SCMR 1983

1983 PLP 461 (SCMR)

DEPARTMENT AND ANOTHER-Petitioners Versus ABDUL REHMAN, FOREST CONTRACTOR AND OTHERS

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
-- Art. 185(3) read with Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 96 & 115 and Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5-Appeal and revision against decree of trial Court dismissed on ground of limitation -Matter involving important question of law of public importance- Leave to appeal-Granted to consider whether delay should not have been condoned and question decided on merits in order to resolve important question of law raised in case.
Honorable Judges
Karam Elahee Chauhan and Nasim Hasan Shah, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1983 PLP 461 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Karam Elahee Chauhan and Nasim Hasan Shah, JJ
Parties DEPARTMENT AND ANOTHER-Petitioners Versus ABDUL REHMAN, FOREST CONTRACTOR AND OTHERS
Primary Law Constitution of Pakistan (1973)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1983 PLP 461 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1973) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1983 PLP 461 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Karam Elahee Chauhan and Nasim Hasan Shah, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1983 PLP 461 (SCMR) (DEPARTMENT AND ANOTHER-Petitioners Versus ABDUL REHMAN, FOREST CONTRACTOR AND OTHERS). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Constitution of Pakistan (1973)

Representation

  • Dr. A. Basit, Advocate Supreme Court and Hamid Aslam Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.
  • Bashir Ahmad -Khan Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Abdul Karim, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.
  • Dr. A. Basit, Advocate Supreme Court and Hamid Aslam Qureshi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.
  • Bashir Ahmad ‑Khan Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Abdul Karim, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondents.
  • The petitioner challenged the above order by filing an appeal on 12‑1‑1981 before the District Judge, Lahore. An application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed explaining the reason for delay which was mainly that the petitioner had to refer the matter to various quarters including the Advocate‑General. N.‑W. F. P., for legal opinion before filing an appeal in question which circumstance had occasioned the delay. How ever, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation on 25‑2‑1981. The petitioner then filed a revision on 19‑3‑1981 and the same was also dismissed by a learned Single Judge by his order dated 5‑7‑1981 on the ground of limitation relying on this Court's judgment in Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan (1981 S C M R 37).

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the judgment dated 5-7-1981 of the Lahore High Court in Civil Revision No. 334 of 1981). Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan 1981 S C M R 37; Superintendent of Central Excise, Lyalipur v. Ch. Faqir Muhammad P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 167 and Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan and others P L D 1975 S C 397 ref.

Judgment & Decree

NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.‑‑This petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 5‑7‑1981, passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, whereby a civil revision (C. R. P. No. 334/81), filed by the petitioners, was dismissed. The facts, which from the background, are that an agreement for exploi tation of forests of Black Mountains, which at the relevant time, fell within the Special Areas attached to the N: W. F. P., was entered into between the parties on 13‑9‑1963. On 12‑6‑1969, the Conservator of Forests, Abbottabad, terminated this agreement under clause 25 thereof on the ground that the respondents had breached certain essential condi tions. The respondents filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction in the civil Court at Lahore on 28‑2‑1970 seeking relief on the basis that the agreement had not been validly cancelled and was still subsisting. The suit was instituted when the entire West Pakistan was still. One Unit and the Provincial Secretary, Agriculture was functioning at Lahore. A representation against the termination of contract made by the respondents had been decided by the Secretary Agriculture at Lahore. In view of this situation, the suit was instituted at Lahore. The Civil Judge, Lahore, in his judgment, passed on 2‑7‑1979, held that the agreement dated 13‑9‑1963 had not been validly terminated and the order of cancellation thereof dated 12‑6‑1969 was of no legal effect. The suit of the respondents was, accordingly, decreed. Under the said decree, the respondents were entitled to get the marking of trees done in accordance with the schedule attached to the agreement and to import the timber accruing therefrom into Hazara District at the rate of Rs. 0.25 paisa per ft. for the un-expired period of the contract. An appeal was filed against the petitioner against the above decree but during the pendency of the appeal on 8‑3‑1980 a compromise deed was entered into between the parties and a consent decree was passed on 8‑3‑1980 accordingly. Before the decree could be executed, the Government of N.‑W. F. P. enacted Ordinance No. VII of 1980 and Regulation No. 1 of 1980 which terminated all contracts of the type involved in the instant proceedings. Section 3(2) and Regulation 1 of 1980 is relevant in this regard which is in the following terms : ‑ 3‑‑(2) Notwithstanding. anything contained in any other law, custom, usage or instructions for the time being in force or in any decree, order or judgment of any Court or other authority :‑ (a) all contracts or other instruments entered into or executed for the extraction of timber or other forest produce in the specified areas, subsisting immediately before the commencement of this Regulation, shall upon such commencement; stand terminated ; and (b)

The terms of the Ordinance are to the similar effect. On 1‑9‑1980, the respondents instituted an application under Order XXI, rule 32, read with section 151, C. P. C. for execution of the Consent Decree dated 8‑3‑1980. The petitioner filed a written reply to the said application in which a preliminary objection was raised relating to the inexcusability of the Decree arising from the enforcement of the Ordinance No. VII and Regulation No. 1 of 1980. The Executing Court, by its order dated 15‑11‑1980, repelled the preliminary objection on the ground to at the N.‑W. F. P. legislation did not bind the Punjab Courts nor governed the decrees issued by them. It was also held that even in its terms the N: W. F. P. legislation in question did not apply to the Consent Decrees. The petitioner challenged the above order by filing an appeal on 12‑1‑1981 before the District Judge, Lahore. An application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed explaining the reason for delay which was mainly that the petitioner had to refer the matter to various quarters including the Advocate‑General. N.‑W. F. P., for legal opinion before filing an appeal in question which circumstance had occasioned the delay. How ever, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation on 25‑2‑1981. The petitioner then filed a revision on 19‑3‑1981 and the same was also dismissed by a learned Single Judge by his order dated 5‑7‑1981 on the ground of limitation relying on this Court's judgment in Commissioner of Incometax v. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan (1981 S C M R 37). Dr. A Basit, learned counsel for the petitioner, in the first instance, attempted to argue that the appeal before the District Judge was not time‑barred but we find no force in this submission. He then submitted that the decree had to be executed through Senior Civil Judge, Abbottabad, where the question would be raised in regard to the executabildy of the decree in terms of Ordinance VII and Regulation No. I of 1980 and the parties would again be coming to this Court and if this question was decided by this Court, namely, whether the terms of the Ordinance and the Regulation do or do not make the Consent Decree inexecutable, which is an important question of law dependent upon the interpretation of two of the enactments just mentioned it would be of assistance to both the parties. He further states that he has been authorised by the N.‑W. F. P. Government that if the Supreme Court decides that the Ordinance and Regulation do not bar the executability of the decree, the Government of N: W. F. P. will raise no obstacle against its execution. In these circumstances, the delay, if any, may be condoned in order to decide this important legal question. We find that in Superintendent of Central Excise Lyallpur v. Ch. Faqir Muhammad (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 167), it was held that although the Government did not need any greater latitude in respect of limitation than the ordinary litigant and that the reasons mentioned for extension of time were not convincing. The Court, however, granted extension of time, as the view put forward in the order appealed against in regard to the question in dispute required to be re-examined. Moreover, if leaves was refused and the Government brought up the matter before the Supreme Court in another case, as it was open to it to do and if the decision in that case went in favour of Government, the decision which was the subject of present petition for leave to appeal would remain as an anomaly in the licensing system, which result, it was desirable to avoid. In Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan and others (PLD 1975 SC 397), a number of appeals were pending before the Supreme Court; some of which were barred by time and the delay was condoned partly on the ground that they involved substantial questions of law of public importance. In this case also an important question of law of public importance is involved. We would, therefore, grant leave to consider whether to delay in this case should not have been condoned and the question decided on the merits in order to resolve the important question of law that was raised in this case. To be made ready on the present record with leave to the parties to add documents, if any and to tie fixed for hearing at a very early date. Leave granted.