1996 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

(4) that the principle of audi alteram partem has been violated as no notice was served upon the petitioner before terminating his services.

4. In order to substantiate these contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Islamia University, Bahawalpur through Vice -Chancellor v. Dr. Muhammad Khan Malik (PLD 1993 Lahore 141) and Khawaja Muhammad Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 18 others (PLD 1988 Lahore 725).

5. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the impugned orders were lawful; that the writ petition was not competent as the petitioner did not avail of the alternate remedy under section 11‑A of the Bahauddin Zakariya University Act, 1975 and the alleged representation averred in the writ petition could not be construed as an alternate remedy under the said section especially when its result was not awaited by the petitioner; that the petitioner was appointed as Professor for a period of two years on probation with effect from 16‑4‑1992 and the initial period of probation expired on 15‑4‑1994. Since he remained on leave from 17‑8‑1993 to 25‑2‑1994, his period was to be excluded in reckoning his period of probation and as such his initial period of probation ended on 24‑10‑1994 when the probation period was further extended for a period of one year and ended on 24‑10‑1995; that the petitioner was appointed on probation with effect from 16‑4‑1992 for a period of two years and on the expiry of the initial period of probation as the petitioner was not confirmed, the probation period automatically stood extended for another period of one year; that the petitioner being a probationer was not entitled to invoke Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 because he was not governed by any statutory rules and, therefore, it was not necessary to hear him and that the order dated 24‑12‑1994 (Annexure K) was implemented immediately and Dr. Muhammad Hasnain Naqvi has been working as Director Institute of Islamic Studies and Arabic since that date and the instant writ petition filed on 11‑4‑1995 after the order was implemented and admitted to be correct cannot be challenged at this stage. In support of these contentions, he has referred to University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others v. Ch. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093).

6. I have given anxious consideration to the arguments addressed by both the learned counsel and have perused the record minutely.

7. I am of the view that the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner have no substance. The facts in the Khawaja Muhammad Sharif's case have got no nexus with the facts of the present case. In 'he Islamic University Bahawalpur's case, the matter related to the transfer of the respondent from on; Department to another Department. It is pertinent to note here that the respondent in that Intra‑Court Appeal was not a probationer and, therefore, the observations made in the precedent case do not help to resolve the controversy

8. It will be advantageous to reproduce section 11‑A of the B.Z.U. Act, 1975: "Revisional powers of the Chancellor: ‑‑The Chancellor may, of his own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an order has been passed by any Authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding or order and may pass such orders as he may deem fit." Admittedly, the petitioner did not avail of an adequate remedy, which was available to him. It has neither been averred in the writ petition nor argued before the Court that the Chancellor refused to pass any order on the alleged representation made by the petitioner. It has also not been alleged that the Chancellor was reluctant to pass any order and, therefore, it was deemed proper to file the writ petition. Further, it has not been alleged that the Chancellor was, in any manner, inimical to the present petitioner or was in league with the Vice‑Chancellor and for that reason, the petitioner did not consider section 11‑A of the said Act as an adequate remedy. Although the writ petition can be dismissed ipso facto, it will be proper to dilate upon the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. There can be no denying the fact that the status of the. petitioner was merely a probationer. Initially he was appointed for two years and subsequently, his probation period stood extended as no order was issued for his confirmation. It is also evident from the record that before the expiry of three years probation period, his services were terminated vide order dated 9‑4‑1995 passed by respondent No.2.

9. The B.Z.U. at its inception in 1975 had adopted the Punjab University Calendar. Therefore, it will be relevant to reproduce the paragraphs relating to probation and confirmation (Chapter II‑‑Terms and Conditions of Service): "Unless otherwise decided by the Syndicate, the members of the Teaching Staff appointed to permanent vacancies shall ordinarily remain on probation for a period of (two years) which may be extended by another year. The total year of probation shall not exceed three years. The period spent on leave, other than casual leave, may be excluded for reckoning the period of probation. An employee who proceeds abroad for higher studies during the period of his probation shall be considered for confirmation only after he has completed the remaining part of the prescribed period of his probation after return from abroad. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the period of probation in such cases would be deemed to have been extended proportionately: Provided that officiating service in a corresponding or higher post may be reckoned as the period spent on probation in the post to which he was appointed." Obviously the Syndicate did not exist at the relevant time and, therefore, the Vice‑Chancellor was vested with the jurisdiction to terminate the petitioner.

10. In Khawaja Muhammad Sharif's case, the matter related to the dissolution of the National Assembly which obviously represents the will of the people. The observations made therein relating to the words "in his discretion or in his opinion" finding mention in Article 58(2) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 cannot be imported in the present case while dealing with the provisions of section 16(3) of the Bahauddin Zakariya University Act, 1975, where the words "in his opinion" also occur. The observations in the precedent case were made in different context and circumstances, which cannot be made basis to facilitate the petitioner, who is a probationer.

11. Even a probationer in the civil service is not entitled to any notice and his services may be terminated without it, as is evident from section 10 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, which is as follows: "Termination of service.‑(i) The service of a civil servant may be terminated without notice (i) during the initial or extended period of his probation."

12. It can, therefore, safely be concluded that wln7e terminating the service, the principle of natural justice was ‑ not infringed in any manner and respondent No.2 was not obliged to set down the reasons showing the unsatisfactory work of the petitioner. In my opinion, the observations made in the University of Punjab Lahore's case relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents provide sufficient answer to the objections raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. In that case, Ch. Sardar Ali was appointed as lecturer on two years' probation. His period of probation was further extended for the third year. His services were subsequently terminated. He challenged the action taken against him by the Constitutional petition, which was, however, dismissed by the learned Judge in Chamber for 'the reasons as follows: "Confirmation does not follow automatically after the expiry of the initial period of probation nor an order of extension of probation was required to be passed before the expiry of initial period of probation. The termination of a probation service for unsatisfactory work and conduct does not violate any of his vested rights. Considering that the period of probation in respect of the petitioner was due to expire at a time when the syndicate was not in existence, the action of the Vice‑Chancellor would appear to be covered by the said subsection." The petitioner preferred the appeal, which was accepted However, the Honourable Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the learned Judge‑in Chamber, wherein it was observed: "It follows from these provisions of the Act that notwithstanding subsection (8) of section 11 of the Act, the appointment of the respondent, as judged in the light of decisions in the cases of Principal, Cadet College, Kohat PLD 1984 SC 170 and Anwar Husain PLD 1984 SC 194 was non‑statutory and a Constitution petition was not competent as held by the learned Judge in Chambers. Hence, this appeal is allowed. The judgment under appeal is set aside and that of the learned Judge in Chamber restored. No order as to costs." Pursuant to the above discussion, this petition being without any merit is hereby dismissed. A.A./M‑2587/L Petition dismissed.