P L D 1989 Peshawar 181 (PLP)

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the entire record pertaining to the matter in issue with their assistance.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset, read out, section 17 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 from the book in his possession and tried to emphasise that the impugned order dated 6‑5‑1987 was passed by the learned Civil Judge Peshawar in his capacity as a Rent Controller, because according to him, the Rent Controller was empowered to execute his own orders as if it were a decree of a civil Court. When he was questioned that the Rent Controllers had no such powers under the original text of the said Ordinance, his reply was that section 17 has since been amended by the Provinces, of Punjab as well as N.‑W.F.P. through amending Ordinances, co‑incidentally both bearing No.IX of 1979. This necessitated the perusal of both the amending Ordinances and since both of them are not to the same effect, it is worthwhile to reproduce both of them, so far as the amendment in section 17 is concerned:‑- PUNJAB URBAN RENT RESTRICTION (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 1979 (ORDINANCE IX OF 1979)

6. Substitution of section 17 of Ordinance VI of 1959.‑‑In the principal Ordinance or section 17 the following shall be substituted, namely:‑ "

17. Every order made under section 10, section 13, section 13‑B and every order passed in appeal under section 15, shall be executed by the Controller as if it were a decree of a civil Court." NORTH‑WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE URBAN RENT RESTRICTION (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 1979 (ORDINANCE IX OF 1979) "

9. Amendment of section 17 of W.P. Ordinance VI of 1959: -- In the said Ordinance, in section 17, after the figure "13" the words and figure "of section 13‑A" shall be inserted.

5. The perusal of the above amendments would make it clear that section 17 of the west Pakistan 'Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance has been totally substituted by the Punjab Amending Ordinance I X of 1979 and according to the substituted provisions, the Rent Controllers of course of that Province, have been invested with powers to execute their orders as if they were decrees of the civil Court. However, the Amending Ordinance IX of 1979 promulgated by N.‑W.F.P. has simply added section 13‑A after the figure 13 in the original text of section 17 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance and the powers of the civil Courts to execute the orders of the Rent Controllers as if it were a decree of civil Court, were not interfered with. The latest editions of the books on rent laws, normally cited in Courts do not contain this distinction, with the result that the Courts, presuming that upto date amendments must have been correctly incorporated in the books, are misled and describe themselves as Rent Controllers,, as in the instant case, while passing any order in the execution proceedings. The correct legal position, therefore, is that in this Province, the Rent Controllers have, so far, not been invested with the powers to execute their own orders as if they were decrees o: civil Courts and that powers still are exercisable by the civil Courts.

6. Consequently, the learned Civil Judge while executing the order of eviction dated 30‑10‑1977, passed by the learned Rent Controller, was acting as a civil Court and was possessed of all the powers available to him under the Civil Procedure Code, as if he was executing the decree of civil Court. The aggrieved persons could file objections before him as executing Court and the petitioner's objections were, therefore, legally entertain-able. Nevertheless, it is well settled that A the Executing Courts cannot go behind the decrees, and in the instant case, behind the order of the Rent Controller. Since the Rent Controllers have limited jurisdiction and their orders are based on the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, irrespective of the ownership of the property, the Executing Courts too, cannot go into the question of ownership while executing the orders of eviction passed by the Rent Controllers. The instant eviction order was passed on the clear admission of tenancy by respondent No.2 and the petitioner has no right to question the legality of the eviction order.

7. The petitioner has admitted that the respondent No.2 was in possession of the suit premises at the time of the institution of the eviction petition, as well as at the time when the eviction order was passed against him on 30‑10‑1977 by the Rent Controller. There is abundant documentary evidence on the file to show that the relationship of landlord and. tenant existed between the respondents Nos.l and 2, since prior to the institution of the eviction petition, and there was no fraud practised upon the Rent Controller at the time of the passing of the order of the eviction. The respondent No.2 has not been produced by the petitioner to depose that the compromise entered into between him and respondent No.l or the rent deed executed by him in favour of respondent No.l were the result of fraud. Additionally the petitioner has not been able to link the house in question with the property allegedly gifted to her by her father‑in‑law respondent No.3. The mere fact that Ali Jan respondent No.3, the donor of the, petitioner, purchased some area out of Khasra No.164, from Abdur Rashid father of respondent No.l and gifted a portion thereof in favour of the petitioner, would not entitle them to lay claim to the built house owned and possessed by respondent No.l and tenanted by respondent No.2. The order of Rent Controller, dated 30‑10‑1977 is not proved to be the result of collusion between respondents Nos.1 and 2 but the collusion appears to be the other way round and the probability is that respondent No.2 after enjoying the possession or the suit house for one year, according to the terms of the compromise, thought of defeating the execution of the order of the Rent Controller by illegally surrendering the possession to Ali Jan respondent No‑3 or through him to .the petitioner, his daughter‑in‑law for ulterior motive. The execution of the legal order of the Rent Controller, R dated 30‑10‑1977 has already been delayed for considerable length of time and there is no justification for ordering de novo trial of the objection petition by the Executing Court, on the mere technical ground that the lower forums have not elaborately discussed the merits of the case. Substantial justice has already been done and the impugned orders do not call for interference.

8. The upshot of the above discussion is that the instant revision petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed, with no order as tot costs. A.A. /732/P Revision dismissed.