1993 PLP 844 (MLD)

At trial respondents filed affidavit of Muhammad Ashraf, who is a Director of respondents Company, and appellants filed affidavit of their employee namely Asgher Ali. Both were cross‑examined. Learned Rent Controller settled the following issues:‑‑. (1) Whether the applicants require the premises for their personal bona fide use? (2) What should the order be? On assessment of evidence" brought on record, learned Rent Controller decided Issue No.1 in affirmative and consequently he allowed the eviction application by the order, which has been impugned in this appeal. Learned counsel for appellants challenged the finding of learned Rent Controller mainly on two grounds. Firstly, it is contended that in the year 1978 the respondents' application on merits was dismissed and appeal filed against it was withdrawn, as such, the principle of res judicata is applicable. Secondly, it has been argued that even now on merits the respondents are not entitled to claim possession of the premises. On first point he cited (1) PLD 1961 Dacca 628 Prafulla Ranjan Chowdhury and others v. Rai Mohan Chowdhury and others, (2) PLD 1965 SC 527 Government of Pakistan v. Syed Akhlaque Hussain and another. In the case of Prafulla Ranjan Chowdhury while dealing with the principle of res judicata, it was held that judgment right or wrong was binding between the parties. In second case, Supreme Court observed that res judicata is the decision itself and not reasons thereof. The principles of res judicala in rent cases would not apply when cause of action of second application arises after the disposal of previous application. Learned counsel for respondents on this point referred to the case reported in 1984 SCMR 881 Muhammad Ahmed and another v. Mst. Sakina Begum and others. In this case, landlord had filed three eviction applications. A First and second were dismissed and 3rd application was allowed. It was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that 3rd application of landlord was not barred on account of previous litigation. On subsequent cause of action, fresh application was maintainable. This can be further explained in the way that f the eviction application filed by landlord on ground of default had failed and the tenant again commits, default in payment of rent, then fresh application for subsequent default would be maintainable, despite the fact that the earlier one was dismissed on merits. This principle? would also apply when fresh application is filed, after the dismissal of earlier application on merits, on subsequent cause of action on the grounds enumerated in subsection (2) (ii) (iii) (a) (b) (c) (iv) (v) and (vii) of section 15 of the Ordinance. In such situation, subsequent circumstances would be parameter for determining the cause of action. In this case, the circumstances had changed and respondents had a cause of action for seeking eviction of appellants. The first eviction application was filed in 1978 and the present one was instituted in the year 1986. In 1984 they got possession of the hotel and they have every right to promote their business. In this connection, it is also noted that section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 contained a provision for summarily rejecting application, which raised substantially the same issue which was decided finally in a former proceeding under said Ordinance. In fact, it was like the principle of res judicata. In the Ordinance, however, there is no such provision. So far the proceedings under the Ordinance are concerned, it can be said that the principle of res judicata, in changed circumstances, would not apply. Next point to be considered is personal requirement. Learned counsel for appellants submitted that mere wish, convenience, whim, fancy of landlord would not be enough to show that landlord genuinely requires the premises in good faith. Also, he argued that element of need and genuine requirement for the purpose of promoting the business would have to be proved beyond doubt by the landlord. In support of above contentions, he cited (1) PLD 1986 Kar. 407 M.S. Baroba v. Manzoor Ahmed, (2) PLD 1986 Kar. 84 M/s. Eastern Express Co. Ltd. v. Tariq Hameed, (3) 1986 CLC 1100 Ikhlaq‑un‑Nabi v. Nawab Ahmed Shamsi and 6 others, (4) 1987 CLC 686 Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Aslam, (5) 1987 MLD 2360 Muhammad Hussain Fathavi and another v. Syed Akber Alis Shah. Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the plea of personal requirement has liberally interpreted the phrase `personal requirement' as is apparent in the following cases. (1) 1985 SCMR 1769 Dildar Hussain Nayyar v. Niaz Muhammad Dar and another. In this case landlord sought eviction of three tenants from three adjoining shops. on ground of his personal need of all three shops. It was held that landlord had a choice and if he needed three shops at a time it had to be considered rather in a pragmatic manner. Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the finding of High Court that a restricted view about need of landlord cannot be taken as there was no such compulsion of law. In the case reported in 1989 SCMR 1366 Mst. Saira Bai v. Syed Anisur Rahman it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that landlord was not required to state the nature of business which he intended to carry out as the same neither was? essential nor formed part cause of action. In PLD 1990 SC 394 Haroon Kassam and another v. Azam Suleman Madha the following observations were made:

"It is bynow the settled law that if the landlord possesses more than one house in the same urban area the choice, as to the house in which he would like to live in, is surely a matter within his prerogative and discretion and the law does not give either to the tenant or the Rent Controller the power to determine where the landlord should personally reside Sabu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Heman Dag 1973 SCMR

185. Earlier in the case of Nooruddin and others v. Asghar All and others 1968 SCMR 1987 a somewhat similar situation was noted inasmuch as another flat to the same building had fallen vacant, which the landlords had let out to another tenant and failed to utilize it for themselves. In the circumstances, it was held that the question as to which portion of the building would suit the landlords better must be left to their discretion and there was nothing unreasonable to the landlords insisting that a particular portion of the building should be made available to them. This view has consistently been followed by us as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, the latest authority being the one reported as Sardar Khan v. Riaz Ahmed and others (1986 SCMR 1981):' Above observations though are in respect of residential building, but since in the Ordinance term `premises' means a building or land let out on rent as such, these observations would also apply to commercial building. The 'respondents' witnesses Muhammad Ashraf, in affidavit‑in‑evidence, reiterated the acts mentioned in the eviction application. He in cross?-examination deposed that there are 61 rooms in hotel, which are m possession of respondents. According to him, these rooms are used for lodging of customers lie deposed that there is no parking space inside the building. He maintained that demand of respondents for premises in question is bona fide. Learned counsel for appellants submitted that the request of respondents for upgrading the hotel as "Two Star" has already been turned down by the relevant authorities, as such, the respondents can no more demand possession on this ground. Learned counsel for respondents meeting this argument submitted that even if it be assumed that hotel cannot be upgraded still, the respondents are within their rights to expand their business and be having the premises for its ultimate use as a restaurant their business would automatically increase. The purpose of upgrading the hotel was to promote the business. The refusal by the relevant authorities to grant status of "Two Star Hotel" would not by itself, be enough for recording the finding against the respondents. Looking to the number of rooms available to respondents for customers, the demand of respondents for the premises in question for using it as a restaurant and dining hall is bona fide. ?? Learned counsel for appellants argued, that notice under section 18 of the Ordinance was not served upon appellants as such, the eviction proceedings could not be instituted against them. The purpose of notice, under section 18 of the Ordinance, is only to inform tenant about new ownership, which appellants knew much earlier these proceedings were started. In fact, previous application was also filed by the respondents. Above all, in this matter the eviction of appellants has not been sought on the ground of default, as such, the service of notice was immaterial. Learned counsel for appellants also argued that in fact, the respondents desired exorbitant increase in rent to which appellants did not agree, therefore, in retaliation the eviction proceedings were started. This plea is also devoid of any force. Demand of higher rent by itself cannot be regarded as an act of mala fides. On this point, reliance is placed on the cases reported in (1) 1985 SCMR 1996 Shamsul Islam Khan v. Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., (2) 1986 SCMR 946 M/S. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Syed Wahid Hussain, (3) 1989 SCMR 1366 Mst. Saira Bai v. Syed Anisur Rahman. Although, in view of above reported cases even demand for higher rent cannot be taken as mala fide, but in this case, as admitted by appellants witness Asgher Ali in his cross‑examination, the respondents had never approached for increasing the rent. There is no substance in this contention. In consequence, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs and the appellants are directed to hand over vacant possession of the premises in question to the respondents within four months time from now. H.B.T./A‑1317/K??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.