P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

2. The revision petition is directed against the order, dated 12‑6‑1965, of Mr. M. E. Hayat, ex officio Additional District Judge, Derajat, by which, he, on appeal, vacated the order of the Senior Civil Judge, D. I. Khan, dated 3‑5‑65, appointing a receiver.

3. The revision petition raises an important question involv ing interpretation of section 115, C. P. Code. The question, raised in the case, may be formulated thus:

"Whether a revision petition can be entertained, when the Appellate Court, in exercise of its discretionary powers, vacates the order of appointment of a Receiver by the trial Court on the ground, that the appointment of a Receiver was not called for?"

4. Briefly, the facts, culminating in this revision petition for the purpose of the point, raised, are that the petitioner brought a suit against the respondents for a declaration: (1) that on the basis of a registered agreement of sale, dated 1‑2‑1962, he purchased the land as detailed in the plaint, (2) consequential relief for grant of a decree of possession of the land as entered in item (a), and (2) for restoration of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants that the latter may not interfere and put hindrance in the ownership rights of the land in suit of the plaintiff.

5. The question, formulated above, admits of a short answer and in the negative, in that the law on this point, in my view, is well‑settled, and it is that when the lower Court passes an order in exercise of its discretionary powers, the High Court should not interfere in revision, in that improper or wrong exercise of discre tion is not recognised as a ground for interference. Interference is justified only in cases, where the High Court reaches the conclusion that the discretion has been exercised "perversely", so as to cause serious injustice to a party, or where the Court his not properly exercised its discretion, which the law only gives it in circumstances, which were wanting in the particular case.

6. Admittedly, the petitioner is out of possession of the land, and he required the trial Court to disturb the status quo in regard to possession by the appointment of Receiver; but before the application could be allowed: (1) not only the petitioner had to make out a prima facie case, (2) but also to make out the further fact that irreparable injury would be caused to him, if a Receiver was not appointed. I refrain from expressing any opinion on the question, whether any prima facie case has been made out by the petitioner or not? Suffice it to say that the petitioner's appli cation for the appointment of a Receiver was liable to dismissal on the second ground, namely, that no irreparable injury was likely to be caused to him; but, conversely, it was the defendant respondents, who would be put to irreparable loss by disturbing of the status quo of possession of the land. It will be convenient here to quote the following pertainent observations in Hanuman Dass v. Pirthvi Nath and others (A I R 1956 All. 677):‑

"We are here concerned with a judicial discretion; and it is of the essence of such a discretion that on the same evidence two different minds might reach widely different decisions with out either being appealable. It is only where the decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagree ment is possible, and is, in fact, plainly wrong, that an appellate body is entitled to interfere. That is, I think, the principle which emerges from the decision of the House of Lords in Evans v. Bartlam 1937 A C 473 (B) and Osenton & Co. v. Johnston 1942 A C 130 (C)."

7. It will be noticed from the authority, quoted above, that even in appeal, the Appellate Court has very limited powers for., the substitution of its own discretion for that of the lower Court. The petitioner, in revision under section 115, C. P. Code, must make out a strong prima facie case that the exercise of discretion against him was likely to cause grave injustice. This as already indicate, the petitioner has not been able to make out.

8. There is another aspect of the case, and it is that in invok ing the revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C. P. Code, the High Court has to satisfy itself upon three matters, namely, (a) that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise juris diction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, i.e., any breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, i.e., by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial, which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while conceding that his case was not covered by clauses (a) and (b), tried to suggest that the case was covered by clause (c). Learned counsel, however, when asked, what particular provision of law or procedure was violated, merely contended to himself by saying that, in the circumstances of the case, the appointment of the Receiver by the trial Court was the only proper order, when the parties to the case were in dispute about the title to the suit land. The argu ment, in my view, is clearly misconceived, in that in invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, C. P. Code, the petitioner must prove that his case is covered by one of the three contingencies, contemplated in section 115, C. P. Code, in that an erroneous decision of the Court, however gross it might be, per se does not bring the case of the petitioner within the purview of section 115, C. P. Code, and that to invoke the benefit of clause (c), the petitioner must not merely prove that there has been violation of any statutory provision or procedure, but must also further prove that the violation was such as to render the proceedings coram non judice.

10. Judged in the light of the tests, laid down above, the petitioner has signally failed to prove that there has been violation of any statutory provision or procedure, much less that the viola tion had been such, which would render the proceedings coram non judice.

11. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed in limine as unmeritorious. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.