1997 PLP 434 (PLC)

7. In this case interpretation of section 8(7) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is required. Section 8(7) reads as follows: "8(7) ... ... ... .. .:. ... ... ... .. ... ... .. .... ... ... .. In case there is a dispute in relation to the change of officers of a trade union, or any trade union is aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar under subsection (5) any officer or member of the trade union may (apply or) appeal to the Labour Court, who shall within seven days of receipt of the application or appeal, as the case may be, pass an order either directing the Registrar to register the change or alteration in the constitution or in the officers of the trade union or may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the Registrar to hold fresh elections of the union under his supervision. " Note: The reproduction of section 8(7) in the Labour Court by Mr. M. Shafi is not correct as the words which are supplied in the bracket are in the original amendment but they are missing in the Labour Code. This subsection refers to subsection (5) which is also reproduced herein: "(8) .. .. ... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (5) The Registrar may refuse to register such change or alteration if it is in contravention of any of the provisions of this Ordinance, or if it is in violation of the constitution of the trade union. .

8. Subsection (5) deals with the refusal on the part of the Registrar provided that he comes to such conclusion and, therefore, specifically such refusal on the part of the Registrar can be assailed in appeal by a trade union.

9. Analysis of section 8(7) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 reveals that it speaks of two situations. The first situation is that there, should a dispute in relation to the change of officers of a trade union, in such eventuality any officer or member of the trade union may apply to the Labour Court and the Labour Court may resolve such dispute or if the change has been approved, direct the Registrar to hold fresh elections of the union under its supervision in case the change has been approved in violation of the constitution or I.R.O. itself. This order shall be passed after taking evidence or holding necessary enquiry, as such orders will be passed on an application.

10. Second situation which emerges from section 8(7) is that there should be refusal on the part of the Registrar to register such change of officers of union or alteration in the constitution. The change or the alteration is specified in section 8(4) and (5) of I.R.O., 1969 and in such eventuality appeal has been provided and in relation to the alteration in the constitution or refusal to approve the change any aggrieved trade union may file an appeal to the Labour Court, and on appeal Labour Court may direct the Registrar to accept the alteration to the Constitution. However, in relation to refusal to the change of office‑bearers, orders can be passed by the Labour Court directing the Registrar of Trade Union to accept the change of officer‑bearers elected by the union or if Labour Court comes to the conclusion that elections have been held in violation of the Constitution direct for the fresh elections.

11. Mr. Ali Amjad, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the dispute in relation to the change of officers of a trade union could only arise after the elections have been held and, therefore, the Legislature was careful enough to give power to the Labour Court to direct the Registrar to hold fresh elections. According to him "fresh elections" would definitely indicate that there should be existence of old elections which firstly should be disapproved by Registrar and the Labour Court on appeal on application, by an order specifying reasons may so order. In the case of application by an officer or member dispute must be in relation to the change of office‑bearers, while in the case of appeal a trade union can be aggrieved by the refusal of Registrar to register the change. Section 8(7) in such case is controlled by section 8(5) of I.R.O.

12. Chaudhry Rasheed Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and 7 stated that the dispute can exist at any time and it is not necessary that there should be elections first and Registrar may approve change arising out of election. He has relied upon the dictionary meaning of word 'dispute' which reads as follows: "Dispute.‑‑‑A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one, side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other. The subject of litigation; the matter for which a suit is brought and upon which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and witnesses examined. "

13. Chaudhry Rasheed Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and 7, however, stated that he has not filed an appeal but he has only filed the application in relation to dispute.

14. Chaudhry Rasheed Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and 7 relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Shamsur Rehman and another v. Presiding Officer, Labour and others,(1982 PLC 742) and has contended that not only against the refusal but also against the acceptance of change of office‑bearers the remedy under section 8(7) is available.

15. I have given anxious consideration and have gone through the judgment of my learned and noble brother Mr. Justice G.M. Kourajo (as his lordship then was). My learned brother has relied upon Mexwell on interpretation of Statutes at page 199 of that book "an intention to, produce an unreasonable result is not to be amputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". My learned brother also relied upon PLD 1965 SC 527 wherein it has been held: "I may here point out that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. When the words used are clear and unambiguous it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any hypothetical construction. The language of the section being clear it was not open to the learned Judge to read into the matter which was not there by reference to other extraneous considerations. "

16. I am in respectful agreement with the interpretation given by my learned brother. I also hold the same view. The change of officers of a trade union can only lead to the dispute when the Registrar accepts the change. But before the acceptance of change of officers of association no dispute shall deem be existing. However, the Legislature has completed two situations, one relates to the change of officers, and the other refusal of Registrar. The Legislature has been given powers of refusal to the Registrar in relation to the change of office‑bearers and alteration in the Constitution under subsection (5) only. Thus, it is only against the refusal of the Registrar in relation to the change of office‑bearers an appeal, lies and in relation to the dispute to the change of office‑bearers an application lies. The Labour Court may dismiss the application or appeal or direct the Registrar to register the change of officer or direct the Registrar to hold fresh elections of the union and in the case of alteration in the constitution of the union the Labour Court may pass an order dismissing the appeal or directing the Registrar to register the alteration in the constitution.

17. Admittedly in this case the elections were not held. Election schedule was announced and against the election schedule application under section 8(7) was filed. The Legislature has not provided for impugning the election schedule before the elections are held. The dispute envisaged in section 8(7) in essence refers to the holding of elections and approval of such change by the Registrar. Even before the change is accepted the Registrar could be approached and all objections can be urged before him and he shall exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by the Legislature and either he may accept the change or refuse it. Any officer or a member of a trade union before such change is approved or disapproved cannot approach a Labour Court. However, such member or officer after elections may approach a Labour Court and raise the dispute challenging the same on the grounds that may be available. Here again it will be seen that the Legislature has not simply stated dispute. The word dispute is further qualified by the words "in relation to the change of officers". The dispute only arises when the Registrar accepts the change and then a member or officer of union can file an application. In such eventuality Labour Court may order that the elections were held ' in the violation of the Constitution or I.R.O., 1969 directing the Registrar to hold fresh elections, or in another situation when a trade union is aggrieved by the refusal of Registrar to register the change, a Labour Court may direct the Registrar to register the change of office‑bearers or hold fresh election, in case a Labour Court comes to a conclusion that there is legal or Constitutional flaw in the elections held earlier.

18. Orders of the Registrar approving the change of office‑bearers or alteration in the constitution is not assailable in appeal before the Labour Court. However, as stated earlier a member or officer of trade union may file application under the provisions of I.R.O. regarding the change of officers.

19. Both these conditions were wanting which is even apparent from the prayer of the respondents Nos. 2 to

5. I would, therefore, hold that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application or to pass any p order. Consequently, I would also hold that respondents Nos. 3 to 5 had no cause of action to impugn the approval of alteration in the Constitution whereby Assistant Vice‑President and Vice‑President were allowed to become members. Their application is premature and not maintainable,

20. Chaudhry Rasheed Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and 7 stated that any order which will be passed should be passed in the light of the order passed by this Court in Constitutional petition ‑No.S‑24 of 1995. A portion of that order has already been quoted (supra). In the first instance my learned brother was hearing the petition arising out the refusal by the Labour Court to confirm the stay granted earlier. The attention of my learned brothers was not invited to the jurisdictional issue nor it was so raised at that time therefore, my learned brother directed the Labour Court to finally determine the case and to proceed with the case expeditiously. As stated earlier, the dispute which is argued before me arose after the order was passed by my learned and noble brother and before me the issue urged is regarding jurisdiction of Labour Court as the application under Order VII, Rule 11 was filed after the order was passed by my learned brother also and in such application jurisdiction of Labour Court is challenged. As such I decided‑the issue of jurisdiction of Labour Court in this petition.

21. After interpreting, that under section 8(7) of I.R.O. when I came to the conclusion that the Labour Court lacks inherent jurisdiction, therefore, even against the interlocutory order passed by the Labour Court Constitutional jurisdiction is available as in terms of Article 199(1) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan a writ will issue in terms of clause (a)(i) thereby this Court can pass an order against a person to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do and that a declaration would be given with any act done or proceedings taken, has been, done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect.

22. Even otherwise to be dealt in accordance with law and the Constitution is an inalienable right of every citizen and the Courts that are charged to do justice, cannot close their eyes to the illegalities which are being committed by the Tribunals of limited jurisdiction. Consequently, therefore I overrule the objections of Chaudhry Rasheed Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 3, 5 and 7.

23. The upshot of the above discussion is that the application filed under section 8(7) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 by respondents Nos.3, 5 and 7 was not maintainable and the learned Labour Court had no jurisdiction, since there was no cause of action, therefore, application under Order VII, Rule 11 filed by the petitioner ought to have been allowed. While allowing application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. filed before the Labour Court, application filed by respondents Nos. 3 to 5 under section 8(7) of the I.R.O., 1969 is declared to be without any lawful authority and dismissed as such. Consequently, this petition is allowed with no order as to costs. C.M.A. 46/97 has become infructuous, as such dismissed. A.A./N‑35/K Petition accepted.