P L D 1961 (W (PLP)

In 1952, the then Punjab Legislative Assembly passed the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act (VII of 1952) by which a number of amendments were made in the Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI of 1887). One of these amendments resulted in the insertion of section 114 after section 113 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. This section ain‑ed at betterment of the lot of occupancy tenants of agricultural land. A number of suits were instituted by the landlords against their occupancy tenants with a view to have it declared that the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act (VII of 1952) was ultra vires the legislature which had passed it. Applications for transfer of some suits were made to this Court, with the result that eleven suits were transferred for trial by this Court. They were registered as Civil Original No. 12 of 1957 and Civil Original Nos. 6 to 15 of 1958. The trial of these suits was entrusted to me and after hearing arguments on the 2nd of November 1959, I reserved judgment. Judgment which was to apply to all the suits was announced on the 29th of February 1960 after giving notice to counsel of all the parties in the eleven suits. By this judgment I dismissed all the eleven suits, but left the parties to bear their own costs. No appeal was instituted against the decision, which is Muhammad Aslam and another v. Mst. Umar Bibi (P L D 1960 Lah. 312=P L R (1960) 1 W P 982).

2. On the 15th of November 1960 applications in ten of the eleven suits disposed of by me were put in. These applications (Civil Miscellaneous 2380 to 2389) were made in suits which had been registered in this Court as Civil Original Nos. 6 to 15 of 1958, and no application has been made in Civil Original No: 12 of 1957. The applications which were made under sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure seek an order that my judgment dated the 29th of February 1960 should be amended and it be directed that only those of the issues in the suit which concerned the competency of the legislature to pass the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act (VII of 1952) shall be deemed to have been disposed of and the cases shall go back to the subordinate Courts from which they were transferred to this Court so that the otter matters which arose in the suit may be disposed of.

3. Mr. Karam Elahi Chauhan, learned counsel who appeared for the petitioners in all these ten petitions, which as they false the same question will be disposed of by this order, contended that as there was an error apparent on the face of the record, necessary correction should be made in my judgments under consideration. He pointed out that in the order passed by me on the 13th of January 1958, it was clearly mentioned that arguments would be heard only on the question of the validity of the legislation and on no other question and that arguments were in fact heard on the question mentioned in my order dated the 13th of January 1958 and, therefore, the suits could not have been dismissed because some other questions still required deter mination. Mr. Sardar Shah Bukhari, Advocate, who appeared for the respondents in all these ten petitions, contended that as the judgments and decrees of which amendment is sought were passed about 8 months before the present petitions were presented in this Court, the petitioners were not entitled to get any relief.

4. That the judgments in which correction is sought con tained an error is hardly open to question because, as mentioned by me in my order dated the 13th of January 1958, argument, were heard by me only with regard to the validity or otherwise of the legislative measure, the passing of which had resulted in the institution of the suits. The question for determination, how ever, is whether the present petitions merit acceptance or not. Three courses were open 'to the parties against whom my judgment dated the 29th of February 1960 went. These courses were as follows: (1) lodging of appeals, (2) presenting of applications for review, and (3) bringing the present applications. The persons effected by the judgments did not follow either of, the first two courses, and have now resorted to the third one. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that because the petitioners had allowed their remedies of appeal and applications for review to get barred by limitation, they should not be allowed by means of these petitions to achieve the ends which they could and should have achieved by those proceedings, and relied on the following decisions in support of his contention : ‑ (1) Satin Nand v. Jhangi Ram A I R 1932 Lah. 238 (2) Mst. Santi v. Mulkh Raj A I R 1937 Lah. 894. (3) Kala Mia v. Sreemati Tajinessa P L D 1952 Dacca 4. (4) Raje Udajiram v. Rajeshwar Trimbakrao A I R 1928 Nag. 149 (1). (5) S M. Bose v. Hafiz Muhammad Fateh Nasib A I R 1934 Cal.

623. In the first of the above cases it was laid down by the then learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked by Court in respect of a matter for which there is an express provision in the Code ; in the second case it was held by a learned Judge of the same Court that section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer on any party a right to have a mistake corrected ; in the third case it was held by a learned Judge of the Dacca High Court that an appealable order cannot be interfered with under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; in the fourth case it was held by an Additional Commissioner of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Nagpur that laches may disentitle a party from getting relief under section 151 or 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while in the fifth case it was held by a Bench of two Judges of the Calcutta High Court that where an alternative remedy is open to an aggrieved party, the Court will not exercise its powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed in all the above cases, but will presently consider whether these decisions have application to the present cases.

5. Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which have been invoked in the present petitioner read as follows :‑ "

151. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the' ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court." "

152. Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties.' "

153. The Court may at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit, amend any defect or error in any proceedings in a suit ; and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceeding." It will be noted that while section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not make any mention of the tune within which the Court may exercise its powers under that section, the other two sections say that the powers mentioned therein may be exercised at any time. With regard to any application under section 151, Article 181 of the Limitation Act would be applicable because that Article provides that if no period of limitation had been prescribed in any of the other Articles with regard to any applications, they could be made within three years of the date on which occasion to make them arises. I am of the view, however that in the present case section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application. After a Court has disposed of a matter, it ceases to be seized of it, and cannot, therefore exercise the power under section 151 which were vested in it for as long as the matter was pending before it.

6. The language used in sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however; makes, it clear that even after a Court has disposed of a suit, it can exercise powers under those sections and indeed a part of section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure could come into play only after a suit, in the pro ceedings of which correction is sought, has been disposed of, because till a suit is disposed of, there is neither a judgment nor a decree in that suit except in those cases in which a preliminary decree has to precede the final decree as in cases for accounts. Sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure confer powers on Courts to make necessary corrections in their proceed ings, orders judgments, and decrees, which powers are unlimited by the 'law of limitation or in any other manner, and those powers can be exercised even if no application in that behalf has been made to the Court.

7. The fact, however, that the powers of Court under sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure to make necessary corrections in its proceedings, orders, judgments and decrees are unlimited does not mean that they will be exercised in all cases in which an application for their exercise is made and it need hardly be emphasised that whether or hot those powers should be exercised will depend on the circumstances of each case. If, for example, a par complaining against a mistake in a proceeding, order, judgment or decree of a Court has not taken early steps for the necessary‑correction being made, a Court will be reluctant to exercise its unlimited but discretionary powers for the benefit of that party. Nor will the Court effect amendments in its own proceedings, orders, judgments or decrees if the error is so insignificant that it could not cause any great prejudice to the party asking for the exercise of the powers of amendment. If, however, a party has applied for amendment at as early a stage as possible and the error or omission, which can be corrected by amendment, is of such a nature that it can adversely effect the party making the application, the Court will ordinarily exercise the power because, their technicalities notwithstanding laws of procedure are meant for advancement of justice and not for denying it.

8. Against the petitioners the main fact is that the judgments were not appealed against and if an appeal were to be instituted now, it would probably be rejected on the ground that it was hopelessly barred by limitation, and an application for review will meet with the same fate on identical grounds. In favour of the petitioners, on the other hand, there is the circumstance that they may not have fully realised the implication of the information which the counsel, who appeared for them in the suit when they were before me, conveyed to them with regard to my order dated the 29th of February 1960, or the counsel may have given them information which was not informative enough. In the affidavit which is attached to each of the petitions it is mentioned that the information sent by the counsel to the client was that the contention of the landlords that section 114 of the Punjab Tenancy Act which had been inserted by the amending Act of 1952 was not ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. The affidavits go on to say that the deponents were expecting that the records of the suits will be returned to the lower Courts from which they had been sent for so that the other questions that arise in the suits may be dealt with, and when the records did not come back for a very long time, enquiries were instituted which disclosed that in the last paragraph of the judgment it had been said that the suits shall stand dismissed. No affidavit has been put in on behalf of the respondents to controvert the above assertions in the affidavits of the petitioners; and as I see no ground for not accepting the assertions in the affidavits, I will proceed on the assumption that they are correct.

9. It is a cardinal principle of administration of justice that mistakes of a Curt should not prejudice anyone. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the counsel who appeared for the present petitioners in the suits which were disposed of by me by means of the judgment under consideration could have been more vigilant is not without substance, bat the question to consider is whether the fact that the learned counsel who were representing the petitioners in the suit when they were before me did not give their clients detailed information which will make them understand the implications of my judgment is a sufficient ground for depriving the petitioner of a right which they clearly had under the law to have the points raised by them in a suit adjudicated upon by a Court. I have given the matter my, anxious consideration and have arrived at the conclusion that the mistake that crept into my judgment by which the eleven suits which had been transferred to this Court as they raised the question whether or not the Act of 1952, which amended the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887, was within the competence of the Provincial Legislature, should be corrected in exercise of the powers vested in me under sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure so that the petitioners may have an opportunity of obtaining determination of the other questions that arose in the suit. I would, therefore, amend the last paragraph of my judgment in Civil Original No. 12 of 1957 by substituting for paragraph 12 that exists the following paragraph : ‑‑ "In view of what I have said above, I hold that the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act (VII of 1952) was a valid piece of legislation. The question of law for the decision of which the suits were transferred to this Court having been decided, the suits shall go back to the Courts in which they were pending at the time of their transfer for the decision of the other questions that arise in the suits. The parties will bear their own costs of the hearing in this Court."

10. The acceptance of the petitions will not enure for the benefit of the plaintiffs in the suit which was registered in this Court as Civil Original No. 12 of 1957 because they have not cared to apply for the correction in my judgment. As the suits, other than Civil Original No. 12 of 1957, shall be deemed not to have been finally disposed of, the decree passed therein on the basis of my judgment dated the 29th of February 1960 will automatically stand amended to the requisite extent. One of the conditions of the acceptance of these petitions is that the respondents in each one of the petitions shall not be ejected from the land in their possession till the final disposal of the suit and the petitioners shall pay the respondents a sum of Rs. 150 in each case for the reimbursement of their expenses. K.M. A. Petition accepted.