiction. In other words, the petitioners had remedy to move appeal/revision before the Member, Board of Revenue which they, admittedly, failed to avail of. We, accordingly, hold the view that Civil Court was not competent to interfere where the Revenue Courts/Authorities had the exclusive jurisdiction. Even on merits, the petitioners had no case inasmuch as they violated the conditions on which they were given the disputed land. They did not cultivate the land in accordance with the terms and conditions of their allotments. The land had, thus, rightly been allotted to the respondents as Islamabad affectees because it became available by operation of law. In such a situation, the judgments of the Courts below are not open to exception. The petitions have been found to be without substance. These are, accordingly, dismissed. A.A./A.1434/S Leave refused.