P (PLP)

SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑The land in dispute belonged to Muhammad Asghar, who mortgaged it with possession to Murad and Nawab sons of Pathana and Mughla and Mutalla sons of Lehna by a mortgage‑deed registered on 3rd of February 1947. Subsequently. Muhammad Asghar mortgaged the above‑mentioned land and some other to Bakhsha son of Wasawa, Dost Muhammad son of Jiwna and Ahmad son of All. The subsequent mortgagees applied to the Revenue Assistant, Gujranwala, under the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act of 1913 for redemption of the land in suit from Murad and others, who were the previous mortgagees, and that application was granted on the 18th of October 1947. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Revenue Assistant granting redemption, Murad and Nawab sons of 'Pathana, and Mughla and Mutalla sons of Lehna, brought a suit for a declaration that the order of the Revenue Assistant passed on the 18th of October 1947 by which redemption of `the land in suit was granted was without jurisdiction, ultra vires and void. In this suit, Bakhsha son of Wasawa, Dost Muhammad son of Jiwana and Ahmad son of Ali, the subsequent mortgagees, and Muhammad Asghar, the mortgagor, were impleaded as defendants. The plaint alleged that as the Revenue Assistant sent no timely notice to the plaintiffs, that as the land in suit was on lease with the plaintiffs till Kharif 1949, that as the mortgage money was Its. 9,000 and that as the mortgage‑deed in favour of the plaintiffs recited that redemption was to take place either in the month of Magh or Bhagan, the order of the Revenue Assistant ordering redemption was not binding on the plaintiffs. Muhammad Asghar did not contest the suit, but Bakhsha, Dost Muhammad and Ahmad, the subsequent mortgagees, raised objections to claim of the plaintiffs and the trial Court framed the following issue :‑ (1) Is the order of the Revenue Assistant about the redemp tion of the land in question arbitrary, illegal and ultra vires ? The trial Court found that the Revenue Assistant had acted within his jurisdiction and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs went in appeal to the District Judge, Gujranwala who, holding that the order of the Revenue Assistant by which redemption of the land in suit was granted was without jurisdiction, decreed the suit and against that decision Bakhsha, one of the contenting defen dants, has presented a second appeal. The attack on the order of the Revenue Assistant was confined before meanly to the ground that the mortgage money being Rs. 9,000, the Revenue Assistant had no jurisdiction to deal with the case under the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act of 1913. The Act in question allows a mortgagor to apply to a person appointed a Collector for the purposes of the Act for redemption of the property under mortgage provided it is land as defined in section 2 of the Act and some other conditions are fulfilled. In this appeal, we are concerned with the interpretation of sub section (3) of section 1 of the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act, 1913 (Punjab Act II of 1913), which subsection reads as follows;

(3) It shall apply only to mortgages of land ............ (a) in which, whatever the mortgage money the land mort gaged, after excluding the area of any share in the common land of the village or of a sub‑division of the village appertaining thereto and mortgaged therewith, does‑ not exceed in area 50 acres; or . (b) in which, whatever the area, the principal money secured under the mortgage does riot exceed 5000 rupees: Provided that it shall not apply to any mortgage made under section 6 of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 ". The learned counsel for the appellants urged that the Revenue Assistant who had admittedly been appointed a Collector under Punjab Act II of 1913 had jurisdiction to order redemption, as the area of the land was not more than 50 acres. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that the decision of the District Judge, that as the principal amount was more than Rs. 5,000 the Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction, was correct. It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondents if it were held that in cases where the area of land in question did not exceed 50 acres the Collector will have jurisdiction to order redemption irrespective of the amount of the principal money, it would amount to entirely overlooking clause (b) of subsection (3). If the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, that in a case where the principal amount exceeded Rs. 5,000 the jurisdiction of the Collector to order redemp tion was excluded even though the area may not exceed the limit fixed by clause (a) were accepted, it would amount to holding that clause (a) did not exist at all. As, however, it is well settled that when interpreting a statute Courts should presume that no part of it was intended to be meaningless and that provisions of the same statute could not have been intended to operate against each other, both the clauses of subsection (3) of section 1 of Punjab Act II of 1913 must be kept in view when deciding whether or not the Collector had jurisdiction to order redemption. Clause (a) of subsection (3) of section 1 of Punjab Act II of 1913 limits the jurisdiction of the Collector with reference to the area of the land under mortgage while clause (b) limits it with reference to the principal money secured under the mort gage. Clause (a) enacts that if the area of the land under mortgage does not exceed the limits fixed by that clause the amount of mortgage money is immaterial while clause (b) enacts that if the principal money secured under the mortgage does not exceed Rs. 5,000 the area of the land under mortgage is immaterial. The expressions "mortgage money" occurring in clause (a) and the "principal, money secured under the mortgage" occurring in clause (b) were obviously intended to refer to two different things. Neither of the above‑mentioned two expressions have been defined either by Punjab Act II of 1913 or the Punjab General Clauses Act (Act I of 1898) and it appears that they were intended to have the meanings assigned to them by the Transfer of, Pro perty Act (Act IV of 1882). Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act defines "mortgage money" as the principal money and interest of which payment is secured for the time being, and it is clear that, except in rare cases, the mortgage money will be more than the principal money secured under the mortgage. Though the fact that clause (a) refers to mortgage money while clause (b) refers to the principal money secured under the mortgage, was not adverted to by the learned District judge in his judgment or by .the learned counsel for the respondents in his arguments, but having fully considered the matter, I have arrived at the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend that clause (b) was to govern clause (a) and to result in the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the collector if the principal money secured by the mortgage exceeded Rs. 5,000 even if the area of the land under mortgage did not exceed the limits prescribed by clause (3). A finding that if the area exceeds the limit fixed by clause (a) or the principal. money secured under the mortgage exceeds the limit fixed by clause (b), the jurisdiction of the collector to order redemption is excluded, would amount to holding that what the Legislature gave with one hand by clause (a) it at once took away with the other by clause (b), but the attribution of that inconsistent Conduct to the Legislature should, if possible, be avoided. Moreover, the employment of the conjunction "or" between the two clauses is a strong indication of the intention of the Legislature to keep them independent of each other and the fact that clause (b) does away with the limit of the area of the land under mortgage fixed by clause (a) is conclusive proof of that intention. One of the reasons given by the learned District judge for his view was that as Punjab Act II of 1913 restricted the ordinary jurisdiction of Civil Courts it should be strictly construed and the learned counsel for the respondents raised that contention in his arguments. My reading of the Act, however, is that it was intended primarily to ensure speedy redemption by orders of revenue authorities and the powers of Civil Courts were preserv ed by section 12 of the Act which empowers any party aggrieved by an order passed under the Act to institute a suit to esta blish, his rights in respect of the mortgage. But even if it be assumed that the Act' in question restricts the ordinary Dowers of Civil Courts that fact does not justify the restricting of the powers of the revenue authorities by doing violence to tile language of the Act or by overlooking some of its provisions altogether. Subsection (3) of section 1 of the Redemption of Mortgages (Punjab) Act, (Punjab Act II of 1913) could perhaps have been more simply worded, but the meaning and intention of the Legis lature has, in my opinion, been made sufficiently clear. If the area of the land under mortgage does not Exceed the limit fixed by clause (a) of subsection (3), the Collector will have jurisdiction to' order redemption irrespective of the amount of mortgage money or the principal money secured under the mortgage as such a case falls, under clause (a) of the subsection. If the principal money secured under the mortgage does not exceed Rs. 5;000 the Collector will have jurisdiction to order redemption irrespective of the mortgage money and the area of the land under mortgage, because such a case falls under clause (b) of, the subsection. If, however, the area of the mortgaged land exceeds the limit fixed by clause (a) and, also the, principal money secured under the mortgage exceeds Rs. 5,000 the case will not be covered by either clan: a (a) or clause (b) of the subsection and the Collector will have no jurisdiction to order redemption. After giving anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and examining all aspects of the questions, I have arrived at the conclusion that the order of redemption passed by the Revenue Assistant, Gujranwala, 'on 18th October 1947 was within the jurisdiction of that officer because the area of the land did not exceed the limit fixed by clause (a) of sub. section (3) of section 1 and the suit to have that order declared without jurisdiction, ultra vires and void was misconceived. The appeal is accepted and the suit is dismissed, but, as the question of jurisdiction was not free from difficulty, I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. At the conclusion of his arguments each learned counsel re -quested that in the event of his contention not being accepted the party he represented be allowed to appeal against my judgment, and, as the point involved is of some complexity, I certify that the case is a fit one for appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court. A.H Appeal accepted.