P L D 1994 Peshawar 55 (PLP)

(c) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)

S. 13(2)(vi)

Ground for reconstruction

Financial status of landlord, whether a ground for reconstruction

Landlord's financial status to reconstruct new building was riot a legal requirement which he was to undertake before obtaining permission of Municipality

Landlord could not be questioned on such point afterwards for law by itself had placed embargo on his bona fides by providing for his punishment with imprisonment or fine or with both in case of his failure to demolish and reconstruct building within specified period. Salim Dil Khan for Appellants. Nasirul Mulk, Bar-at-Law for Respondent No.1. Nemo for Respondents Nos.2 to

4. Date of hearing: 1st December, 1993. Rozi Khan, the respondent herein, in the year 1988 filed an application under section 13 of Ordinance No. VI of 1959 before the Rent Controller for the eviction of his four tenants from a certain property (consisting of few shops and a `mandi') on the sole ground of reconstruction of the property by the landlord into an uptodate commercial market. All the tenants resisted the petition and the learned Rent Controller after framing necessary issues between the parties arising out of the pleadings recorded evidence on both sides and ultimately allowed the petition and passed ejectment order against the appellant and the other tenants, i.e., respondents Nos.2 to 4 on 15-12-1991 in view of his affirmative decision of issue No.8 relating to the landlord's requirement of the premises for purpose of reconstruction. Out of the four tenants appellant Sahibzada alone contested the matter in appeal before the District Court as the remaining three persons in the meanwhile had patched up the matter with their landlord and vacated the premises under their possession. The learned District Judge after hearing the parties in appeal affirmed the finding of the Rent Controller on the issue of reconstruction of the property by the landlord and dismissed the appeal on 9-7-1992. Hence this second appeal under section 15 subsection (4) of Ordinance No.VI of 1959.

2. I have heard Mr: Salim Dil Khan Advocate on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Nasirul Mulk, Bar-at-Law for the respondent-landlord. A preliminary objection was taken at the outset that the appeal was barred by limitation having not been instituted within the prescribed period of limitation provided under section 15(4) of the N.-W.F.P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance No.VI of 1959. In the instant case the first Appellate Court has passed its judgment on 9-7-1992. A second appeal should have been ordinarily filed within 30 days as required under subsection (4) of section 15 of the Ordinance ibid. The record on the contrary indicates that the appellant moved an application for the grant of certified copy of judgment of the lower Appellate Court on 15-7-1992 and the same was delivered to him on 19-7-1992. He later on filed the instant appeal before this Court on 24-11-1992 almost four months after the receipt of certified copies of judgment etc. and the second appeal was thus hopelessly time-barred. The learned counsel stated that his client was under an impression that no right of second appeal was available in the case in view of the amendment in section 15 of the Ordinance and some time later when he consulted a local advocate in the matter he was advised that a second appeal in rent cases from the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) was competent in view of the fact that the amendment made in section 15 of Ordinance No.VI of 1959 having not been enforced in those areas but the appeal could not be instituted in time due to certain mishap having taken place in the family of his counsel. Obviously such an argument cannot be accepted as a good cause on the condonation of delay for the simple reason that ignorance of law cannot be made an excuse on the commonly accepted cardinal principle in legal jurisprudence and similarly the allegation, that the appeal could not be filed in time on account of certain untoward incidents having taken place in the family of his lawyer are also not sufficient grounds for excusing the appellant from the wrath of limitation in a case like wherein he is bound to explain each day's lapse in not filing the appeal in time. The second appeal in the circumstances would be hopelessly time-barred.

3. On merits too the appellant has got no case. The eviction of the appellant from the premises has been asked on the sole plea of reconstruction of property by the landlord, into' a new commercial building. Section 13(2)(vi) of the Ordinance states, that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant from a rented building which he reasonably and in good faith requires for reconstruction and the landlord has obtained necessary sanction for reconstruction of the property from the Municipality where such building is situated. In this case the landlord has taken necessary permission from the Municipal Committee, Mingora and a site-plan for the proposed building has also been furnished by the Committee after necessary formalities. The learned counsel next argued, that the landlord has no financial status to construct a new building on the premises and he did not also furnish any certificate like this to the Municipal Committee when he obtained permission for the construction of the proposed building. This is not a legal requirement which he was to undertake before obtaining permission of the Municipal Committee as subsection (2), clause (vi) of section 13 of the Ordinance reads. He cannot be also questioned on this point afterwards as the law by itself in the Ordinance places an embargo on his bona fides by speaking for his punishment with imprisonment or fine or with both in case of the landlord's failure to demolish and reconstruct the building within a specified period. This may not be out o place to mention here that after the order of the Rent Controller the other three tenants (who are now respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in the second appeal) had vacated the premises in. favour of the landlord and they have later on re occupied shops in the new building which has been partially erected on the site The learned counsel on behalf of the landlord stated that only that must portion of the building now remains to be re-constructed by his client which is presently in possession of the appellant. This fact further tells on the bona fide; of the landlord in requiring his property for reconstruction. In this background of the case I see no substance in the second appeal and dismiss it with costs. AA./1506/P???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed,