P L D 1975 Karachi 483 (PLP)
SHER BAHADUR AND 2 OTHERS-Petitioners Versus CHAIRMAN, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, KARACHI AND ANOTHER — Respondents
| Citation | P L D 1975 Karachi 483 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Dorab Patel and Jamaluddin H. Ahmed. JJ |
| Parties | SHER BAHADUR AND 2 OTHERS-Petitioners Versus CHAIRMAN, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, KARACHI AND ANOTHER — Respondents |
| Primary Law | Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1975 Karachi 483 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1975 Karachi 483 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Dorab Patel and Jamaluddin H. Ahmed. JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1975 Karachi 483 (PLP) (SHER BAHADUR AND 2 OTHERS-Petitioners Versus CHAIRMAN, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, KARACHI AND ANOTHER — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ali Amjad for Petitioners.
- S. J. Alam, Deputy Attorney-General for Respondent No. 1.
- Fazle Ghani Khan for Respondent No. 2.
- Date of hearing : 13th March 1975.
Headnotes / Summary
Ss. 22-A, cl. (9), 53(2) & 16-Complaints under S. 53(2) of unfair labour practice within meaning of S. 16-Proceedings can be initiated '' before the Commissioner by any party after amendment of S. 22-A(9) by amending Ordinance XIX of 1974. Hazoor Alam v. National Industrial Relations Commission and another 1974 P L C 161 held not applicable.
Judgment & Decree
JAMALUDDIN H. AHMED, J...The petitioners in this case who claim to be the workmen of respondent No. 2 and also members of the Star Textile Mills Workers' Union, which is the Collective Bargaining Agent of tile workmen of respondent No. 2, have moved this constitution petition against the action taken by respondent No. 1, tile Chairman, Industrial Relations Commission, Karachi that is of entertaining a complaint against the petitioners and some others on 1st of June 1974, at the instance of respondent No.
2. This complaint which is Annexure `B' of this petition purports to be under section 53 (2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and accuses the petitioners and others of activities amounting to unfair labour practices within the meaning of section 16 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The respondent No. 1 after recording statement of A. H. M. Dadabhoy. ' the Director of the respondent No. 2 passed an order on the same, stating therein that as there appeared to be a contravention of section 16 (d) of the
1. R. O., 1969, the petitioners should appear before him on 3‑6‑1974. The order also stated :‑ "Meanwhile they are directed to refrain from doing any wrongful act to avoid occurrence of unfair labour practices failing which drastic action . would be taken against them." It is these proceedings and the order, which are challenged before us as being without jurisdiction, illegal and void.
2. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that under section 22‑A, cl. (9) of the I. R. O. it is only the industry‑wise Trade Unions federation of such trade unions, or federations at the National level, who are competent to initiate proceedings before the Commissioner, and the complainant in this case being respondent No. 2 was neither competent to file the complaint nor was the Commissioner entitled to initiate proceedings upon his motion. Respondent No. 2 did not fall in any category described under clause (9) of section 22‑A. In support of this contention he relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Hazoor Alain v. National Industrial Relations Commission and another (1974 P L C 161). The question for consideration before the D. B. in that case was exactly the same i. e. whether the proceedings can be initiated before the Commis?sioner, only by `industry‑wise trade unions, federations of such unions and federations of the National level and not by any individual and, therefore, involved the interpretation of clause (9) of section 22‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The conclusion reached in this case, in the words of the learned Chief Justice was:‑ "It being an admitted position that in all these cases the proceedings have been initiated by individuals I have, by reason of all that I have said above, come to the conclusion that these petitions must be allowed and that in each case it must be declared that the proceedings are without lawful authority and of no legal effect." Although this judgment supported the contention of the learned counsel, subsequent to this judgment which is dated 16‑1‑74, the law has been materi?ally changed. By the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance XIX of 1974, subsection (9) of section 22‑A has been substituted and it now reads as under "(c) for subsection (9) the following shall be substituted and shall be deemed always to have been so substituted, namely: `(9) The Commission may, on the application of a party, or of its own motion,‑ (a) initiate prosecution, trial or proceedings, to take action, with regard to any matter relating to its functions; and (b) withdraw from the Junior Labour Court or Labour Court any application, proceedings or appeal relating to unfair labour practice.'; (d) in subsection (10‑A), after the word "it" at the end, the words "and grant such relief as the Commission has the power to grant" shall be substituted and shall be deemed always to have been so substituted." Obviously the effect of this is that the proceedings or prosecutions of the nature of the case under consideration, could be initiated even on the application of a party and all these previous limitations have been removed. And w this change is deemed always to have existed, it is effectively applicable to the facts of the present case also, but the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the language of clause (9) (a) of section 22‑A was relatable only to prosecutions, trial or proceedings etc. with regard to the matters relating to the functions of the Commission itself and such were described as offences in clause 8 (f) of section 22‑A. Clause 8 of section 22‑A reads as under :‑ "The following shall be the functions of the Commission, namely :- (a) to promote the formation of trade unions of workers within the same industry whether in establishments within a Province or in more than one Province and federations of such trade unions; (b) to promote the formation of federations at the national level; (c) to adjudicate and determine an industrial dispute to which an industry‑wise trade union or a federation of trade unions is a party and any other industrial dispute which is, in the opinion of the Central Government, of national importance and is referred to it by that Government; (d) to register industry‑wise trade unions, federations of such trade unions and federations at the national level; (e) to determine the collective bargaining agents amongst industry‑wise trade unions, federations of trade unions and federations at the national level; (f ) to try offences in respect of matters relating to any of its functions; (g) to deal with cases of unfair labour practices on the part of employers or workmen, whether individually or collectively and to take, in such manner as may be prescribed, measures calculated to prevent an employer or workman from committing an unfair labour practice; (h) to advise Government, industry‑wise trade unions and federations in respect to the education of workers in the essentials of trade unionism, including education in respect of their rights and obligations, and to secure the provision of facilities required therefor, and to apportion the cost thereof between the Provincial and Central Governments, industry‑wise trade unions, federations of such trade unions and federations at the national level, and the employers, in such manner as may be considered equitable by the Commission ; and (i) such other powers and functions as the Central Government may, by notifications in the official Gazette, assign to it from time to time."
3. In the submission of the learned counsel, therefore, the present case being an offence under section 53(2) for violating section 16 (d) of the I. R. O. was not covered by clause 8 (f ) of section 22‑A which spoke only of the matters relating to the functions of the Commission itself. According to him section 16 of the I. R. O. deals with unfair labour practices and the only power that the above‑quoted amendment gave to the Commission was that of withdrawing any matters relating to such unfair labour practices from the Labour Court as envisaged in sub‑clause (b) of clause (9). He, therefore, concluded that even in its amended form the language of subsection (9) of section 22‑A of the I. R. O. did not permit the continuing of the present complaint as the Commission bad no powers to proceed with the same. Now this whole argument is misconceived. Clause 8 (g) of section 22‑A is as under :‑ "to deal with cases of unfair labour practices on the part of employers or workmen, whether individually or collectively, and to take, in such manner as may be prescribed, measures calculated to prevent an employer or workman from committing an unfair labour practice." When we pointed out this to the counsel and asked him to explain how the present case would not be covered by this provision, he had no answer, except that the intention of the Legislature was not to treat cases of unfair labour practices as offences for the purposes of this section and therefore only offences relating to the function of the Commission were contemplated under sub‑clause (8).
4. This contention also has no force at all. To deal with cases of unfair labour practices, being one of the functions of the Commission under clause (8) of section 22‑A, any offence relating to that would also be covered by sub‑clause (f) and therefore clause (9) of section 22‑A in its amended form would cover such offences also. Additionally, section 53(3) expressly extends to a contravention of section 16 (d) (1) for which the impugned notice was made.
5. As a result, we find no force in the contentions of the counsel for the petitioners and the petition fails. The proceedings initiated before res?pondent No. 1 are to continue. As the petition involved consideration of a point of law, we dismiss the same, but with no order as to costs. K. B. A. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? Petition dismissed.