P L D 1967 Lahore 75 (PLP)

For the purpose of Court‑fee the plaint, was valued at Rs. 130 treating the suit to be under section 7 (iv) (c), of the Court‑fees Act, 1870, and the same value was fixed for the purpose of jurisdiction. The suit was resisted by the Society on a number of pleas. However, no objection was taken' as to the valuation of the suit either for the purpose of Court‑fee or jurisdiction.

3. The suit was tried by the Senior Civil Judge, Montgomery, who vide his judgment dated the 15th of November 1955; dismissed it with costs. Against this judgment the appellant filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Montgomery, putting the same value on the memorandum of appeal for the purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction as was done in the trial Court. The learned District Judge raised an objection suo motu against the jurisdictional value of the suit and by his order, dated the 3rd of January 1957, directed the plaintiff‑appellant to amend the value of the memorandum of appeal as also the plaint for the purposes of jurisdiction and to fix it at Rs. 86,838‑9‑0 the sum for which the Society's claim was decreed. In , reaching that conclusion that learned District Judge based himself on rules 10 and 11 framed by the High Court with the previous sanction of the Provincial Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. The appellant refused to amend the jurisdiction value of the memorandum of appeal and the plaint in terms of his order, dated the 3rd of January 1957, the learned District Judge rejected both the plaint in the original suit and the memorandum of appeal purporting to be under Order VII, rule 11 (b), Civil procedure code. Hence this appeal.

4. It is not controverted that in a suit properly falling under section 7(iv) (c) of the Court‑fees Act the plaintiff is the sole arbiter to determine the value of the suits for purpose of Court‑fee and has to pay Court‑fee ad valorem on that valuation. Section 7 (iv) (c) refers to a suit to obtain a declaratory decree or order where consequential relief is also claimed. It is not disputed either, that the suit in the instant case was such a suit and, therefore, its value for purposes of Court‑fee at Rs. 130 as fixed by the plaintiff‑appellant cannot be questioned. This at once attracts the application of section 8 of the Suits‑ Valuation Act, 1887, which reads: "Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court Fees Act, 1870; section 7, paragraphs 5, 6 and 9, and paragraph 10, clause (d), Court‑fees are payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of Court‑fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same." A suit falling under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court‑fees Act not among the exceptions set out in the above section, and therefore its value for purpose of Court‑fee and jurisdiction would be same. The first step, therefore, in all such cases is to ascertain the value for purpose of Court‑fee. But as pointed out above in a suit falling under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff himself values the relief sought. In the instant case, the learned District Judge did not question the value of the suit for the purposes of Court‑fee, for obviously the suit fell under, section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. That being so, the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction is then automatically fixed in view of the provisions of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The section on its plain language militates against fixing of one valuation for the purposes of Court‑fee and another for jurisdiction. In Ghulam Haider v. Bashimber Das (P L R 1932 Lah. 458) in a suit for a declaration and consequential relief, the plaintiff valued his suit for the purposes of Court‑fee at Rs. 230, but valued the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 56,

610. It was held that the real value of the suit for purposes of Court‑fee as well as jurisdiction was Its.

230. This proposition is also supported by a Full Bench decision in Mian Karam Elahi v. Muhammad Bashir (P L D 1949 Lah. 8). In that case Munir, A. C. J. who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench observed at page 13. "Now section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides where in certain kinds of suits, including suits referred to in section 7 (iv) (c), Court‑fees are payable ad valorem under the Court‑fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of Court‑fees and the value for purpose of jurisdiction shall be the same." Ghulam Qadir v. Messrs Bulaqui Mall & Sons (P L D 1949 Lah. 461) relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent for the contrary view is distinguishable on facts. All that was held in that case was that in suits for cancellation of decree, the value of which cannot be satisfactorily ascertained under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, different values "can be fixed" in respect of such suits for purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction. In that case, the relief claimed by the plaintiff included a prayer for the cancellation of certain decrees on account of their being obtained by fraud. That judgment cannot be read as laying down an inflexible rule that in cases properly falling under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court‑fees Act, identical value for purposes of Court‑fee and jurisdiction cannot be fixed. Therefore, in my humble opinion, there is nothing in the case of Ghulam Qadir, which may impair the authority of the Full Bench decision in the case of Karam Ilahi. Then it is pertinent to point out that Karam Ilahi's case though reported earlier was decided later than Ghulam Qadir's case. Therefore, even if they are understood as laying down contradictory propositions, then the view taken in Karam Rahi's case will prevail being later in point of time. Consequently in a suit properly. falling under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act to place one value for purposes of Court‑fee and another for purposes of jurisdiction would be a contravention of the express provisions of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act.

5. Rules 10 and 11 of the Rules framed by the High Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act upon which the learned District Judge rested his decision for the material purpose reads as follows:‑ "

10. Suits in which the plaintiff asks for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document securing money or other property having such value,‑ Value.‑(a) For the purpose of the Court Fees Act, 1870, was determined by the Act. (b) For the purposes of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, according to the value of the subject‑matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be‑ (i) If the whole decree is sought to be cancelled, the amount .for which the decree was passed " "

11. The foregoing rules are subject to the following explanation (i) (ii) a suit falling within any of the above descriptions is not excluded therefrom merely by reason of the plaint seeking other relief in addition to that described in any of the foregoing rules. According to its opening words, rule 10 will come into play only if the plaintiff asks for relief of cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value. In the present case, as pointed already, the appellant has not asked for any such relief. He was content to pray for a decree declaring the compromise decree to be a nullity and for the consequential relief of permanently restraining the society to execute the same. Since these two reliefs, if granted, would effectively nullify the effect of the decree against the appellant, he need not have asked for the further relief of cancellation of the decree. Therefore, in my opinion, rule 10 does not in terms apply to the instant case, and a fortiori rule 11 is not attracted either. Therefore it 'was wholly wrong for the learned District Judge to have compelled the appellant to value the plaint and the memorandum of appeal at Rs. 86, 838‑9‑0.

6. There is yet another aspect of the matter which was completely overlooked by the learned District Judge. Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act expressly forbids an objection as to under‑valuation or over‑valuation of a suit or an appeal being entertained except in the manner specified in the section. For the material purpose the section reads: " ..an objection that by reason of the over‑valuation or under‑valuation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower appellate Court which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an appellate Court unless (a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that Court, or (b) the appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was over‑valued or under‑valued, and that the over‑valuation or under‑valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits. The above provision is expressly prohibitory and therefore mandatory. It seems to me to be perfectly clear that the section requires all objections as to improper valuation of a suit to be raised before the settlement of issues and if a defendant omits to raise objection at the proper stage he will not be permitted to raise it subsequently. It is a self‑contained provision complete in itself and no objection as to the value of suit for purposes of jurisdiction can be raised or entertained otherwise than in accordance with it. The section upon its analysis prescribes the following three conditions, namely. (i) That the objection as to jurisdictional value of the suit must be taken before the frame or recording of issues or if the case is such that it would not admit raising of the plea in the trial Court, then it must have been taken in the memorandum of first appeal; (ii) that the appellate Court shall not consider the objection relating to the jurisdiction value of the suit unless it is so raised; and (iii) that the wrong valuation of the suit or the appeal, as the case may, has prejudicially affected the merits of the case. None of the above conditions is satisfied in the present case and therefore it is impossible to maintain the learned District Judge's orders dated the 3rd January 1957, and the 15th January 1957, by which he first purported to require the appellant to amend the jurisdiction value of the suit and the appeal and upon his refusal to do so, rejected his plaint and memorandum of appeal.

7. For the reasons given above, I accept this appeal and society Ltd. hold that the plaint and the memorandum of appeal in the Courts Muhammad below were properly valued for purposes of jurisdiction. I mould, therefore, set aside the order of the lower appellate Court, dated the 15th of January 1957, and the earlier order, dated the 3rd of January 1957, rejecting the plaint and the memorandum of appeal under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C., and remand the case to the learned District Judge, Montgomery, for decision on merits in accordance with law. Costs of this appeal will abide the result of the appeal before the learned District Judge. The parties are hereby directed to appear in that Court on' the 1st June 1966. The appeal shall be decided without avoidable delay. K. M. A. Appeal accepted.